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Abstract 
At present climate and energy policy in the US consists of a patchwork of technology and 
performance standards implemented in different economic sectors and at different levels of 
government, rather than a more efficient economy-wide carbon tax or cap-and-trade policy. This 
is evidenced by policies such as state-level Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs), national 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), and the recently finalized EPA rule for power plants: the Clean 
Power Plan (CPP). These sector-specific policies when implemented jointly can interact with 
each other in ways that are synergistic or competitive and affect the mix of renewable energy, 
fossil fuels and prices in the electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors. The purpose of 
this research is to examine the effect of these overlapping policies on greenhouse gas reduction 
and welfare costs for the electricity, transportation, and agricultural sectors relative to levels that 
would have been achieved by each of these policies individually. Joint implementation of the 
RFS and the RPSs can increase the cost of bio-electricity and biofuels by competing for biomass 
and shift the mix and spatial pattern of production of renewable fuels used for compliance; on the 
other hand, renewable electricity generated as a co-product of the cellulosic ethanol refining 
process could lower the cost of complying with the RPSs but not add significantly to the 
greenhouse gas reductions achieved by the RPS. Similarly, implementing the CPP and the RPSs 
together could result in more renewable and low carbon electricity and greenhouse gas reduction 
than with either policy alone but at higher welfare costs than with either policy alone or with a 
cross-sector carbon tax. This research seeks to disentangle the complex and multi-sectoral 
spillover effects of these policies by developing an integrated, dynamic, open economy model of 
the US electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors. It contributes to the literature that has 
focused on analyzing these policies in isolation and using single sector models.   
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In the first paper I quantify the effects of concurrent implementation of the RFS and 
RPSs on the spatial pattern of biomass prices and production, the level and price of bio-
electricity, and carbon intensity of electricity over the 2007-2030 time period. I find that spatial 
pattern of bio-electricity is changed by implementation of the RFS, where it is used less 
intensively in RPS states and no longer used is some non-RPS states, though the carbon intensity 
of biomass feedstock is decreased. In the second paper I examine the welfare and greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission effects of the state level RPSs and the RFS both individually and when 
implemented jointly, in order to quantify the policy interactions and spillovers. I also compare 
the effects of the jointly implemented RFS and RPS to an economy-wide carbon tax that 
achieves equivalent GHG emissions reductions to measure the welfare cost. I find that the RFS 
& RPSs jointly implemented cause spillovers that increase welfare cost of the two policies by $7 
billion relative to the sum of what each attains independently; and that their welfare cost relative 
to a GHG-equivalent carbon tax is $109 billion. I also find that a national RPS could achieve an 
equivalent share of renewables to the state-level RPSs at a $62 billion lower welfare cost for the 
electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors combined. In the third paper I shift focus to the 
CPP in order to consider how the welfare cost and its distribution changes based on whether the 
state-level targets are implemented as rate-based or mass-based standards and how they compare 
to a hypothetical national emissions cap that achieves equivalent emissions reductions. I find that 
a mass-based CPP is a more efficient in achieving GHG reductions than a rate-based CPP, but 
also leads to larger electricity price increases. A national electricity sector emission cap with 
permit trading, which would achieve the same economic outcome as a carbon tax, could achieve 
equivalent GHG reductions at $57 billion or $36 billion lower cost than the state-level rate-based 
or mass-based standards, respectively. The state-level RPSs are not obviated by the 
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implementation of either a rate-based or mass-based CPP as they still lead to greater levels of 
electricity generation from renewable sources and lower cumulative GHG emissions. The RPSs, 
which also lead to a lower average consumer electricity price, reduce the magnitude of the 
electricity price increase found from the CPP. These results suggest that implementing energy 
policy with a sector-specific or region-specific approach can results in significantly higher 
welfare cost and reduced effectiveness of policies that should be considered in decision making. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Current energy and climate policy in the US has taken the approach of focusing on 
sector-specific and region-specific policies that consist of both technology and performance 
standards. This is evidenced by sector-specific policies such as the national Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS), which mandates production of biofuels, the state-level Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPSs), that require a minimum share of electricity be generated from renewable 
sources, and just recently the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issue the final rules for 
the Clean Power Plan (CPP) which caps state-level power plant emissions rates. These policies 
are applied to the most carbon-intensive sectors of the US economy: the transportation sector 
which contributes 28% of total US greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and is regulated by the RFS 
and the electricity sector which contributes 33% to total US GHG emissions and is regulated by 
the RPSs and the CPP. This is occurring at a time when the levels of GHG in our atmosphere 
have reached levels not seen in a million years, with projections that future GHG emissions rates 
could lead to an increase in average global temperatures by 3 to 6 degrees Celsius by the end of 
the century (Gillis 2013; OECD 2012).  
 The RFS is an ambitious policy authorized by the Energy Independence and Security Act 
(EISA) of 2007, which is a volumetric mandate requiring at least 36 billion gallons of a specified 
mixture of first- and second-generation biofuels by 2030. A RPS is generally a share or mixture 
mandate that requires a legally specified minimum percentage of electricity generation that must 
be derived from renewable energy sources. RPSs have been imposed by individual US states 
independent of the federal government; currently they have been imposed by twenty nine states 
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at varying levels of stringency and differing implementation schedules. The CPP is a finalized 
rule issued by the EPA in 2015 under authority granted by the Clean Air Act. It specifies state 
level rate-based emission mandates, where the quantity of CO2 emissions per unit of electricity 
generation must be no greater than the target set. The EPA bases the state-level targets on the 
extent to which it has determined reductions can be attained from: improving the efficiency of 
coal-based power plants, switching from coal based energy to natural gas based energy, 
increasing the share of renewables and nuclear, and energy efficiency improvements. The 
commonality of these policies is through the bioenergy sector which will provide feedstock for 
biofuels necessary to meet the RFS and provide feedstock to generate bio-electricity to either 
achieve the goals of the RPSs or aid in reducing the emission rates to levels required by the CPP. 
While these are the policies currently preferred by policy makers, in theory they are 
likely to be less economically efficient at achieving the goal of GHG emissions reduction than a 
Pigouvian tax on carbon emissions or an emissions cap-and-trade policy. This reasoning 
however can be complicated when there exists learning externalities in alternative energy (low-
carbon) technologies or when the policy has effects on internationally traded goods (i.e. “terms-
of-trade” effects) (Fischer and Newell 2008; Chen et al. 2014). Additionally, policy makers’ goal 
may not only be GHG reductions but also energy security, or development of “green” industry 
and jobs. It is therefore important to quantify the extent to which these sector-specific policies 
deviate from first-best policies such as an economy-wide carbon tax in terms of welfare, but also 
variables such as renewable energy development. Additionally, the regional constraints on these 
policies, being imposed at the state-level by the RPSs and the CPP, may also lead to less efficient 
outcomes than national policies, by preventing the lowest cost changes in the energy mix and 
consumption. 
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The concurrent implementation of these sector-specific policies in the electricity and 
transportation sectors raises critical research questions about their potential interaction and 
spillover effects and joint effects on policy outcomes. The RFS and RPS generate competing 
demands for bioenergy derived from the agricultural and forestry sectors with implications for 
the extent to which biomass is used to for production of biofuels and bio-electricity and has 
implications for the mix of renewable fuels used for compliance with the two policies and their 
GHG outcomes. Given the RPSs are regionally heterogeneous in their stringency the spatial 
pattern of demand for biomass is not expected to be uniform, which has implications for land-use 
allocation and crop prices. The RFS and RPSs could be antagonistic in their effects on welfare 
cost and GHG reductions by increasing the price of biomass feedstock and reducing co-firing of 
biomass feedstock at coal-based power plants or by inducing the generation of electricity as a co-
product of the cellulosic ethanol refining process. Thus, are the savings in GHG emissions 
achieved by these policies jointly larger or smaller than those that could be achieved by each 
policy individually? What is the welfare cost of these policies when implemented alone versus 
jointly? What is the level of an economy-wide carbon tax that could achieve equivalent 
cumulative GHG reductions to the RFS and RPSs and what is its effect on economic surplus and 
other economic variables? Taking these measures of changes in GHG emissions and welfare 
cost, what is the cost-effectiveness of policies and portfolios and how do they compare to each 
other? The CPP is specified as a state-level rate-based standard, but may be implemented as a 
mass-based standard (emission cap) by states. It is therefore of interest the extent to which these 
standards differ in terms of their effect on the energy mix, welfare cost, and its distribution. 
Could the GHG emission reductions goals of the CPP be achieved at a lower welfare cost with a 
hypothetical national emission standard? What is the level of carbon tax that would need to be 
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levied on the electricity sector to achieve the goals of the CPP? Given that the RPSs will 
continue to be implemented as the CPP is being imposed, to what extent do these change the 
GHG emission reductions, renewable energy development, and welfare cost found under the 
CPP alone? 
There has been some previous work examining these different research questions. The 
RFS has been the subject of much research (see review in Chen et al. 2014), with much of it 
focusing on the corn ethanol mandate, though recent analysis has also incorporated second 
generation (cellulosic) biofuels (Beach, Zhang and Mccarl 2012; Chen et al. 2014; Chen and 
Khanna 2013). Much of the focus of economic research on the RPSs has been on examining a 
hypothetical national RPS, rather than the twenty nine state-level RPSs currently being 
implemented; this analysis is done using various partial-equilibrium and energy system models 
(Palmer and Burtraw 2005; Kydes 2007; Bird et al. 2011). Some of the effects of electricity 
sector policy on biomass production in the agricultural and forestry sectors have been considered 
with forest sector models (Abt, Abt and Galik 2012; Ince et al. 2011), and forest and agricultural 
sector models (McCarl et al. 2000; White et al. 2013; Latta et al. 2013), but these have held the 
demand for bio-electricity as endogenous and not examined spillovers from the RFS. 
Implications for the RFS from bio-electricity have been considered by Dumortier (2013), but the 
analysis also held electricity demand is exogenous. The CPP being a recent policy, there is 
relatively little economic literature on it, though there has been recent work on considering the 
preference for rate-based or mass-based (emission caps) standards in the Western US (Bushnell 
et al. 2014; Fowlie et al. 2014).  
In this dissertation I make contributions to this previous literature by answering the 
research questions discussed. This is done by developing an integrated model of the US 
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electricity, transportation, agricultural sectors that can simulate multiple sector specific policies 
simultaneously. I quantify the effects of the current state-level RPSs in terms of welfare cost and 
GHG emission then compare them directly to a hypothetical national RPS, which achieves the 
same share of renewable generation. I consider the economic effects of imposing both the RFS 
and RPSs jointly, while allowing for mix of fuels for the generation of renewable electricity and 
feedstocks for bio-electricity to be determined endogenously. Within the context of the RFS and 
RPS I consider the extent to which co-firing of biomass and coal, as well as other forms of bio-
electricity is undertaken and how it is spatially allocated. I quantify the effects on the energy 
mix, GHG emission, and welfare cost of imposing the state-level emission rate standards 
imposed by the EPA under the CPP and compare them to an emission equivalent state-level 
mass-based standard and a national emissions cap with trading of credits. I also consider the case 
where the state-level RPSs are implemented along with the CPP to quantify the effects on 
variables of interest. 
I undertake this research by developing an integrated model of the US agricultural, 
electricity, and transportation sectors called BEPAM-E. Extending work done by Chen et al. 
(2014), which analyzes the RFS, this model incorporates a model of the US electricity sector, 
which interacts with agricultural and transportation sectors through bioenergy markets. This 
integrated model allows for the simultaneous determination of the prices and quantities for the 
energy, transportation, and agricultural goods considered in the model comprising an economy-
wide partial-equilibrium. This model considers bioenergy and the pathways through which it can 
be used for bio-electricity or biofuel. Changes in the demand of bioenergy can change the 
quantities of other crops and thus cause land-use changes, thus the model derives an endogenous 
regional supply of bioenergy depending on the different policies in place. The results of the 
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model also allow for calculation of the welfare effects of these policies across economic sectors, 
producers, consumers, and net government revenues. A careful accounting of GHG emissions 
from all three sectors is also an output of the model. Taking the model results together 
assessments can be made on the differing welfare costs, GHG emissions reductions, and cost-
effectiveness of different policies and portfolios of policies. 
In the first paper of this dissertation (Chapter 2) I describe the development of the 
BEPAM-E, the dynamic, multi-market, partial-equilibrium model of the US electricity sector and 
how it is integrated with agricultural and transportation sector model. In this chapter I use this 
model to answer the research questions regarding: the level of spatial pattern of bio-electricity 
induced by the state-level RPS, then examine how it changes with implementation of the RFS. 
Additionally, I quantify the changes in the carbon-intensity of the bioenergy industry with 
concurrent implementation of the RFS and RPSs. 
In the second paper of this dissertation (Chapter 3) I extend the development of this 
model to allow for the calculation of the welfare measures of producer surplus, consumers 
surplus, and net government revenues in the electricity sector while also accounting for the 
lifecycle GHG emissions derived from power plants. Using this framework I am able to quantify 
the effect of implementing the RPS alone and jointly with the RFS on economic surplus and 
GHG emissions, which then allows for quantification of the spillover effects of the policies. I 
then solve for an economy-wide carbon tax that achieves equivalent domestic GHG reductions to 
the combined RFS and RPSs in order to determine the welfare cost of the sector-specific 
policies. 
In the third paper of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 4, I further modify BEPAM-E 
in order to evaluate the CPP. I do this by adding in detailed power plant level CO2 emission 
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input rates and policy constraint that limit them. Within this framework I evaluate alternative 
versions of the CPP and also evaluate the effect of stacking it with the preexisting RPSs. I first 
simulate the CPP as a state-level rate-based policy as specified by the EPA, then compare it in 
terms of economic outcomes to a GHG-equivalent state-level mass-based standard and a national 
emission cap. Finally, rate-based and mass-based CPP are analyzed when they are stack with the 
state-level RPSs as evaluated in Chapter 3. 
The overall goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the economic 
and GHG effects of sector and region specific energy and climate policies and to compare them 
to those of a cross-sector carbon tax policy. The policies considered by this dissertation are the 
RFS, the RPSs, and the CPP. By analyzing the independent effects of these policies and the 
spillovers when implemented together in terms of energy mix, biomass production, GHG 
emission, and welfare cost this research contributes to the overall literature on effectiveness of 
energy policy with a focus on bioenergy.  
To highlight some of the results of this research I find that the RFS & RPSs jointly 
implemented cause spillovers that increase welfare cost of the two policies by $7 billion relative 
to the sum of what each attains independently; and that their welfare cost relative to a GHG-
equivalent carbon tax is $109 billion. I also find that a national RPS could achieve an equivalent 
share of renewables to the state-level RPSs at a $62 billion lower welfare cost for the electricity, 
transportation and agricultural sectors combined. In the third paper I shift focus to the CPP in 
order to consider how the welfare cost and its distribution changes based on whether the state-
level targets are implemented as rate-based or mass-based standards and how they compare to a 
hypothetical national emissions cap that achieves equivalent emissions reductions. I find that a 
mass-based CPP is a more efficient in achieving GHG reductions than a rate-based CPP, but also 
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leads to larger electricity price increases. A national electricity sector emission cap with permit 
trading, which would achieve the same economic outcome as a carbon tax, could achieve 
equivalent GHG reductions at $57 billion or $36 billion lower cost than the state-level rate-based 
or mass-based standards, respectively. The state-level RPSs are not obviated by the 
implementation of either a rate-based or mass-based CPP as they still lead to greater levels of 
electricity generation from renewable sources and lower cumulative GHG emissions. The RPSs, 
which also lead to a lower average consumer electricity price, reduce the magnitude of the 
electricity price increase found from the CPP.  
This research suggest directions for future research that could prove fruitful. Moving 
forward from the analysis of the CPP, it is of interest not only the welfare cost of different types 
of standards, but what types of standard a state will choose to implement, this will be dependent 
on choices of other states, this suggest an interesting assessment of this using a game theory 
framework. I think there is also promise in taking a more in-depth look at how future vehicle 
technology and related transportation policy has cross-sectoral spillovers with the electricity 
sector in terms of GHG emissions and welfare cost, particularly with recent attention to battery-
electric vehicles. 
The papers in this dissertation build on work done on the previous papers, beginning 
from development of an integrated electricity, agricultural, and transportation sector model and 
examination of the total and spatial effects on bioenergy markets; moving on to the calculation of 
the welfare and GHG effects of these policies; to finally imposing the constraints of the CPP on 
the electricity sector with and without the RPS to quantify the effects. A detail description of this 
work and its results and conclusions follow from here. 
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Chapter 2  
Spillover Effects of Sector-Specific Renewable Energy Policies: 
Implications for Bioenergy and GHG Emissions 
 
2.1 Abstract 
Bio-electricity has the potential to reduce GHG emissions by displacing carbon intensive 
coal-based electricity. The extent to which state-level Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) 
provide incentives for bio-electricity generation and its implications for GHG mitigation will 
depend on the competitiveness and GHG intensity of bio-electricity relative to other renewable 
sources and whether it predominantly displaces coal or natural gas-based electricity generation. 
Implementation of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) will significantly increase demand for 
biomass and its price, thereby adversely affecting the competitiveness of bio-electricity in 
meeting the RPSs with the potential for leakage effects on GHG emissions. I quantify this 
indirect effect of the RFS on GHG emissions by developing a spatially explicit, dynamic, 
integrated model of the agricultural, electricity, and transportation sectors in the US to examine 
the mix of renewable electricity under the RPS, the extent to which it will be affected by the RFS 
and its consequences for GHG emissions. I find that the share of bio-electricity in total 
renewable generation is 20% under the RPS; 79% of this is from biomass co-fired with coal in 
existing coal-based electricity plants. The joint implementation of the RFS and RPS raises the 
price of biomass by 40% and affects the mix of biomass feedstock and type of bio-electricity 
produced from being predominantly co-fired generation under the RPS to include a dominant 
share of co-product electricity generated in cellulosic bio-refineries under the RPS and the RFS; 
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as a result, bioelectricity principally displaces coal under the RPS but natural gas under the RPS 
and RFS policies and leads to 7% lower GHG savings from the electricity sector than under the 
RPS alone. Our analysis shows the importance of considering market-mediated effects in 
evaluating the GHG benefits of renewable energy policies. 
2.2 Introduction 
Growing interest in renewable energy for the electricity and the transportation sectors has 
led to state-level Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) and the federal Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS) that mandate a share of demand being met by renewable energy sources. 
Twenty-nine states have implemented RPSs that range from 10%-40% of electricity being 
produced using renewable sources by 2030 (DSIRE 2011). Commercial production of cellulosic 
biofuel is just emerging and is expected to grow to 16 billion gallons by 2030 (EIA 2012). These 
policies have the potential to interact with each other in complex ways by affecting the mix of 
renewable energy used to meet the RPS and the mix of fossil fuels displaced as both policies  
compete for bioenergy for electricity generation and biofuel production (EIA 2010a).  
Joint implementation of the RFS with the state RPSs can raise the cost of bio-electricity 
and displace demand for negative-carbon bioenergy co-fired with coal by zero-carbon wind 
energy. Additionally, it can affect the extent to which renewable energy displaces carbon-
intensive coal instead of the relatively less carbon intensive natural gas and gasoline. Bio-
electricity can be generated through the co-firing of coal and biomass in a coal based power plant 
(Qin et al. 2006), as well as in new dedicated biomass power plants (bio-power plant) and as a 
co-product of cellulosic biofuel production (Humbird et al. 2011). It can also affect the mix of 
feedstocks produced to meet the demand for biomass for electricity and biofuels; these 
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feedstocks differ in their GHG intensity and thus affect the GHG savings achieved by different 
policy combinations.  
Demand for bioelectricity to meet the RPS will be location specific because it will 
depend on the costs of producing it, availability relative to other renewable source such as wind 
energy, and the stringency of the state-specific RPSs. These costs will also depend on other 
demands for biomass in response to other renewable energy policies such as the RFS. Unlike the 
state RPSs which can be met by a variety of renewable sources, the cellulosic biofuel component 
of the federally mandated RFS can only be met using biomass. Additionally, since the RFS is a 
federal mandate, it is likely to induce biofuel production in locations with the lowest cost of 
biomass and could displace use of biomass for bio-electricity by raising the price of biomass. 
The implementation of the RFS will therefore not only affect the competitiveness of bioenergy 
relative to wind energy for electricity generation but also the locations where bio-electricity is 
produced. The production of cellulosic biofuels under the RFS could also affect the mix of 
bioelectricity produced by increasing production of electricity as a co-product of biofuel 
production. The indirect effects that the RFS imposes on the mix electricity generation will have 
implications for the mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions achieved by these policies, 
due to the differences in carbon-intensities of both the fossil-fuel sources offset and the 
renewable sources induced. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the mix of renewable electricity generated, the 
types of bio-electricity and feedstocks likely to be produced, and the spatial variability in these 
across different regions in the US under the state RPSs implemented independently and jointly 
with the RFS. I also examine the implications of implementing these policies independently and 
jointly for the mix of fossil fuels displaced and for the GHG emissions from the transportation 
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and electricity sectors. I undertake this analysis by developing a dynamic, price-endogenous, 
open economy model of the electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors in the US. This 
model extends the Biofuel and Environmental Policy Analysis Model (BEPAM) used previously 
to analyze the effects of biofuel policies on the transportation sector (Chen et al., 2014; Huang et 
al., 2012) by including the US electricity sector and related fossil fuel sectors (coal and natural 
gas) that provide inputs to the electricity sector. The extended BEPAM with the electricity sector 
(BEPAM-E) incorporates the existing fossil and renewable electricity generating capacity in the 
US as well as the potential for endogenous expansion in natural gas, wind, and bio-electricity 
generation.  
I consider the potential to produce bio-electricity from a variety of different feedstocks, 
crop residues, and dedicated energy crops like miscanthus and switchgrass as well as forest 
biomass. Energy crops have the potential to be negative-carbon sources of bioenergy due to their 
substantial potential to sequester carbon in the soil (Dwivedi et al. 2015; Khanna et al. 2011). I 
incorporate heterogeneity in the costs and economic viability of these feedstocks and other uses 
of the land at a fine spatial resolution of a Crop Reporting District (CRD) with 306 CRDs across 
the US. Allocation of land across various conventional crops and energy crops is determined 
endogenously based on demand, land availability and suitability, location of coal-based power 
plants and costs of transporting biomass for co-firing to existing power plants. I apply the 
BEPAM-E model to endogenously determine the share of bioelectricity, the mix of feedstocks 
and the price of biomass under the RPSs and RFS implemented in isolation and jointly over the 
2007-2030 time period.  
Several studies have compared the cost-effectiveness of individual renewable energy 
policies relative to a carbon pricing policy (Palmer and Burtraw, 2005; Fisher and Newell, 2008).  
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Palmer and Burtraw (2005) analyze the implications of a hypothetical federal RPS for the price 
of electricity assuming an exogenously given supply curve of biomass; they do not endogenously 
determine the mix of biomass feedstocks, location of production, or the implications of 
implementing the RFS for the shares of conventional and bio-electricity generation.  
Other studies have examined the effects of overlapping federal policies such as a cap and  
trade policy and state RPSs (Paltsev et al. 2009; Fischer and Preonas 2010). A few studies have 
examined the potential for co-firing to contribute to renewable energy policy goals nationally 
(McCarl et al. 2000), and in particular states, such as Illinois (Khanna, Dhungana and Clifton-
Brown 2008; LaTourrette et al. 2011) and Indiana (Brechbill, Tyner and Ileleji 2011). Abt et al. 
(2012) examine the availability of forest biomass for bio-electricity in the Southeast. A few 
studies have examined the mix of forest and agricultural biomass to meet the RPS (Ince et al. 
2011; White et al. 2013; Latta et al. 2013). Dumortier (2013) examines the availability of 
biomass for cellulosic biofuels assuming a binding constraint on demand for co-firing imposed 
by existing coal-based electricity plants at an exogenously set biomass price. In contrast, our 
analysis allows for simultaneous determination of the demand and supply of biomass, 
endogenously determining the regional prices that clear the markets with both the RPSs and 
RFS.  
This paper extends the studies above by examining the interaction effects between 
overlapping renewable energy policies, the state RPSs and the RFS, in two different sectors the 
electricity and the transportation sectors). It also examines the effect of implementing the RFS on 
the price of biomass, the share of bio-electricity to meet the RPS and on GHG emissions.  There 
is a large literature examining the potential market-mediated effects of the RFS on food and fuel 
prices which lead to indirect land use change and a rebound effect on fuel consumption in the 
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rest of the world that can offset a part of the emissions savings achieved by displacing fossil 
fuels by biofuels (Khanna and Crago 2012; Chen and Khanna 2012). This paper extends that 
research by analyzing the potential for another market mediated effect of the RFS as it increases 
demand for biomass and diverts it from displacing coal-based electricity generation to displacing 
other less carbon intensive fossil fuels.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.3 I description of the model (BEPAM-E) 
with emphasis on the electricity sector extensions developed here. In Section 2.4 I describe the 
data and parameters used in the numerical simulation. In Section 2.5 I present the results of the 
model with a focus on conventional and renewable electricity generation, biomass feedstock 
production quantities and locations, and bio-electricity prices, from the considered policies. 
Lastly in Section 2.6, I conclude the paper with a discussion of the implications of my findings. 
2.3 Model 
I develop an integrated, dynamic, price-endogenous, electricity sector model that is 
incorporated with BEPAM to simulate production and consumption decisions in the agricultural, 
electricity, and transportation sectors in response to various policy constraints. The BEPAM-E 
maximizes the discounted sum of consumer and producer surplus in the three sectors, subject to 
various technological, material balance and policy constraints. In the agricultural sector, land 
allocation and crop production decisions are made at a Crop Reporting District (CRD) level. The 
model considers the 306 CRDs in the 48 contiguous US states as spatial decision units and 
incorporates the heterogeneity in crop, livestock, and forest residue production across 295 of 
these CRDs, while the other CRDs only include forest biomass from residues and pulpwood.  
I consider electricity generated from three types of fossil-fuel based power plants using 
coal, natural gas or oil, and from six types of plants using other energy sources. These include 
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wind, biomass, geothermal, solar, municipal waste, and nuclear. Electricity can be generated 
from biomass by co-firing biomass with coal at an existing coal-based electricity plant, 
combusting biomass in a dedicated bio-electricity plant and as a co-product of the cellulosic 
ethanol refining process. The solution to this model endogenously determines the amount of 
electricity generation, fossil fuel use in the electricity sector (coal, natural gas, and oil), 
renewable generation capacity expansion in the electricity sector (wind and biomass), and coal 
power plants’ decisions to co-fire biomass, in addition to regional crop production, land-use, 
biofuel production, liquid fuel consumption for transportation and VKT. Capacity expansion for 
nuclear, geothermal, and solar energy is fixed exogenously based on Annual Energy Outlook 
2010 projections but utilization is determined endogenously based on cost, availability and 
policy targets (EIA 2010a). 
A dynamic model is used in order to account for investments that yield returns over 
multiple years, such as those in perennial bioenergy crops and power plant capacity while 
incorporating technological change due to learning by doing. Instead of assuming that decision 
makers have perfect foresight about the future, I use a rolling horizon approach in which decision 
makers are assumed to make resource allocation plans for the next 10 years taking current prices, 
demand conditions, land availability in different categories and costs of technology as given and 
then to update their expectations about these variables every year. This is achieved by solving the 
model iteratively; after solving each 10-year market equilibrium problem I take the first year 
solution values as ‘realized’, move the horizon one year forward and solve the updated model 
again. The full mathematical model is stated and described in Appendix A1.  
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2.3.1 Electricity Sector 
 The electricity sector is represented by twenty electricity marketing regions (EMR) each 
with its own demand for electricity and potential to trade across geographically adjacent regions 
subject to constraints on transmission capacity (Table 2.1). The annual demand for electricity is 
met by existing infrastructure of electricity generation capacity as well as expansion of 
generation capacity using natural gas, wind, or biomass sources. Fuel inputs for electricity 
generation are provided by fossil fuel markets for coal, natural gas, and fuel oil and by the 
agricultural and forest sectors for biomass feedstocks.  
I represent end-use consumer demand for electricity with linear demand curves for each 
of the EMRs. These demand curves are aggregations of state-level, sector specific (residential, 
commercial, and industrial) demand curves contained within these regions. I calibrate the state-
level, sector specific demand functions using observed data on annual average electricity price 
for each sector and the annual amount of generation by the sector for each region in 2007-2011 
(Table B.1) and assuming a price elasticity of demand of -0.25 (Dubin and McFadden 1984; EIA 
2011b) based on studies reviewed in Table B.2; I examine the sensitivity of our results to a 
higher value. Electricity from all sources and regions is considered to be functionally 
substitutable. Electricity demand is assumed to increase at an exogenous rate of 0.7% (AEO, 
2010) and shift the demand curve for electricity to the right over time.  
I now describe my approach and data for modeling existing power plants and new power 
plant capacity expansion (see Table B.4). I model all existing power plant capacity by fuel type 
at the CRD level. Electricity generated from power plants using fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, or 
oil) is a function of the quantity of fuel input and the plant conversion efficiency; it is 
constrained to be no greater than the nameplate plant capacity times the capacity factor. The 
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plant conversion efficiency measured by the amount of electricity in mega-watt hours (MWh) 
per mega-joule (MJ) of fuel input, the nameplate capacity (total capacity available) of the power 
plant, and the capacity factor (the percentage of nameplate capacity utilized annually) are all 
obtained from the EPA’s eGRID database (2010a). Generation from plants using other energy 
sources (existing wind, hydroelectric, geothermal, solar, municipal waste, and nuclear) is 
constrained to be no greater than the nameplate capacity. All existing power plants have an 
operation and maintenance (O&M) cost per MWh, fossil fuel-based power plants also incur an 
endogenous fuel cost per MWh. I assume that existing power plant capacity will retire at 
historically observed rates. 
I allow for new power plant capacity to be built during the time horizon of the model. 
Power plant capacity expansion is determined endogenously for natural gas, co-firing, co-
product, dedicated biomass power, and wind electricity generating plants, assuming a given 
capacity factor and heat rate. Electricity generated from these new sources (excluding co-firing) 
incurs a levelized cost that represents the fixed and variable O&M costs, transmission 
infrastructure costs, and annualized capital cost, per MWh (Table B.5). I assume that coal power 
plant capacity will not expand due to EPA’s New Sources Performance Standard, which 
effectively prevents future coal capacity expansion (Kotchen and Mansur 2012).  
I model the expansion of electric power generated from wind using upward sloping 
supply functions for wind generation by EMR following Paul et al. (2009). These functions 
represent the marginal cost of generation from new wind turbine capacity for various amounts of 
electricity generated from wind. A constraint is placed on electricity generated from new wind 
turbines by requiring that new capacity always be fully utilized in future periods. Data for 
generating these supply curves and projections for wind capacity in the future at multiples of the 
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base price were obtained from the EIA and are based on the results of the NEMS model, used by 
the AEO (Table B.5).  
Bio-electricity generation can be expanded along three pathways: co-firing at a coal power 
plant, fired at a new dedicated biomass power plant, and as a co-product of cellulosic ethanol 
refining. Co-fired biomass is assumed to be converted using the same heat rate as the particular 
coal power plant, while generation from bio-power and co-product sources is based on an 
assumed heat rate from the literature (Qin et al. 2006; Humbird et al. 2011). The heat rate 
determines the amount of feedstock required to generate an MWh of electricity and thus affects 
the relative price of bio-electricity, I examine the sensitivity of results to these assumptions. I 
assume a 10% limit on the mixture of biomass to coal, but also examine a more relaxed co-firing 
limit of 20% which falls within the range examined in other studies (Qin et al. 2006; Dumortier 
2013). In order for bio-electricity to be generated, biomass feedstock must be transported from 
where it is produced to a power plant to be burned. I allow for the endogenous determination of 
the transportation of biomass feedstock from any CRD where it is produced to any other CRD to 
be co-fired (see Appendix A & B for further details). 
The endogenous price of generation from co-firing is a function of the delivered price of 
biomass feedstock, the conversion efficiency of the coal power plant, processing costs, and the 
capacity conversion cost. The endogenous price of generation from a dedicated bio-power plant 
similarly is a function of the delivered price of biomass feedstock, the heat rate of the bio-power 
plant, the processing cost, and the levelized cost.1 
Electricity generated at a power plant must be transmitted to end-use consumers through 
transmission infrastructure. All electricity generation incurs a transmission cost and percentage 
                                                 
1 The levelized cost is net of fuel cost and bio-power generation is assumed to take place in the CRD in which the 
feedstock is produced (for further details see Oliver and Khanna 2015). 
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loss before it is delivered. The model also allows for electricity generated in a given electricity 
market region (EMR) to be transmitted to an adjacent market region to meet demand in that 
region subject to a transmission capacity constraint. This inter-regional transmission is subject to 
transmission capacity constraints based on historically observed levels (EIA 2011a). Inter-
regional transmission constraints are used to represent real world constraints on electricity 
transmission due to limited transmission capacity as well as transmission and distribution loss. 
These transmission constraints also allow for the model to endogenously determine regional 
electricity prices instead of one national price, without which generation from anywhere in the 
country could flow to anywhere else in the country, equalizing prices across all regions.  
Electricity market price formation is an endogenous feature of BEPAM-E. The solution 
to the model produces an implicit merit cost ordering of generation from existing and new power 
plants, where lower marginal cost generation is utilized before higher marginal cost generation. 
The transmission and distribution cost and energy loss that must be incurred to reach end-use 
consumers, is factored into a generator’s production decision, thus influencing the equilibrium 
price and generation level. Regional electricity prices are a result of the price-endogenous model 
and comprise a spatial equilibrium, where each region either has an excess supply or demand 
relationship with each adjacent region, these supply and demand relationships are all solved 
simultaneously, thereby endogenously determining regional electricity prices, interregional 
transmission, and the marginal unit of generation. The model assumes one time block, annual 
capacity utilization (capacity factor) of existing power plants is capped at 2007 observed levels 
and new capacity is assumed to be utilized at levels assessed by the AEO (EIA 2010a). 
The natural gas supply function is a linear upward sloping function representing the 
national supply of natural gas for all sectors. It represents the national wellhead price at which a 
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given annual quantity of natural gas will be provided to the market. The supply function is 
calibrated annually for the year 2007 with the observed national average wellhead price and 
production. The increased availability of natural gas due to shale gas production is captured by 
shifting the natural gas supply curve according to the observed price for production 2011, where 
the price has decreased by 63% from 2007 (Table B.8). The supply curve is shifted annually in 
subsequent years according to projections by the AEO (Table B.3). The natural gas supply 
elasticity is based on a number of studies described in Table B.2 and assumed to be 0.48. Natural 
gas used for power generation incurs a regional transportation and distribution cost. Therefore 
the regional delivered natural gas price for the electricity sector is a function of the endogenously 
determined national wellhead price plus the regional transportation and distribution cost. The 
demand for natural gas across sectors other than electricity is assumed to be exogenous. The 
supply of coal and fuel oil for electricity generation is assumed to be perfectly elastic at state-
specific fixed prices; these prices are exogenously set annually, from observed data for 2007-
2011 and from EIA growth rate projections for the following years (EIA 2012).  
The model allows for learning-by-doing in the electricity sector for new wind and 
dedicated biomass capacity using an experience curve approach. The experience curve approach 
assumes that the industrial cost of electricity generation will decrease over time as cumulative 
production increases. It is modeled using the equation 𝑌 = 𝑎𝑋𝑏, where Y is the per-unit cost of 
production, X is the cumulative production, a is the initial per-unit cost of production and b is the 
learning rate (de Wit et al. 2010). The quantity of wind or dedicated biomass based generation is 
used to update the cost of generation from these sources at each iteration of the model. The 
parameters for defining these experience curves are provided in Table B.6. 
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2.3.2 Transportation Sector 
BEPAM–E includes linear demand curves for VKT with four types of vehicles, including 
conventional gasoline, flex fuel, gasoline-hybrid, and diesel vehicles. The VKT production 
function considers the energy content of alternative fuels, fuel economy of each type of vehicle 
and the forthcoming Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards, and technological limits on 
blending gasoline and ethanol for each of these four types of vehicles, as specified by Energy 
Information Administration (2010a). Demand curves are exogenously shifted for VKT with each 
type of vehicles over time as projected by the Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2010a) to capture the 
growth in demand due to changes in vehicle fleet, income and population.  
Linear supply curves for domestic gasoline and diesel as well as for gasoline supply and 
demand in the ROW are included. Exports of gasoline from the ROW to the US are determined 
by the difference between gasoline demand and supply in the ROW; diesel is assumed to be 
produced domestically. 
The biofuel sector includes several first- and second- generation biofuels. First-
generation biofuels include domestically produced corn ethanol and imported sugarcane ethanol, 
soybean biodiesel, DDGS-derived corn oil and waste grease. Second-generation biofuels 
included here are cellulosic ethanol and biomass-to-liquid diesel produced using the Fischer-
Tropsch process. The potential for learning by doing to lower technology cost for cellulosic 
ethanol refining is allowed here as well. A detailed discussion of the modeling assumptions and 
data used to parameterize the transportation sector can be found in Chen et al. (2014).  
2.3.3 Agricultural Sector 
The agricultural sector is characterized by linear demand functions for the crop and 
livestock products produced at the national level. Crops are either consumed domestically, traded 
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with the rest of the world, fed to livestock (processed or directly), or used for biofuel production 
(energy crops). Import supplies and export demands are modeled with linear demand and supply 
functions, respectively. The crop and livestock sectors interact through land-use competition and 
the use of agricultural products for livestock feed. Agricultural product demand is exogenously 
shifted at an exogenous rate. 
The agricultural sector includes fifteen conventional crops, eight livestock products, two 
bioenergy crops, crop residues from the production of corn and wheat, forest residues, various 
processed commodities, and co-products from the production of corn ethanol and soybean oil. In 
the crop and livestock markets, primary crop and livestock commodities are consumed either 
domestically or traded with the ROW (exported or imported). Primary crop commodities can 
also be processed or directly fed to various animal categories. Domestic and export demands and 
import supplies are incorporated by assuming linear price-responsive demand/supply functions. 
The commodity demand functions and export demand functions for tradable row crops and 
processed commodities are shifted upward over time at exogenously specified rates.  
Five land types are included in the agricultural sector for each CRD: cropland, idle 
cropland, cropland pasture, pasture land and forestland pasture.  Crops can be produced using 
alternative tillage, rotation, and irrigation practices. Yields and costs of production of crop 
residues and dedicated energy crops also differ across regions. Cropland availability and crop 
yield is assumed to respond to endogenously determined crop prices based on estimates obtained 
in Miao et al. (forthcoming).  
Biomass can be obtained from four different sources: crop residues, energy crops, forest 
residues, and pulpwood. Crop residues are a byproduct of corn production and are modeled as 
joint products of corn and wheat production. The energy crops considered here are miscanthus 
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and switchgrass, which can be produced on available cropland or cropland pasture. The supply of 
forest residues and pulpwood is modeled at the CRD-level using available quantities and price 
estimated by Perlack and Stokes (2011). 
2.3.4 Policy Constraints 
I model the state RPSs as a constraint that requires eligible renewable generation 
consumed in each EMR, to be no less than the RPS proportion times the total consumed 
generation in each EMR. The state level RPSs are averaged at the EMR level using annual 
generation-weighted averages to obtain a regional RPS (Table 2.1). The RPS proportions 
parameters are calculated from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency 
(DSIRE 2011). In general these parameters represent the RPS for an EMR and are proportions 
that increase over time until the target percentage is achieved in a target year. As some state’s 
RPS only applies to renewable capacity built after a specific date, I calculate the amount of 
generation from renewables built before that specified date and exclude it from meeting the RPS 
(see Appendix B for details). The regional RPSs are assumed to be binding.  
I implement the RFS in the model by imposing the annual volumetric targets for biofuels 
projected by the AEO as a binding mandate (EIA 2010a). Since the RFS is implemented as a 
blend mandate, I estimate the blend rates that will achieve the volumetric targets each year 2007-
2030 as in Chen et al. (2014) and impose those as binding annual constraints. I find these blend 
rates to range from 6% in 2007 to 24.5% in 2030.  
2.3.5 GHG Emissions 
Lifecycle analysis is used to estimate the GHG emissions resulting from the production, 
processing, and transportation of crops, changes in soil carbon sequestration with conventional 
crops under conventional tillage and no-till and with energy crops, during the production of 
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biofuels, and consumption of fossil fuels for transportation and electricity generation. The 
methods for estimating the life-cycle emissions from biofuel production applied here are 
described in Dwivedi et al. (2015) and in Chen et al. (2014). The rate of soil carbon sequestration 
varies by CRD and is obtained using the DayCent model (Dwivedi et al. 2015). The average rate 
of soil carbon sequestration for miscanthus and switchgrass is 8.8 MT/Ha/year and 5.3 
MT/Ha/year, respectively and this results in a negative GHG intensity per unit of energy for 
these energy crops. I assume that the crop residue collection rates are low enough to not lead to a 
soil carbon loss (Chen et al. 2014). The national average life-cycle GHG intensity of bio-
electricity generation by feedstock type, with and without the indirect land use change effect is 
provided in Table B.7 while corresponding values for the national average life-cycle GHG 
intensity of biofuels with and without the indirect land use change effect are in Table B.9. I also 
estimate the effect of the change in world gasoline price under the RFS and the RPS & RFS 
policies and its implications for changes in gasoline consumption in the ROW. For a detailed 
discussion of the fuel rebound effect see Chen et al., (2014) and Chen and Khanna (2012). 
Emissions-intensity of fossil fuel based electricity generation is from GREET (2013) (Table 
B.7). 
2.4 Data 
Electricity is generated at power plants conditional on each plant’s generation capacity. 
The existing capacity of each power plant at the CRD level is parameterized based on the 
Emission and Generation Integrated Database (EPA 2010a). The capacity by power plant type is 
aggregated by CRD. The capacity factor for each county is calculated based the weighted 
average on the plant capacity factor of all power plants of a specific type in a given CRD (EPA 
2010a). The fixed and variable O&M costs of existing power plants is obtained from a version of 
the NEMS model (UCS 2011).  
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The cost of electricity generation from new power plants is represent with the levelized 
cost that includes the O&M costs, transmission costs, fuel costs, and annualized capital costs 
(EIA 2010a) as described in Oliver and Khanna (2015a). The cost of modifying a coal plant for 
co-firing is assumed to $120/kW and is obtained from (EIA 2010a). Bio-electricity feedstock 
processing cost are $18/MT (Appendix B). Biomass feedstocks used for bio-electricity are all 
assumed to have the same heat content per unit of dry matter (Haq 2002). The cost of 
transportation of biomass from its harvest location to a potential co-firing or dedicated bio-power 
plant is based on constant cost per mile per ton (Searcy et al. 2007), times the distance from 
centroid of the CRD where it was produced to the centroid of the CRD where it is consumed.  
Wind energy supply curves are specified for each EMR and are based on data from the 
National Energy Modelling System (NEMS) model (EIA 2011b). These data are projections of 
the amount wind capacity that is available by region at multiples of a base capacity cost. These 
capacity supply curves are converted to generation supply curves using a capacity factor of 0.34 
and calibrate the base cost with a levelized cost of $148/MWh (EIA 2010a). The relative price of 
wind energy will be on factor in determining the regional share of bio-electricity, I thus test the 
sensitivity our results to this assumption by examining a lower wind energy price. 
A national natural gas supply function is calibrated annually for the years 2007-2011 with 
the observed national average wellhead price and production from the corresponding years and 
with a price elasticity of 0.48. Natural gas used for power generation incurs a regional 
transmission and distribution cost. Coal and fuel oil based power plants pay a constant per-unit 
price for fossil fuels that varies by state, which is obtained from the EIA State Energy Data 
System (EIA 2010b). The electricity demand functions are calibrated with parameters calculated 
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from data on state electricity retail sales, retail electricity price, and the price elasticity of 
demand for electricity as described in Oliver and Khanna (2015). 
Data for the agricultural sector are obtained from numerous sources and a briefly 
described here (see details in (Chen et al. 2014)). Consumption of agricultural commodities, 
including imports and exports along with the county level historical crop acreages and 
availability of non-cropland acreage are obtained from NASS/USDA. Agricultural commodity 
elasticities are obtained from a number of sources (see details in (Chen et al. 2014)).  
The supply of biomass is derived from perennial bioenergy crops (miscanthus and 
switchgrass), crop residues, corn stover, and wheat straw, and forest residues and pulpwood. 
County-specific corn stover and wheat straw availability is proportional to historically observed 
grain yields and their harvest rates are limited to levels based on tillage practices to prevent soil 
degradation. The incremental costs of producing them include the cost of harvesting and 
replacement fertilizer application. County-specific yields of miscanthus and switchgrass on two 
types of land qualities, high quality cropland and low quality cropland pasture, are simulated 
using the DayCent model. As the mix of feedstocks used for bio-electricity generation and 
biofuel production is sensitive to their yields, I examine a case where yields are lower than those 
simulated with the DayCent model. Their cost of production is estimated using methods 
described in Chen et al. (2014) and Dwivedi et al. (2015). Forest residue and pulpwood supply 
are assumed to be exogenously given obtained from the Billion-Ton Update on the annual 
quantity of county level supplies at various biomass prices over the period 2012 to 2022 by year 
(Perlack and Stokes 2011). 
Demand curves for VKT are calibrated with projections from the AEO (EIA 2010a). 
ROW gasoline and diesel supply and demand curves, and US gasoline and diesel supply curves 
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are also calibrated with data from AEO. The model contains costs and conversion rates for 
several first- and second- generation biofuels. A detailed discussion of the data used to 
parameterize the biofuel markets in the model can be found in Chen et al. (2014). 
GHG emissions from the activities analyzed here are accounted for by using life-cycle 
analysis (LCA). I account for the production, processing, and transportation of crops as well as 
changes in soil carbon sequestration under different tillage practices. The methods for estimating 
the life-cycle emissions from biofuel production applied here are described in Dwivedi et al. 
(2015) and in Chen et al. (2014) and from electricity generation are described in Oliver and 
Khanna (2015a). 
2.5 Results 
I first validate BEPAM-E by comparing the simulated outcomes for 2007 under the 
current policy landscape including the corn ethanol mandate, the corn ethanol tax credit and 
tariff, and state-level RPSs for that year and comparing them with the observed prices and 
quantities in the relevant markets (Table 2.2). I find that the total electricity generated and the 
amount of electricity generated using natural gas and coal deviates by less than 4% from 
observed data. Average national electricity price deviates by 14% and national wellhead natural 
gas price deviates by 7%. As shown in Figure 2.1, simulated electricity generation closely 
matches the observed level of generation across all regions, with majority of regions deviating by 
less than 6%. The model results for the transportation and agricultural sectors with BEPAM-E 
continue to match those observed as in Chen et al. (2014). I find that that land allocation to the 
major US crops (corn, soybeans, wheat, and sorghum) deviates by less than 10%, while in fuel 
markets gasoline price and consumption deviates by less than 1% from observed levels in 2007.  
For the purposes of this analysis I consider four (4) policy scenarios and examine 
outcomes over the 2007-2030 period for the electricity, agricultural and transportation sectors: 
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(1) a No-Policy baseline scenario where neither the RFS or RPSs are in effect, (2) a RPS 
scenario with all state-level RPS imposed, (3) a RFS scenario with the RFS blend mandate 
imposed at the federal level and, (4) a RFS & RPS scenario where both the RFS and RPSs are 
implemented. 
2.5.1 Electricity Generation 
 The RPS, RFS & RPS scenarios increase generation of electricity from renewable 
sources and decrease generation from fossil fuels compared to the baseline no-policy scenario in 
2030 (Table 2.3). The share of renewables increases to 16% under the RPS and under the RFS & 
RPS but the mix of renewables varies considerably under these two policy scenarios. The share 
of bioelectricity in total renewable generation is 20% under the RPS and 17.5% under the RFS & 
RPS with a corresponding increase in wind generation under the latter policy scenario. More 
importantly, the mix of bioelectricity also changes with the addition of the RFS to the RPS. The 
share of co-fired electricity generation decreases from 16% under the RPS to 9% under the RFS 
& RPS; the share of dedicated bioelectricity generation also decreases from 4% to 2.8% while 
the share of co-product electricity increases to 5.6% due to the production of biofuels under the 
RFS.  
 This change in the type of renewable electricity and mix of bioelectricity has implications 
for the fossil energy displaced. The higher share of co-fired generation under the RPS results in a 
4.7% decline in coal-based generation while other forms of bioelectricity and wind generation 
primarily displace natural gas based electricity by 12.5%. In contrast, in the RFS & RPS case, the 
share of coal-based electricity declines by only 2.4% while the share of natural gas based 
electricity declines by over 14%.  
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The larger displacement of natural gas under the RFS & RPS lowers the price of natural 
gas and the average price of electricity. As a result, total generation increases by about 2% under 
the RFS & RPS and by 1% under the RPS. 
2.5.2 Feedstock Production and Land Use 
 The quantity of biomass feedstock produced varies significantly across the three 
scenarios. The total amount of biomass production under the RPS increases by 67 M MT relative 
to the No-policy scenario in 2030, where an 87% share goes toward producing bio-electricity.2 
The total amount of biomass feedstock production under the RFS & RPS scenario increases by 
277 M MT compared to the No-policy scenario in 2030, but the total amount used directly for 
electricity generation is smaller and 79% of the biomass goes towards producing cellulosic 
ethanol to meet the RFS mandate which produces electricity as a co-product (Table 2.3). 
 The mix of feedstocks produced also varies across scenarios. Forest residues constitute a 
major share of the biomass used for electricity generation under the RPS while agricultural 
biomass, particularly crop residues provide the dominant share of biomass under the RFS & RPS 
scenarios. The share of energy crops increases from 11% under the RPS to 19% under the RFS & 
RPS scenarios. The spatial distribution of biomass feedstock production for bio-electricity and 
cellulosic ethanol in 2030 also varies significantly across scenarios (Figure 2.2). The RPS 
scenario leads to much of the biomass being produced in the rain fed region of the US; with the 
highest concentration of biomass feedstock production being in the Illinois and Missouri regions 
(Figure 2.2a). Since much of this biomass is used for co-firing, the areas where biomass 
production occurs coincides with the location of coal-based power plants. Under the RFS & RPS 
scenario the production of agricultural and forest biomass for direct conversion to bio-electricity 
decreases relative to the RPS scenario (Figure 2.2c). Feedstock production in the Midwest and 
                                                 
2 The remaining share is used for an exogenously given biomass pellet demand. 
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South-east increases substantially but most of it is now used for biofuel production and indirectly 
for co-product electricity generation (Figures 2.2c and 2.2d). Biomass production for bio-
electricity now occurs largely in the Western States and in the North-east using crop and forest 
residues.  
 The land required to produce these feedstock for each scenario is shown in Table 2.4. 
Land use increases relative to the No-policy scenario by 0.5 million Ha under the RPS, as the 
land under energy crops increases by about 0.7 million Ha and land under food crops decreases 
by about 0.1 million Ha. The RFS & RPS scenario exhibits a large increase in land use, of about 
4 million Ha relative to the RPS scenario to produce the additional feedstock required to meet the 
biofuel mandate. The RFS & RPS combined are found to use less agricultural land than the RFS 
alone, because a greater share of biomass is obtained from crop residues (Table 2.3), which 
doesn’t require land in addition to that used to grow food crops. 
2.5.3 Prices 
The farmgate price of biomass feedstock varies across CRDs depending on land 
availability and quantity of production with a larger level of biomass feedstock supply requiring 
a higher price to divert land to its production. Figures 2.3a and 2.3b illustrate the biomass 
feedstock production by CRD for the RPS and RFS & RPS scenarios, while dots indicate 
locations of coal-fired power plants. In the RPS scenario the price of biomass feedstock varies 
across the US and has average price of $51/MT. In the Midwest, where the greatest amount of 
feedstock is produced, I see prices ranging from about $46-75/MT, while in Northeast there is a 
lower quantity feedstock produced, but at higher prices ranging from about $76-105/MT. The 
highest feedstock prices are found in the Southwest, but the quantity produced is relatively low. 
The RFS & RPS scenario results in the greatest level of biomass production and also results in 
the greatest feedstock prices with an average of $92/MT. In the Midwest prices range from about 
 31 
 
$76-105/MT, while in the Northeast prices range from about $106-135/MT and consist primarily 
of forest biomass.  
 Bio-electricity prices vary across regions, scenarios, and sources and are a function of the 
feedstock prices as illustrated in Figures 2.3a and 2.3b. Figures 2.3c and 2.3d show the effect of 
the increase in the price of bio-electricity with the implementation of the RFS on the share of 
bio-electricity in different regions. This share decreases in the central and southern regions of the 
US where biomass is diverted for producing cellulosic biofuels. Co-firing electricity tends to be 
less costly than electricity from a bio-power plant due to the lower heat-rate and relatively low 
plant conversion cost, though it is more costly than generation from existing coal power plants, 
which is on average about $53/MWh (Table 2.5). These costs vary by region based on the heat-
rate and/or transportation cost. The average price of electricity from co-firing is found to increase 
from $78/MWh under the RPS to $92/MWh under the RFS & RPS (Table 2.5). Regions such as 
CO, WY and IN, OH, WV, NJ have relatively lower bio-electricity prices under both scenarios 
as they rely on lower cost co-firing only, while regions like  CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT and NY 
have relatively high bio-electricity price under both scenarios, due to use of higher cost dedicated 
bio-power plants and relatively stringent RPSs. The increase average price of bio-electricity 
across regions with the combined RFS & RPSs implies an increase in the implicit subsidy that 
goes towards bioelectricity, which corresponds with an increase in the welfare cost of the policy 
(Oliver and Khanna 2015a).  
2.5.4 GHG Emissions 
Cumulative GHG emissions from the US agricultural, electricity, and transportation 
sectors decrease under the RPS and RFS & RPS scenarios; by 2.7% and 4.4%, respectively, over 
the 2007-2030 time period (Table 2.6). This decrease in emissions under the RFS & RPS 
scenario is 6% lower than the sum of the reduction that would be achieved by each of the 
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policies individually. This indicates that by changing the mix of renewable electricity and the 
type of fossil fuel displaced, the implementation of the RFS lowers the effectiveness of the RPS 
in reducing GHG emissions. The implementation of the RFS with the RPS results in wind energy 
with zero GHG intensity displacing bioelectricity that on average has a negative GHG intensity. 
The GHG intensity of the biomass produced from all feedstocks is also calculated for each 
scenario. This value represents the national average rate of GHG emitted or sequestered from the 
use of biomass produced from energy crops or forest residues, excluding indirect land use 
change. We find that under the RPS the average carbon intensity of biomass is -0.03 MT of GHG 
per MT of biomass feedstock (Table 2.3), the negative sign indicating that the use of this level of 
biomass reduces emission, due to soil carbon sequestration, aside from any decreases that occur 
through offsetting fossil fuels for electricity or transportation. Under the RFS & RPS scenario we 
see the average carbon intensity of biomass feedstock is even lower at -0.06 MT of GHG per MT 
of biomass, due to the greater utilization of energy crops, which have a high rate of soil carbon 
sequestration. Additionally, the implementation of the RFS with the RPS results in more natural 
gas being displaced than coal and total generation being larger than with the RPS alone. 
Both the RFS and RPSs achieve their greatest rate of GHG abatement in the final years of 
the time period analyzed, as this is when the policies reach their target stringency. The RPSs 
reduces emissions by 3.4%, while the RFS & RPS combined reduces emissions by about 7.2% in 
2030. This reduction is 8% lower than the sum of the reductions that could be achieved by the 
RPS and the RFS individually.  
2.5.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
I now examine the robustness of our model outcomes to assumptions and choices for 
parameter values for the maximum limit to co-firing being 20% instead of 10% in the benchmark 
case. I also examine sensitivity to the net co-product generation coefficient (which determines 
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the amount of electricity produced as a co-product of a gallon of ethanol from a cellulosic 
ethanol refinery (Humbird et al. 2011)) to being 25% lower than in the benchmark case. I also 
consider a 25% lower base cost of wind generation which is used to parameterize the wind 
supply curves instead of the $148/MWh (EIA 2010a) assumed in the benchmark case. The heat-
rate of dedicated bio-power plants determines how much biomass is required to generate an 
MWh, the case where this requirement is 30% less than in the benchmark is considered in the 
sensitivity analysis. The yields of energy crops are based on the simulation model DayCent 
(Dwivedi et al. 2015), here I consider the case where these yields are 20% lower. 
 The changes in the quantity of bio-electricity generation in response to the parameter 
changes are shown in Figure 3a. The increase in co-firing mix rate increases bio-electricity 
generation by about 10-20% relative to the benchmark scenarios, while a lower cost of wind 
generation substantially decreases bio-electricity generation, replacing it with wind generation. 
The change in dedicated bio-power plant conversion efficiency has the greatest effect in which 
direction and why on bio-electricity generation. Changes in the co-product generation coefficient 
and energy crop yield have little effect on bio-electricity generation. Bio-electricity generation is 
reduced going from the RPS to the RFS & RPS scenario in all cases, except the low wind cost 
case, where the co-firing and dedicated biomass are reduced but the additional co-product 
generation provided by the RFS offsets this reduction. 
 The sensitivity of the quantity of agricultural and forest biomass production to parameter 
changes is illustrated in Figure 3b. With a lower cost of wind generation, biomass production is 
significantly decreased under the RPS and under the RPS & RFS. A greater efficiency of 
dedicated bioelectricity production results in significantly increased biomass production under 
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the RPS, but the percentage is much less under the RPS & RFS. The other parameter changes 
have little effect on biomass production. 
 The change in average farmgate biomass price, relative to the benchmark levels is 
illustrated in Figure 3c. In all cases the price of biomass is increased under the RFS & RPS 
relative to the RPS only scenario. The sensitivity of the price of bio-electricity to various 
assumptions is illustrated in Figure 3d. I again see that a lower wind generation cost lowers the 
price of bioelectricity by lowering the demand and price of biomass while a lower yield of 
energy crops increases the price of bioelectricity under the RPS and RFS & RPS.  
2.6  Conclusion 
This paper examines the spillover effects due to the joint implementation of the RFS and 
RPSs on the mix of feedstock production, mix of renewable energy and fossil energy and on the 
GHG savings in the electricity sector. The implementation of the RFS affects the regional 
competiveness of bio-electricity relative to wind generation by diverting biomass towards 
cellulosic ethanol production and increasing feedstock prices; this changes the mix of biomass 
feedstocks produced, which affects the carbon-intensity of bio-electricity and biofuel. These 
spillover effects of the combined sector-specific energy policies have implications for the 
cumulative GHG reductions that can be achieved by each of these policies.  
This paper develops a dynamic, partial-equilibrium, open-economy model (BEPAM-E) 
of the US agricultural, electricity, and transportation sectors that incorporates endogenously 
determined choices of the mix of feedstocks, sources of renewable energy and displacement of 
fossil fuels and their implications for GHG emissions. This model is then used to simulate 
markets in these sectors under policy scenarios which include the RPS with and without the RFS 
in order to understand how the implementation RFS affects the regional prices and quantities of 
bio-electricity generation, biomass feedstock mix, and GHG emissions.  
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I find that the RPS substantially increases the quantity of bio-electricity generation, 
primarily through co-firing, but this is significantly reduced by implementation of the RFS which 
increases the price of biomass and bio-electricity leading to greater reliance on wind energy. In 
particular, the implementation of the RFS reduces the amount of biomass being produced for co-
firing with coal in the Midwest where much of the coal power plant capacity is located. However 
overall biomass production increases to meet the demands for biofuels under the RFS with the 
majority of the increase being derived from increased energy crop production and crop residues. 
This increased share of energy crops induced by the RFS decreases the carbon-intensity of 
bioenergy. However, the net impact of the combined policies is a net decrease in the amount of 
GHG emission reductions achieved by the electricity sector by about 7% relative to the reduction 
that would be achieved by the sector in the absence of the RFS. Overall, the combined policies 
achieve 6% lower reduction in GHG emissions than the sum of the reduction that could have 
been achieved by each policy independently. This analysis highlights the importance of 
considering policy interactions among a portfolio of renewable energy policies rather than 
analyzing the effectiveness of each policy in isolation. 
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2.7 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1 Electricity Market Regions and RPSs 
Region State RPS  
Existing 
Eligible 
Renew-
ables 
Regional 
RPS 
Reg-
ion State RPS 
Existing 
Eligible 
Renew-
ables 
Regional 
RPS 
1 
Arizona 9% 0% 
10.5% 
10 
Delaware 18% 1% 
17.7% New Mexico 16% 5% Maryland 19% 21% 
2 California 32% 25% 32.4% Pennsylvania 18% 2% 
3 Texas 5,880 
MW   
5,880 
MW 
11 Michigan 
10% 3% 
10.0% 
4 Florida 0% 0%   
12 
Indiana 0% 0% 
6.8% 
5 Wisconsin 10% 5% 9.6% New Jersey 20% 2% 
6 
Iowa 105 
MW   
8.8% + 
105 MW 
Ohio 
11% 0% 
Montana 10% 1% West Virginia 0% 0% 
Nebraska 0% 0% 
13 
Colorado 21% 5% 
11.5% 
North Dakota 0% 0% Wyoming 0% 0% 
South Dakota 0% 0% 14 Kansas 16% 2% 16.3% 
7 
Connecticut 25% 5% 
25.9% 
15 Oklahoma 0% 0%   
Maine 39% 2% 
16 
Arkansas 0% 0% 
  Massachusetts 28% 0% Louisiana 0% 0% 
New Hampshire 23% 3% Mississippi 0% 0% 
Rhode Island 16% 1% 
17 
Illinois 22% 1% 
18.6% 
Vermont 0% 0% Missouri 11% 2% 
8 
Idaho 0% 0% 
12.7% 
18 
Alabama 0% 0% 
  
Nevada 22% 10% Georgia 0% 0% 
Oregon 20% 0% 
19 
Kentucky 0% 0% 
  
Utah 0% 0% Tennessee 0% 0% 
Washington 13% 0% 
20 
North Carolina 12% 4% 
6.6% 
9 New York 24% 1% 24.4% 
South Carolina 0% 0% 
Virginia 0% 0% 
DC 18% n/a 
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Table 2.2 Model Validation 
Variable 
2007 
Observed 
2007 
Simulated 
% 
difference 
Agricultural Sector 
   Total land (M Ha) 123.0 122.2 1% 
Land under corn (M Ha) 34.3 33.9 1% 
Land under soybeans (M Ha) 28.1 28.8 -2% 
Corn ($/MT) 142.5 167.9 -18% 
Soybeans ($/MT) 303.7 373.8 -23% 
Electricity Sector 
   Coal Generation share (% points) 0.5 0.5 1% 
Hydroelectric Generation Share (% points) 0.1 0.1 0% 
Natural Gas Generation Share (% points) 0.2 0.2 -2% 
Nuclear Generation Share (% points) 0.2 0.2 1% 
National wellhead price of natural gas ($/GJ) 5.8 5.4 7% 
Natural gas for electricity sector (M GJ) 7224 6618 8% 
Natural gas for all sectors (M GJ) 24776 24170 2% 
Coal for Electricity Sector (M GJ) 22592 22296 1% 
Electricity generation (M MWhs) 3748 3597 4% 
National average electricity price ($/MWh) 86.7 98.7 -14% 
Transportation Sector 
   Gasoline ($/Liter) 0.7 0.7 0% 
Corn ethanol ($/Liter) 0.6 0.8 -30% 
Gasoline Consumption (B Liters) 494.8 497.1 0% 
Ethanol Consumption (B Liters) 26.7 25.2 6% 
Gas Miles Consumption (B km) 4715 4714 0% 
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Table 2.3: Electricity Generation and Biomass Feedstock Production in 2030 
Energy Source 
No 
Policy RPS RFS 
RFS & 
RPS 
Total Generation (M MWh) 4372 4432 4396 4455 
  
(1.4%) (0.5%) (1.9%) 
Coal-based 1899 1810 1923 1854 
  
(-4.7%) (1.3%) (-2.4%) 
Natural Gas-based 1099 962 1083 942 
  
(-12.5%) (-1.5%) (-14.3%) 
Total Renewables 418 703 433 703 
  
(68.2%) (3.8%) (68.2%) 
Share of Total Renewablesa (%) 
    Co-firing 8.9 15.9 3.0 9.1 
Dedicated biomass 0.0 4.1 0.0 2.8 
Co-product 0.0 0.0 9.2 5.6 
Total Bio-electricity 8.9 20.0 12.2 17.5 
Wind 8.9 31.1 8.6 33.7 
Otherb 82.2 48.9 79.2 48.9 
Feedstock Sharesc (%) 
    Corn Stover 0 37 48 46 
Wheat Straw 0 7 9 11 
Miscanthus 0 11 26 19 
Switchgrass 0 0 3 0 
Forest Residues 100 44 17 14 
Pulpwood 0 1 0 11 
     Total Biomass (M MT) 33 100 262 310 
Share for Bio-electricity (%) 60 87 3 17 
Share for Cellulosic Biofuel (%) 0 0 95 79 
Share for Biomass Pellet Exportd (%) 40 13 3 4 
 
Biomass Carbon Intensity (MT 
GHG/MT feedstock) 0 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 
a Share out of total renewable generation. 
b Includes hydroelectric, solar, and geothermal, whose generation levels are given exogenously. 
c Share of feedstock out of total biomass production. 
d An exogenously given quantity of biomass pellets for export to Europe. 
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Table 2.4: Land Use in 2030 
  
No 
Policy RPS RFS 
RFS & 
RPS 
Cropland (M Ha) 
    Total Cropland 120.0 120.5 125.0 124.0 
Land Under Food Crops 117.0 116.8 109.1 108.9 
Land Under Energy Crops 0.0 0.7 4.3 3.5 
from regular cropland 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.8 
from cropland pasture 0.0 0.2 3.9 2.7 
Land Under Corn Stover 0.0 6.9 24.3 27.6 
Land Under Wheat Straw 0.0 2.7 10.6 16.1 
 
Table 2.5: Prices in 2030 
  
No 
Policy RPS RFS 
RFS & 
RPS 
    % Change from No-policy 
Electricity price (average cents/kwh) 11.5 -3 -1 -4 
Coal generation (max of all technologies) 5.3 -2 0 -4 
Natural Gas-based generation 8.8 -6 0 -6 
Co-fire 6.0 30 18 52 
Wind 13.0 15 0 15 
Natural Gas price ($/GJ) 4.17 -9 -1 -10 
Farmgate biomass feedstock price ($/MT) 35.3 51 68 149 
Land rental rate (average $/Ha) 502 1 35 35 
 
Table 2.6: Change in GHG emissions 
  RPS RFS 
RFS & 
RPS 
Cumulative Emissions (B MT GHG) Change from No-policy 
Agricultural and Forest Sector 0.0 0.7 0.8 
Transportation Sector  0.0 -3.1 -3.1 
Electricity Sector  -3.0 0.2 -2.8 
    
Total  -3.1 -2.2 -5.0 
Percentage change relative to No-Policy  (-2.7%) (-1.9%) (-4.4%) 
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Figure 2.1: Validation of Simulated Regional Electricity Generation in 2007 
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Figure 1: Biomass Production in 2030
Figure (a) Biomass Production for electricity under RPS, (b) Biomass Production for electricity under RPS & RFS, (c) Biomass Production for 
Cellulosic Ethanol under RFS, (d) Biomass Production for Cellulosic Ethanol under RFS & RPS (M MT). Dots indicate coal-fired power plant 
locations. 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
Figure 2.2: Biomass Production for Bio-electricity and Cellulosic Ethanol in 2030 
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(a) Farmgate biomass price under RPS, (b) Farmgate biomass price under RFS & RPS ($/MT). Dots indicate coal-fired power plant locations. (c) bio-
electricity share of non-hydroelectric renewables under RPS, (d) bio-electricity share of non-hydroelectric renewables under RFS & RPS. 
(a) (b) 
(d) (c) 
Figure 2.3: Farmgate Biomass Price and Bio-electricity share in 2030 
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Figure 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Figure 2.4a: Bio-electricity Generation  
 
Figure 2.4b: Biomass Production 
 
 
Figure 2.4c: Average Farmgate Price of Biomass Feedstock 
 
Figure 2.4d: Price of Bio-electricity 
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Figure 2.5: Energy Crop Yields and Forest Supply 
 
Figure 2.5a: Average Miscanthus Yields (MT/Ha) 
 
Figure 2.5b: Average Switchgrass Yields (MT/Ha) 
 
 
Figure 2.5c: Aggregate Forest Residue & Pulpwood Supply at 
P=$80/MT (M MT) 
 
Figure 2.5d: Average Corn Stover Yields (MT/Ha) 
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Chapter 3  
Implementing the Renewable Fuel Standard with the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard in the US: Implications for Policy Costs 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Policies to encourage a shift to renewable energy and greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation in 
the US have set sector-specific technology standards, such as the Renewable Fuel Standard 
(RFS) and the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) for the transportation and the electricity 
sectors, respectively. The welfare effect of each of these policies is, however, not sector specific; 
particularly, when implemented jointly these policies can interact in complex ways through a 
common reliance on bioenergy feedstock with cross-sector effects on social welfare and GHG 
emissions. Furthermore, the regional approach to policy as exhibited by the state-level RPSs can 
lead to policy attainment choices that are not efficient from the national perspective. This paper 
examines the welfare costs and effectiveness of GHG abatement with each of these policies 
implemented independently and jointly and compares them with those under a carbon tax over 
the 2007-2030 period using an integrated, dynamic, open-economy, price-endogenous model of 
the electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors for the US. I find that the welfare costs of 
these policies differs across these sectors and for the US vs the rest of the world. The domestic 
welfare cost of the RPS & RFS jointly is $109 billion while its global cost is $525 billion; 
corresponding values with a $19 per ton of CO2 tax that achieves the same level of GHG 
abatement over 2007-2030 are (-) $18 billion and $33.5 billion. I find that the national RPS to 
have a cost-effectiveness $23/MT of GHG, while the state-level RPSs are much less cost-
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effective, costing $51/MT of GHG emissions.  Compared to a no-policy baseline, the global 
welfare cost per ton of GHG abatement of the RPS & RFS is $171 while of the carbon tax is $7. 
3.2 Introduction 
Growing concern about global climate change and dependence on fossil fuels has led to 
sector-specific energy policies in the US that set technology standards for the share of renewable 
energy to be consumed; these include the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) for the 
transportation sector and state-specific Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) for the electricity 
sector. These two sectors combined contribute about 70% of US greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions making them a key focus of renewable energy policies.3 The RFS, established by the 
Energy Independence and Security Act in 2007 (EPA 2010b) sets volumetric mandates for 
blending specified quantities of different types of biofuels (from food crops and cellulosic 
biomass) with liquid fossil fuels while the state-specific RPSs set targets for the share of 
electricity to be generated using renewable sources by the 29 participating states (DSIRE 2011).  
Sector specific, energy technology policies are likely to be less efficient in reducing GHG 
emissions than a carbon tax policy that imposes the same carbon price on all sectors, because the 
former do not allocate abatement in the least cost manner across sectors or encourage the least 
cost approach to abatement. Moreover, sector-specific policies can distort resource allocation 
across sectors when they compete for similar resources such as bioenergy which can be utilized 
both for electricity generation and transportation.  Implementation of the RFS, with its large 
biomass requirement, may conflict with goals of reducing overall US GHG emissions over the 
next two decades because it will divert a constrained supply of biomass from displacing carbon-
intensive coal-based electricity generation to displacing the relatively less carbon-intensive 
                                                 
3 http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/transportation.html 
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gasoline (Fraas and Johansson 2009).4 However, there are concerns about the extent to which a 
modest carbon tax can reduce GHG emissions, given the inelastic demand for energy. Palmer 
and Burtraw (2005) show that a high carbon tax of $82/ton of CO2 would be needed to achieve 
the same GHG reduction as a 15% national RPS. This has led to a preference among policy 
makers for sector-specific renewable energy policies to induce investment in renewable energy 
technologies (DOT 2010).  
The purpose of this paper is to develop an integrated framework to compare the welfare 
costs, GHG emissions savings, and cost-effectiveness of the RFS and RPSs policies implemented 
in isolation and jointly with those of a carbon tax policy. In examining these policies I take into 
account not only the direct effect of the policy on its specific sector (i.e. electricity and 
transportation), but its cross-sector effects on the agricultural sector, since bioenergy demand 
will affect the allocation of land for food and feed production and affect consumers and 
producers of crops. Furthermore, I account for the interaction effects of the RFS and RPS on the 
mix of renewable energy, GHG emissions and welfare in all three sectors.  
I undertake this analysis by developing a dynamic, price-endogenous, open economy 
model of the electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors in the US. This model extends the 
Biofuel and Environmental Policy Analysis Model (BEPAM) used previously to analyze the 
effects of biofuel policies on the transportation sector (Chen et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2012) by 
including the US electricity sector and related fossil fuel sectors (coal and natural gas) that 
provide inputs to the electricity sector, as well as regional forest residue and pulpwood supplies. 
The extended BEPAM with the electricity sector (BEPAM-E) incorporates the existing fossil and 
                                                 
4 The Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) (2012) projects approximately 34 million metric tons (MMT) of biomass 
would be required for bio-electricity under RPSs, 4 and projects that full implementation of the RFS by 2030 would 
generate demand for 238 MMT of biomass. This increase in demand for biomass for biofuels could affect the 
competitiveness of bioelectricity. 
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renewable electricity generating capacity in the US as well as the potential for expansion in 
natural gas, wind, and bio-electricity generation.  
BEPAM-E is used to simulate the economic and GHG effects of the state RPSs and RFS 
implemented in isolation and jointly over the 2007-2030 time period. I measure the discounted 
welfare costs of these policies by examining their impact on the consumer and producer surplus 
in the electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors and government revenue in the US over 
2007-2030 relative to a counter-factual no-policy scenario. I also measure the impacts of these 
policies on crop and fuel prices in the world market and their implications for the economic 
surplus and GHG emissions in the rest of the world.  
Additionally, I examine the welfare cost of achieving the same level of domestic GHG 
abatement as is predicted with the joint implementation of RFS and state RPSs with those that 
would be achieved by a carbon tax on emissions from all three sectors. Economic theory shows 
that a performance based policy, such as a carbon tax, is the most cost-effective strategy for 
achieving a targeted level of GHG abatement in a closed economy; this is not necessarily the 
case when considering an open-economy, where these policies affect the terms-of-trade (Chen et 
al. 2014; Lapan and Moschini 2012) or lead to knowledge spillovers or learning-by-doing 
(Fischer and Newell 2008), which can offset their domestic efficiency costs. 
Lastly, I examine the mix of renewable and conventional sources used for electricity 
generation and how it differs depending on whether the RPS is implemented in isolation or 
jointly with RFS and compare these to the mix induced by a carbon tax. With multiple types of 
fossil fuels and renewables, the effect of the RPS on GHG emissions will depend on its impact 
on the mix of fossil fuel sources for electricity and on the mix of renewable generation that is 
induced. The latter in turn will be affected by whether the RPS is implemented by itself or jointly 
with the RFS. The effectiveness of the RPS at reducing GHG emissions will be larger if 
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renewable sources displace coal rather than natural gas, which is less carbon intensive. However, 
implementation of the RPS can be expected to first displace the most expensive fossil fuel-based 
electricity which could be from natural gas rather than coal, because existing coal plants with 
their capital cost already sunk remain less costly than generation from new natural gas capacity, 
despite low natural gas prices.5 In contrast to the RPS, a carbon tax penalizes fuels based on their 
carbon intensity and is expected to induce greater reduction in coal-based generation. 
I find that a relatively low CO2 tax of $19/ton can achieve the same level of cumulative 
reduction in domestic GHG emissions as the combined RPS & RFS policies over 2007-2030. All 
three policies lead to an increase in the net economic surplus of the agricultural sector which 
offsets the welfare costs of these policies on the transportation and electricity sectors. Overall, 
the RPS & RFS impose a $109 billion welfare cost on the US while the carbon tax leads to a 
marginal gain in domestic economic surplus.  Globally, the welfare costs of the RPS & RFS are 
even higher at $525 billion while those of the carbon tax are $33.5 billion. 
These policies differ significantly in the mechanisms by which these reductions are 
achieved; the RPS & RFS lead to a 6.6% share of renewables in electricity generation a share of 
24% share of biofuels in transportation fuel while the carbon tax achieves GHG reductions 
primarily by reducing coal-based electricity generation and vehicle kilometers travelled. After 
accounting for leakage effects due to indirect land use change and global fuel price effects of 
these policies that affect emissions in the rest of the world, I find that the global emissions 
reduction achieved by a carbon tax is more than 50% higher than by the combined RPS & RFS 
policies. Overall, I find that the per ton global welfare cost of GHG abatement with the RPS & 
RFS is $171 while with the carbon tax is $7 per ton of CO2.  
                                                 
5 The average operation, maintenance, and fuel costs for existing fossil steam power plants is $31.9/MWh (EIA 
2013) while the levelized cost for a new conventional natural gas-fired turbine is $81.3/MWh (EIA 2012). 
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This paper is organized as follows. The next section includes a review of previous 
literature, followed by a description of the model (BEPAM-E) with emphasis on the electricity 
sector extensions developed here and the data and parameters used in the numerical simulation. I 
then present the results of the model and conclude with a discussion of policy implications.  
3.3 Previous Literature 
Several studies have examined the GHG savings, cost effectiveness and price effects of a 
national RPS using electricity/energy sector models such as the Haiku Model (Palmer and 
Burtraw 2005), the Regional Energy Deployment System (ReEDS) model (Bird et al., 2011) and 
the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) (Kydes 2007; Palmer, Sweeney and Allaire 
2010). These studies have also compared the performance of a hypothetical national RPS to that 
of a carbon tax/cap-and-trade policy. In general these studies show that the RPS will have 
modest impacts on electricity price, although some find that this effect will be positive (Palmer 
and Burtraw 2005) while others find it will be negative (Nogee, Deyette and Clemmer 2007).  
These studies differ widely in their estimates of the cost of GHG abatement: Palmer and Burtraw 
(2005) find the welfare cost of a 15% RPS is $126/ton while others find a much lower cost 
(Johnson 2014). These studies also show that a cap-and-trade policy would be more cost-
effective than the RPS.  
Existing studies analyzing the RPS do not consider its interactions with other energy 
sector policies implemented jointly with it, such as the RFS or the effects of these policies on the 
agricultural sector that will be affected by the spillover effects of the implementation of these 
policies. Changes in demand for biomass have the potential to divert land from food/feed 
production and affect crop prices, consumers and producers. Assessment of the welfare effects of 
sector-specific renewable energy policies can therefore depend on whose welfare is accounted 
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for. In contrast to existing studies above that have focused on the welfare effect of the RPS on 
the energy sector only, this paper expands the boundary of analysis to examine the welfare 
effects on the agricultural sector as well and shows that this can significantly affect the 
assessment of the net benefits of these policies for the US and the ROW.   
Moreover, existing studies have taken the biomass supply curve as exogenously given.  
The supply of biomass is likely to be policy/demand driven since it is costly to transport it. The 
RPS driven demand for biomass for co-firing will create incentives to produce it in regions close 
to the location of existing coal-based electricity generating plants. On the other hand, new 
biofuel refineries to meet the RFS targets will have an incentive to locate in regions with low 
cost supply of biomass. The joint implementation of the RFS and the RPS could modify these 
incentives and induce biofuel production in regions where the co-product electricity can meet the 
requirements for RPS as well. The integrated multi-sectoral modelling approach underlying 
BEPAM-E enables us to endogenously determine the supply of biomass to meet policy demands 
cost-effectively while taking into account the heterogeneity in biomass costs and availability 
across the US at a fine spatial resolution. 
There is a large literature examining the effects of the RFS on land use, food and fuel 
prices and GHG emissions (see review in Chen et al. 2014). Most of these studies have focused 
on the effects of the corn ethanol mandate. Exceptions include Beach and McCarl (2010) and 
Beach et al. (2012) who use the Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization Model (FASOM) 
and Chen et al. (2014) and Chen and Khanna (2013) who use BEPAM which incorporates both 
corn ethanol and cellulosic biofuels to examine the effect of the RFS on land use, food prices, 
welfare, and GHG emissions in the transportation and agricultural sectors. While FASOM 
incorporates the effects of the demand for bio-electricity on GHG emissions, it assumes that the 
demand for electricity and the share of bioelectricity is exogenously given and does not analyze 
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the implications of the RFS for the costs of implementing the RPS (Latta et al., 2013; White et 
al., 2013). Other studies examining the effects of the demand for bio-electricity assume that a 
fixed share will be met by forest biomass (Abt et al. 2012; Ince et al. 2011; Latta et al. 2013; 
White et al. 2013).  
In contrast to these studies, I determine the mix of renewable sources of electricity (such 
as wind, biomass) endogenously and examine the feedback effects of the RPS on electricity price 
and demand in estimating the resulting GHG savings. Our findings highlight the importance of 
considering concurrent inter-sectoral policies when evaluating the costs of a particular policy and 
the importance of allowing for endogeneity in the mix of fossil fuels, bioelectricity, and other 
renewables in evaluating the effectiveness of the RPS. It also shows the spillover effects of these 
policies on other sectors such as agriculture and its implications for the cost of bioelectricity and 
its share in the renewable sources used to meet the RPS. I also show the contrasting effects of 
these policies on domestic vs global welfare costs and GHG emissions. 
3.4 Model 
BEPAM-E is a nonlinear, dynamic, multi-sector, price-endogenous, open-economy, 
partial equilibrium, mathematical programming model that simulates U.S. agricultural, 
transportation fuel, and electric power sectors including international trade with the rest of the 
world (ROW). Market equilibrium is found by maximizing the sum of consumers’ and 
producers’ surpluses in the agricultural, transportation fuel, and electric power sectors subject to 
various material balance constraints and technological constraints in a dynamic framework. 
BEPAM-E considers regional supply of crop and biofuel feedstocks at CRD level where crop 
production costs, yields, and resource endowments are specified for each CRD and each crop. 
The model includes all 306 CRDs in the 48 contiguous states, they are used as spatial units to 
model electricity generation from existing power plants by fuel type, while generation from new 
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electricity capacity is considered at Electricity Market Regions (EMR), twenty of which are 
included in the model consisting of groups of adjacent states. The model endogenously 
determines the agriculture and transportation sector variables of food consumption, gasoline, 
diesel, and biofuel consumption, imports of gasoline and sugarcane ethanol, mix of biofuels, and 
regional land allocation among different food, feed and fuel crops and livestock activities over a 
given time horizon. It also endogenously determines electricity sector variables such as 
generation by energy type (coal, natural gas, oil, wind, co-fired biomass, dedicated biomass, and 
co-product), regional electricity consumption, inter-regional electricity transmission, bio-
electricity feedstock transportation, and GHG emissions. A detailed description of the model is 
presented in Chapter 2. 
3.4.1 Welfare Effects 
I calculate the domestic welfare cost of a policy from the discounted sum of the changes in 
consumer surplus, producer surplus in the electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors and 
in government revenue in the US at the equilibrium prices and quantities relative to the no-policy 
baseline over the 2007-2030 period. I refer to this as the change in the domestic economic 
surplus in these sectors since it does not account for changes in the monetized value of the GHG 
emissions between the policy scenario and the no-policy baseline. A 3% discount rate is used to 
obtain the net present value of welfare costs for each of the policy scenarios. Based on the 
changes in prices and quantities of tradable commodities, I also compute the change in economic 
surplus in the ROW agricultural and fuel sectors relative to the no-policy baseline (as in Chen et 
al., 2014). 
Equilibrium prices at the national level are simulated for the agricultural and transportation 
fuels markets while regional prices are simulated for natural gas and electricity markets and 
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CRD-specific prices are simulated for biomass. Consumer surplus is estimated for the three 
sectors as the area under national demand curves for each of the agricultural products and VKT 
and under the regional demand curves for electricity.  
Producer surplus is estimated from national supply curves for gasoline, diesel, and natural 
gas. Producer surplus from electricity generation is calculated for all types of electricity 
generators as the difference between their marginal cost and the electricity price times the 
quantity sold, given the implicit merit cost ordering this implies that the marginal unit receives 
zero profit, while lower cost generators receive positive profit. Producer surplus earned by the 
natural gas producers supplying to the electricity sector is included in the electricity sector 
producer surplus. Effects of these policies on producer surplus from natural gas supplied for 
other uses like residential heating is not included in this analysis. Additionally, the assumption of 
a fixed price of coal implies there is no producer surplus in the coal sector.  
Since the RFS is a federal policy, I assume there is a national price for ethanol. However, 
the cost of producing cellulosic biofuels differs across CRDs due to differences in CRD specific 
biomass production costs. As a result, the cellulosic ethanol refineries earn a producer surplus 
due to differences in their feedstock costs across CRDs even though they are all assumed to have 
the same industrial cost of converting feedstock to fuel. The revenue from co-product electricity 
generation with biofuel production is included in the producer surplus of the electricity sector. 
Government revenue is calculated from existing fuel taxes on gasoline and from the carbon tax.  
3.5 Results 
I first validate the model by examining the extent to which the simulated results deviate 
from the observed levels in the initial model year of 2007. I find that electricity generated from 
coal and natural gas sources and total electricity generation deviated by less than 4% from the 
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observed data. Average national electricity price deviates by 14% and the national wellhead 
natural gas price deviates by 7% (for further details see the Chapter 2).  
The model is solved for six different scenarios that include a baseline scenario and four 
policy scenarios. Scenario 1 is the No-Policy baseline scenario in which there is no government 
policy. Scenario 2 is the RPS scenario which simulates the effects of imposing the average of 
state level requirements for renewable electricity annually at the EMR level over the 2007-2030 
period as shown in Table 2.1. In Scenario 3 the RFS scenario is implemented as a blend mandate 
which is imposed annually at the national level to achieve the volumetric targets projected by the 
AEO (2010). In Scenario 4 the RFS &RPS scenario the RFS and state RPSs are imposed jointly. 
In Scenario 5, a Carbon Tax of $19.40 per metric ton of CO2 is imposed; this tax rate is found by 
iteratively solving the model such that it achieves equivalent cumulative domestic GHG 
emissions savings similar to those in the RPS & RFS scenario 4, over the 2007-2030 period. 
Finally in Scenario 6, a national RPS which achieves is set to achieve the same proportion of 
renewable energy generation as the state-level RPSs have been found to in Scenario 2 over the 
2007-2030 timer period is considered. 
3.5.1 Effect of Energy Policies on the Electricity Sector 
3.5.1.1 Generation 
 The four policy scenarios differ substantially in their effect on the magnitude and 
direction of change in coal-based electricity generation, which has the largest share in total 
electricity produced. I find that relative to the no-policy baseline, the RPS and the RPS&RFS 
reduce annual coal generation by 5% and 3% respectively. The Carbon Tax leads to a much 
larger reduction in coal generation of 8% in 2030 while the RFS alone leads to an increase of 1% 
in coal-based electricity in 2030 relative to the no-policy baseline because the higher price of 
biomass makes displacement of coal through co-firing less competitive than in the no-policy case 
 56 
 
(Table 3.1). Natural gas-based generation is reduced in all scenarios relative to the no-policy 
baseline: it is 15% lower under the RPS & RFS scenario and 2% lower than under the RFS alone 
in 2030 relative to the no-policy scenario. In contrast to the carbon tax which penalizes coal 
based generation more than natural gas based generation due to its high carbon intensity, the RPS 
(without and with the RFS) decreases natural gas-based generation more than coal-based 
generation since new natural gas capacity is more costly than existing coal-based plants. This is 
consistent with findings by previous studies (Palmer and Burtraw, 2005). 
 Both the RPSs and the RPS & RFS increase renewable-based generation by 68%, relative 
to the no-policy baseline, though the mix differs. The RFS only increases renewable-based 
generation by 4%, primarily from co-product electricity (Table 3.1). Compared to the sector-
specific renewable energy policies, the Carbon Tax increases renewable generation as relatively 
smaller amount (by 24%), the majority of which comes from co-firing of biomass. In contrast to 
the RPS and/or RFS, which lead to an increase in annual total electricity consumption the carbon 
tax reduces annual generation by 1.7% compared to the no-policy baseline in 2030. The RPS, 
RFS, and RPS & RFS lead to an increase in electricity generation by 1.4%, 0.5%, and 1.8% 
respectively, in 2030 relative to the no-policy baseline (Table 3.1). On the other hand, the 
Carbon Tax leads to a 1.7% decrease in annual generation compared to the no-policy baseline. 
As a given the federal RPS is set at a level to achieve an equivalent annual share of 
renewable generation as that which is found to be achieved by the state level policy. However, I 
find that this share of renewables is achieved by a different generation mixture across the 
scenarios. The federal RPS results in a decrease in total generation which allows for a smaller 
quantity of renewable generation to achieve an equivalent share of renewables as the state RPS. 
Renewable generation increases by 64% over the No-policy scenario compared to a 68% 
increases from the state-level policies.  
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3.5.1.2 Prices 
The RPS, RFS, and RPS & RFS scenarios lead to a decrease in the national average 
consumer electricity price by 4%, 2%, and 5% respectively in 2030 relative to the no policy 
baseline (Table 3.2). Whereas, both the carbon tax and national RPS cause an increase in 
electricity prices of 5.8% and 0.2%, respectively. The price of electricity under the RPS, RPS & 
RFS, and national RPS scenarios is a function of the implicit tax placed on fossil fuel based 
generation and the implicit subsidy placed on renewable generation by the state RPSs (Fischer 
2010). It also depends on the effect of the RPS on the price of natural gas which is displaced by 
renewable fuels (since the price of coal is assumed to be fixed) (Wiser and Bolinger 2007). I find 
the average marginal implicit tax on fossil fuel based generation to be $30.9 per MWh and the 
average marginal implicit subsidy for renewables to be $40.8 per MWh under the RPS. The 
implicit subsidy on renewable electricity is higher under the RPS & RFS scenario due to the 
higher cost of bio- electricity induced by the almost tripling of the price of biomass as compared 
to the RPS alone. 
Additionally, the average price of electricity decreases due to a decrease in the wellhead 
price of natural gas (Table 3.2), which is similar to the directional price changes found from a 
survey of NEMS results (Nogee et al. 2007) for a federal RPS. The largest decrease in natural 
gas price occurs in the RPS & RFS policy scenario (10%) because of the displacement of natural 
gas based electricity by the increased bioelectricity, co-product electricity and wind electricity. 
The RFS also leads to a small decline in the price of electricity because of the co-production of 
electricity which shifts the electricity supply curve out at all prices; additionally, displaces 
natural gas based generation and lowers the cost of natural gas based electricity. In contrast to 
these policies, the carbon tax increases average electricity prices by 6%, even though it decreases 
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the price of natural gas by 3% in 2030 relative to the no-policy baseline due to the decreased 
demand for electricity. 
3.5.2 Effect of Energy Policies on the Transportation Fuel Sector 
3.5.2.1 Biofuel and Fossil Fuel Consumption 
 The four policies scenarios vary in their effect on biofuel production (Table 3.1) 
The RPS has no effect on the production and consumption of biofuels even with the co-
production of electricity. Under the RFS I see an increase of 42 B Liters of corn ethanol and 82 B 
Liters of cellulosic ethanol to meet the mandate in 2030. Joint implementation of the RPS and 
RFS leads to slightly lower production of cellulosic ethanol 81 B Liters due to the higher cost of 
biomass for bio-electricity than under the RFS alone and slightly higher imports of advanced 
biofuels. The carbon tax is too low to induce production of the lower carbon intensive cellulosic 
biofuels; it marginally increases imports of sugarcane ethanol. The RFS and the RPS & RFS 
scenarios lead to a decrease in gasoline and diesel consumption by 15-16% and 2% respectively 
as they are replaced by the large increases in corn and cellulosic ethanol (Table 3.1). A carbon 
tax achieves reduction by leading to a 1% decline in fuel consumption and in VKT.  
3.5.2.2 Transportation Fuel Prices 
Like the RPS, the RFS imposes an implicit tax on fossil fuels for transportation and an 
implicit subsidy on biofuels (Chen et al., 2014). Under the RFS scenario I find that the implicit 
tax on gasoline is $0.05 per liter and is $0.06 per liter on diesel, while the implicit subsidy on 
cellulosic ethanol is much larger at $0.20 per liter (Table 3.2). The implementation of both the 
RPS & RFS leads to a larger implicit tax of $0.08 per liter on gasoline compared with just the 
RFS, which results in a slightly larger decrease in gasoline consumption. The implicit subsidy on 
cellulosic ethanol under the RPS & RFS policy is much higher than under the RFS alone because 
of the higher cost of biomass. The carbon tax penalizes fuels according to their carbon intensity; 
the $19.40 per MT of CO2 equates to a $0.06 per liter tax on gasoline, and leads to an increase in 
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the price of gasoline and diesel by 5% and 4% respectively. 
3.5.3 Effect of Energy Policies on the Agricultural Sector 
3.5.3.1 Biomass Production 
The production of biomass from both the agricultural and forest sectors increases across all 
four policy scenarios. As shown in Table 3.1, the bulk of the biomass produced is from the 
agricultural sector; with the supply from the forestry sector being very similar across alternative 
policy scenarios. Under the RPS the increase in bioelectricity leads to increased production of 
agricultural and forest biomass by 55 MT and 11 MT respectively in 2030. The RFS causes a 
much greater increase in biomass production, particularly from agricultural feedstocks, in order 
to meet the biofuel mandate; agricultural and biomass feedstock increase by 224 MT and 12 MT, 
respectively. The implementation of the RPSs with the RFS further increases the demand for 
agricultural biomass and shifts the mix of feedstocks towards crop residues. The carbon tax 
induces a much lower amount of biomass feedstock production than even the RPS.  
3.5.4 Effect of the Energy Policies on Economic Surplus and GHG Emissions 
3.5.4.1 GHG Emissions 
The five policy scenarios differ in the extent and mechanisms by which they achieve 
GHG emission reductions (Table 3.3). The RPS reduces cumulative GHG emissions over the 
2007-2030 period by 3% primarily from reducing fossil fuel-based generation and increasing the 
share of renewable fuel. This is offset to some extent by the increase in electricity generation in 
response to the reduction in electricity price. The RFS achieves a lower cumulative decrease in 
GHG emissions of 2%, resulting from the net displacement of gasoline and diesel by biofuels 
after including the offsetting effect of the increase in VKT as fuel prices decline. The higher 
reduction in GHG emissions under the RPS compared to the RFS is in part due to the lower 
GHG intensity of liquid fossil fuels relative to coal and natural gas and in part due to the 
relatively low GHG savings achieved with corn ethanol as compared to bioenergy from crop 
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residues and energy crops used for electricity generation. The national RPS causes a much larger 
decrease in GHG emissions than the state-level RPSs by 3.7% over the time period. The national 
RPS does substantially better at reducing GHG emissions than the state level policies is due to 
both a greater use of carbon negative bio-electricity generation, primarily in the form of co-firing 
and due to the fact that it decreases total generation resulting in a greater decrease of highly 
carbon intensive coal-based generation. 
In the scenario where both the RFS and RPS are implemented jointly there is a reduction 
in cumulative emissions by 4.4% (5.1 B MT) relative to the no-policy baseline. The reduction in 
emissions from the electricity sector achieved under the RPS & RFS scenario is about 6% lower 
than under the RPS alone; this is because the higher price of biomass in the RPS & RFS scenario 
reduces the amount of co-firing and bioelectricity while increasing wind-based generation. 
Bioelectricity from dedicated energy crops has a negative carbon intensity as compared to the 
zero carbon intensity of wind-based electricity; as a result the change in the mix of renewable 
sources for electricity generation increases its carbon intensity. Additionally, the RPS & RFS 
scenario results in greater use of coal and less natural gas than the RPS alone. The carbon tax is 
set to achieve equivalent emission reductions to the RFS and RPS (4.4%) and does so primarily 
by decreasing electricity consumption; particularly coal-based generation as well as gasoline and 
diesel consumption. 
 The share of renewable energy under both the RPS & RFS increase over time and the 
thus the largest amount of annual GHG emission reduction is achieved in 2030. I estimate that 
the RPS and RFS reduce GHG emissions by 3.3% and 5.2% in 2030, respectively, relative to the 
no-policy baseline and that jointly the two policies reduce emissions by 7.5%. The RPS achieves 
larger reductions in early years as compared to the RFS (which relies mainly on corn ethanol till 
2015) but has a lower impact on emission in the latter years. The carbon tax rate remains 
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constant across the time period and is found to reduce emissions by 4.7% in 2030. This shows 
that the potential for a uniform carbon tax rate to achieve large reductions in the future is limited 
and the rate would need to increase significantly for it to achieve similar reductions annually as 
the RFS and RPS & RFS policies in the long run. 
 Table 3.4 shows the impact of the four policy scenarios on GHG emissions after 
including the leakage effects in the ROW due to the indirect land use change and the effect of 
rebound effect caused by changes in gasoline price in the world market on global fuel demand 
(see Chen and Khanna 2012). These leakage effects offset a considerable amount of the 
reduction in GHG emissions achieved domestically, particularly by the RFS. The RPS has little 
effect on ROW fuel market thus it global GHG abatement is similar to its domestic level of 
abatement. The cumulative reduction in global GHG emissions relative to baseline GHG 
emissions in the US by the RFS & RPS is 2.7%. The carbon tax has little negative leakage, 
which results in it achieving the highest level of cumulative global GHG reduction (4.1%) over 
2007-2030 relative to the other policies. 
3.5.4.2 Welfare Cost 
The domestic welfare costs of each of the four policy scenarios and their distribution 
across the three sectors are presented in Table 3.3 while the global welfare costs are presented in 
Table 3.4. The domestic welfare costs of the RPS if it is assumed to be implemented in isolation 
are $156 billion. Achieving an equivalent share of renewable generation under a national RPS, is 
much less costly than the state level, with a welfare cost of $94 billion. The RFS if implemented 
alone would lead to an increase in domestic economic surplus of $54 billion relative to the no-
policy baseline due to the improvement in terms of trade (similar to the finding in Chen et al., 
2014). The domestic welfare costs of the two policies implemented jointly are $109 billion. This 
is larger than the sum ($102 billion) of the costs of the RPS and the RFS if each were assumed to 
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be implemented in isolation. This indicates that joint implementation of the two policies raises 
their costs because of the increased competition for biomass which raises the cost of bio-
electricity and biofuel production and shifts the mix of renewable electricity towards more wind-
generation whose marginal cost increases.   
Analyzing the effects of these policies on each of the three sectors, I see that the RPS 
imposes significant welfare costs on the electricity sector while the RFS imposes high welfare 
costs on the transportation sector. The joint implementation of the RPS & RFS raises the welfare 
costs of the RPS for the electricity sector by $16 billion (10%) relative to the costs if the RPS 
were to be implemented alone. Similarly, the implementation of the RPS raises the costs of the 
RFS for the transportation sector by $20 billion due to the higher cost of biofuels. It increases the 
loss in surplus for VKT consumers and the fossil fuel producers responsible for blending 
biofuels.  
The implications of including the welfare impacts on the agricultural sector are evident 
from Table 3.3. All four policy scenarios lead to a reduction in consumer surplus for agricultural 
consumers but an increase in the surplus for agricultural producers with the net increase in 
economic surplus for the sector. This offsets some or all of the costs imposed by the policies 
considered here on the electricity and transportation sectors. In the case of the RFS, the net 
impact on present value of economic surplus across all three sectors is an increase of $54 billion. 
The reason for this net economic benefit is that the RFS increases price of agricultural 
commodity exports and reduces imported fuel prices as shown in Table 3.1. In an open economy 
setting, the improvement in the terms of trade offset the domestic efficiency costs imposed by the 
biofuel mandate. 
Compared to the other policy scenarios, the carbon tax imposes the largest welfare costs 
on the transportation and electricity sectors. However, it also leads to a large increase in tax 
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revenues and to a gain to the agricultural sector. As a result overall economic surplus increases 
by $18 billion relative to the no-policy baseline; this can be compared to the $109 billion welfare 
cost of the jointly implemented RPS & RFS which achieves equivalent cumulative domestic 
GHG reductions as the carbon tax.   
While the terms-of-trade effect results in the RFS increasing domestic economic surplus 
it also affects the surplus of consumers and producers in the agricultural and fuel sectors in the 
ROW. Table 3.4 shows that gain in economic surplus in the US from the RFS is more than offset 
by the decrease in economic surplus in the ROW agricultural and fuel sectors; by a total $415 
Billion; the combined RPS & RFS have a similar effect on ROW economic surplus. Adding the 
changes in domestic and ROW surplus gives the global change in economic surplus, which is 
$361 billion from the RFS and $525 Billion for the RPS & RFS. The carbon tax leads to the 
smallest negative impact on the global economic surplus ($20 B).  
3.5.4.3 Cost-Effectiveness 
Combining the results on welfare cost and GHG emission changes across scenarios I 
assess the cost-effectiveness of each policy scenario at the domestic and global level by 
comparing their per ton cost of GHG abatement (Table 3.4). The domestic cost of domestic GHG 
abatement is greatest under the RPS alone at $51/MT and least under the RFS at -$35/MT6. I find 
the national RPS to be much more cost-effective than state-level with a cost-effectiveness ratio 
of $23/MT of GHG. The fact that the national RPS has both a lower welfare cost and a greater 
GHG reduction than the state-level RPS is what leads to this result. The cost-effectiveness of the 
RPS & RFS and Carbon Tax, which achieve equivalent domestic GHG reductions, is $25/MT 
and -$4/MT, respectively.  
                                                 
6 The negative sign indicates that for each MT of GHG abatement domestic economic surplus increases by $35. 
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These costs change substantially when global welfare cost and global GHG reductions 
are taken into consideration. The large negative impact of the RFS on global welfare combined 
with the small impact on global GHG emissions result in a very high cost of GHG abatement of 
$1593/MT. The RPS does not cause a significant terms-of-trade effect, thus its global abatement 
cost is the same as its domestic cost. The RPS & RFS becomes much more costly when viewed 
from a global perspective ($171/MT). The most cost-effective policy at the global level is the 
Carbon Tax at $7/MT.  
3.5.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
To examine the robustness of our key results on GHG emissions and social welfare to 
variations in some of the important model behavioral and technical parameters in the electricity 
sector I conduct a sensitivity analysis. I consider six different scenarios which consist of a 
variation in one of the key parameters. In scenario (1) the elasticity of demand for electricity is 
increased from the benchmark value of -0.25 to -0.7. In scenarios (2) and (3), I consider a low 
value and high value for the natural gas supply elasticity of 0.09 and 3.1, respectively. Finally in 
scenario (4), I consider the case where the amount of co-product electricity generation with 
cellulosic biofuel production is 25% lower than in the benchmark case. 
As shown in Figure 3.1, I find that the GHG emissions reduction achieved by the RFS is 
about 2% across all the scenarios examined, while those with the RPS ranges from 2-3%. These 
reductions are higher if the demand for electricity is more elastic. The GHG emissions reduction 
achieved by the RPS & RFS policy ranges between 4% and 4.5% across the scenarios. The 
emissions reduction achieved by the carbon tax of $19.4 per MT of GHG is the most sensitive to 
the parametric assumptions considered here and ranges from 4% to 6%; it is significantly 
affected by the elasticity of demand for electricity and co-firing limit on biomass. 
The sensitivity of domestic economic surplus to these parameter changes is presented in 
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Figure 3.2. Across the different parameter assumptions, the percentage increase in total 
economic surplus under the RFS relative to the no-policy baseline ranges between 0.1% and 
0.15%. The corresponding decrease in surplus with the RPS ranges from -0.25% to 0.5%; the 
maximum losses occur in the scenario with the more elastic demand scenario. The loss in 
economic surplus under the RPS & RFS scenario is lower than that under the RPS under all 
parametric assumptions considered here and ranges from 0.15% to 0.4%. The gain in economic 
surplus with the carbon tax ranges from 0.05% to 0.1% relative to the no-policy case.  Overall, I 
find that the effects of these policies on GHG emissions and domestic economic surplus exhibit a 
sensitivity of only a few tenths of a percentage point to changes in these behavioral and technical 
parameters.  
3.6 Conclusions 
Renewable energy is being promoted to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and to reduce 
GHG emissions in the transportation and electricity sectors using policies that are sector-specific 
and impose targets for the quantity or share of renewables to be consumed. While policies such 
as the RFS and the state-level RPSs have the potential to lead to a significant share of the 
transportation fuel and electricity generation being met by renewable sources in the US there has 
been no analysis comparing their potential to reduce emissions and the cost at which they 
achieve those emissions abatement using the same framework. This paper fills that gap by 
developing an integrated model of the electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors 
(BEPAM-E) to examine the domestic and global welfare costs of GHG abatement of the RFS 
and the RPSs implemented independently and jointly and to compare these to those under a 
carbon tax that achieves the same level of cumulative reduction in GHG emissions over the 
2007-2030 period.  
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Additionally, the state-level RPSs while being beneficial in terms of reducing GHG 
emissions, also restrict the set of options in terms of renewable resources available and fossil-
fueled energy that can be reduced to achieve the policy goals. These restrictions can lead to both 
a higher welfare cost than necessary to achieve a given policy goal and could also change the 
effectiveness of the policy in reduction GHG emissions. There exists research on both the cost 
and effectiveness of a national RPS and state-level RPS, but there hasn’t yet been a direct 
comparison. 
Our analysis leads to several key findings. The state level RPSs lead to significantly 
larger reduction in domestic GHG emissions (2.7%) than the RFS alone (2%), but also result in 
less reductions than could be achieved with a national RPS (3.7%). The RPS & RFS achieve a 
combined reduction in GHG emissions of 4.4%. The RPS & RFS policies achieve reductions 
primarily by inducing a shift towards renewable fuels while allowing electricity generation and 
VKT, respectively, to increase marginally. In contrast, the carbon tax achieves the same 4.4% 
reduction primarily by reducing electricity generation by 2% and VKT by 1%.  
These policies differ considerably in their effects on global GHG emissions. Since the RFS has a 
large impact on crop prices and gasoline prices, it results in a negative leakage through indirect 
land use changes and fuel use changes in the ROW, which almost fully offset the savings in 
GHG emissions achieved domestically. The carbon tax achieves a much larger cumulative global 
GHG reduction (4.1%) than the RPS & RFS policies (2.7%).   
Our analysis shows the importance of including the welfare effects on the agricultural 
sector in determining welfare costs of abatement associated with these energy sector policies 
because they create a demand for bioenergy that affects land use and crop prices. All policies 
lead to a net gain in economic surplus for the agricultural sector On the other hand, the RPS and 
RFS policies impose significant welfare costs on the electricity and transportation sectors, 
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respectively. In the case of the RPS, these are offset slightly by gains to the agricultural sector. 
However, the RFS leads to significant net benefits to the domestic agricultural producers which 
more than offset costs to the other sectors. Nevertheless, the domestic welfare costs of a jointly 
implemented RPS & RFS are significantly higher than those of the carbon tax that achieves the 
same level of GHG reduction; in fact, the carbon tax leads to a net gain in domestic economic 
surplus since a large part of the costs are imposed on ROW fuel producers.  
The cost of abatement with the RPSs estimated here is lower than estimates by Palmer 
and Burtraw (2005) and higher than those in Johnson (2014) and could be due to differences in 
policies analyzed and modeling approaches. I also show the cost of abatement under a RPS can 
vary greatly depending on if it is implemented as a national policy or a patchwork of state-level 
policies as currently the case. More importantly, I find that implementation of the RFS would 
raise the costs of meeting the RPS for the electricity sector by 10% because it would raise the 
costs of biomass which are not fully offset by the co-product electricity generated by cellulosic 
biofuel production. The joint implementation of the RFS and the RPS policy would increase the 
share of wind electricity and lower the amount of co-firing of biomass with coal and result in 
larger displacement of natural gas than coal crowding out some of the GHG abatement benefits 
relative to the RPS alone. Thus studies estimating the effectiveness of the RPS alone without 
considering the implications of the demand for biomass for cellulosic biofuels would 
underestimate its welfare costs and over-estimate the GHG savings. 
The RFS imposes significant costs on the ROW, primarily on agricultural consumers and 
fuel producers. As a result, the global welfare costs of the RFS and the RPS & RFS are very 
high, particularly compared to those with the carbon tax. These results on global welfare cost 
combined with global GHG emissions, show that the RPS & RFS is much less cost-effective 
than a carbon tax policy at abating global GHG emissions.  
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Although the RFS is not an effective policy for reducing GHG emissions over the 2007-
2030 period, I find that by 2030 the RPS & RFS have the potential to lead to annual savings in 
domestic GHG emissions that are twice as high as those with a constant carbon tax examined 
here because of the induced increase in the share of renewable energy. This suggests that in the 
longer run, these policies have the potential to outpace the carbon tax in their GHG savings 
unless the carbon tax increases rapidly enough to induce a large shift to renewable energy. I 
leave it to future research to analyze the carbon tax needed to achieve the same long term 
reduction in GHG emissions as the RPS & RFS and to compare their welfare effects. 
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3.7 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.1: Effects of Alternative Policies on the Energy and Agricultural Sectors in 2030 
Energy Source No Policy RPS RFS 
RFS & 
RPS 
Carbon 
tax 
National 
RPS 
Fossil Fuels Quantity % Change from No Policy 
Electricity Generation (M MWh)   
     Coal 1899 -4.7% 1.3% -2.4% -7.5% -6.7% 
Natural Gas 1099 -12.5% -1.5% -14.3% -3.6% -12.8% 
Fuel Oil 19.8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total Generation 4372 1.4% 0.5% 1.9% -1.9% 0.0% 
Transportation   
         US Gas Consumption (B Liters) 504.7 0.0% -15.4% -15.6% -0.9% 0.0% 
US Diesel Consumption (B Liters) 180.7 0.0% -1.7% -2.0% -1.1% 0.0% 
Gas Miles Consumption (B km) 6621 0.0% 1.2% 0.9% -0.9% 0.0% 
Diesel Miles Consumption (B km) 725.3 0.0% -0.6% -0.9% -1.0% 0.0% 
Renewable Sources Quantity Absolute change from No Policy 
Electricity Generation (M MWh)   
     Co-firing 37.0 74.4 -24.0 26.6 95.1 124.3 
Co-product 0.00 0.0 39.7 39.1 0.0 0.0 
Dedicated biomass 0.00 29.0 0.0 19.9 0.0 34.8 
Wind 37.2 181.6 0.0 199.2 5.4 108.9 
All renewable generation 417.7 285.0 15.7 284.9 100.6 268.0 
Share of renewables (% points) 9.13 6.7 0.0 6.6 2.4 6.7 
Biofuels   
     Eth Consumption Total (B Liters) 18.3 0.0 125.5 125.1 -0.2 0.0 
Corn Ethanol (B Liters) 14.6 0.0 42.2 42.2 -0.2 0.0 
Cellulosic Ethanol (B Liters) 0.0 0.0 82.2 81.0 0.0 0.0 
Share of Biofuels (%) 3 3 24 24 3 3 
Agricultural Products Quantity Absolute change from No Policy 
Biomass (M MT)   
     Agricultural Biomass 0.1 54.8 223.9 232.9 42.6 86.1 
Forest Biomass 32.8 11.4 11.5 11.5 8.4 11.1 
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Table 3.2: Effects of Alternative Policies on Market Prices in 2030 
  No Policy RPS RFS 
RFS & 
RPS 
CO2 
tax 
National 
RPS 
  Price % Change from No Policy 
Fossil fuels   
     US Gasoline Consumer Price($/Liter) 0.96 0.0% -6.3% -4.8% 4.3% 0.0% 
US Diesel Consumer price ($/Liter) 0.98 0.0% 3.1% 4.5% 5.0% 0.0% 
Natural Gas Wellhead price ($/GJ) 4.17 -8.7% -1.3% -10.2% -2.9% -9.7% 
Electricity   
     Average Electricity Price ($/MWh) 117.63 -3.8% -1.5% -5.2% 5.8% 0.2% 
Crops   
     Corn ($/MT) 125.89 -0.3% 38.9% 38.5% 1.5% 0.0% 
Soybeans ($/MT) 335.66 0.4% 32.9% 33.7% 0.4% -0.3% 
Wheat ($/MT) 229.92 -0.1% 9.0% 8.4% 0.7% 0.2% 
Average Land Rent ($/Ha) 502.27 1.0% 43.5% 43.2% -0.7% 1.0% 
Biofuels Price Absolute change from No Policy 
Ethanol Consumer Price ($/Liter) 0.63 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Cellulosic Eth. Producer Price 
($/Liter) 0.00 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 
Biomass Producer Price ($/MT) 35.33 18.1 24.0 52.6 9.6 20.5 
Tax and Subsidy Tax or Subsidy 
Implicit Tax on Gasoline ($/Liter) 
  
0.05 0.07 0.06 
 Implicit Tax on Diesel ($/Liter) 
  
0.06 0.08 
  Implicit Subsidy on Corn Ethanol              
($/Liter) 
  
0.20 0.20 
  Implicit Subsidy on Cellulosic  
Ethanol ($ Liter) 
  
0.26 0.36 
  Average Implicit Tax on Fossil fuel  
Generation ($/MWh) 
 
30.9 
 
29.7 
9.7-
20.6 
 Average Implicit Subsidy on  
Renewable generation ($/MWh)   40.8   49.3     
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Table 3.3: Welfare Effects and GHG Emissions in the US under Alternative Policy 
Scenarios 
  RPS RFS 
RFS 
& 
RPS 
Carbon 
tax 
Federal 
RPS 
  Change from No Policy 
Economic Surplus ($B) 
     Agricultural Sector 
     Agricultural Consumers -0.1 -165.2 -166.1 -2.9 -0.6 
Biomass Producers 9.4 6.9 33.4 -0.2 10.8 
Agricultural Producers 0.1 384.9 385.1 5.6 0.6 
Total for Agricultural Sector 9.4 226.5 252.4 2.4 10.8 
Electricity Sector 
     Electricity Consumers 93.8 23.1 117.3 -408.4 -201.6 
Electricity Producers -195.9 -34.3 -233.4 -359.3 162.4 
Natural Gas Producer -63.6 -2.6 -65.8 -15.7 -67.4 
Total for the Electricity Sector -165.7 -13.8 -181.8 -783.4 -106.7 
Transportation Fuel Sector 
     Cellulosic Ethanol Refineries 0.0 48.0 66.5 0.0 0.0 
Gas and Diesel Producers 0.2 -202.3 -206.0 -61.0 0.5 
VKT Consumers 0.0 -37.7 -72.9 -532.6 1.0 
Total for the Transportation Sector 0.2 -192.1 -212.4 -593.6 1.6 
Government 
     Government Revenue 0.0 33.2 32.7 1392.6 0.0 
Total Across Sectors 
     Economic Surplus -156.1 53.9 -109.1 18.0 -94.3 
Economic Surplus (%) -0.4% 0.1% -0.3% 0.0% -0.2% 
Emissions (B MT) 
     Cumulative Emissions 
     Agricultural and Forest GHG Emission 0.0 0.7 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 
Transportation Sector GHG Emissions 0.0 -3.1 -3.1 -0.4 -0.4 
Electricity Sector GHG Emissions -3.0 0.2 -2.8 -3.8 -4.0 
US GHG Emissions -3.1 -2.2 -5.0 -5.0 -4.2 
US GHG Emissions (%) -2.7% -1.9% -4.4% -4.3% -3.6% 
Emissions in 2030 
     GHG Emission in 2030 (B MT) -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 
GHG Emission in 2030 (%) -3.3% -5.2% -7.5% -4.7% -4.5% 
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Table 3.4: Welfare Costs and GHG Emission Effects of Alternative Policies in the US and 
the Rest of the World (2007-2030) 
  RPS RFS 
RFS & 
RPS 
Carbon 
tax 
Domestic Economic Surplus ($B) -153.9 59.9 -110.3 31.3 
Economic Surplus in the ROW Agricultural Sector 
($B) -0.5 -131.6 -129.4 -2.5 
Economic Surplus in the ROW Fuel Sector ($B) 0.0 -283.9 -286.6 -49.0 
Total ROW Economic Surplus ($B) -0.5 -415.5 -416.1 -51.5 
Global Economic Surplus ($B) -154.3 -355.6 -526.4 -20.2 
Global GHG Emissions (B MT) -3.03 -0.22 -3.10 -4.86 
Domestic Cost of Abatement ($/MT) 51 -274 36 -6 
Global Cost of Abatement ($/MT) 51 1625 170 4 
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Figure 3.1: Sensitivity Analysis: GHG Emissions 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Sensitivity Analysis: Economic Surplus 
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Chapter 4  
Implications of Policy Choice under the Clean Power Plan and 
Stacking it with Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 
4.1 Abstract 
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) rule is the most significant climate policy 
implemented thus far in the US, portending a large decrease in GHG emissions from the 
electricity sector and changes in the electricity generation mix. The CPP is specified at the state-
level as a rate-based standard with the option for states to pursue a mass-based policy. It will also 
be implemented along with pre-existing Renewable Portfolio Standards. I quantify the effects of 
implement the CPP as state-level rate-based or mass-based standard and compare to an 
equivalent national-level policy. Furthermore, I consider the extent to which the existing RPSs 
impact the effectiveness of the CPP. These issues are examined using an dynamic, multi-
regional, price-endogenous model of integrated agricultural, electricity, and transportation 
sectors in the US, called BEPAM-E; which I update to include power plant-level smokestack 
carbon emissions and different versions of the CPP, in order to analyze the effect of these 
policies the energy mix, energy and commodity prices, and economic surplus. I find that a rate-
based CPP would lead to the smallest reduction total generation and increase in electricity price, 
while a mass-based standard could achieve equivalent GHG emission reduction at welfare cost 
$21 billion less. When the CPP is implemented with RPS it reduces the price increases and 
increase renewable energy development. A national mass-based CPP could achieve GHG 
emissions reductions equivalent to a state-level rate-based or mass-based CPP at $57 billion or 
$36 billion less welfare cost, respectively. 
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4.2 Introduction 
Climate policy in the one of the most GHG intensive economic sectors, the US electricity 
sector, which contributes about 40% of all CO2 emissions in the US has primarily consisted of 
state-specific policies generally known as the Renewable Portfolio Standards. As of 2014 the 
federal government has weighted in more heavily through the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), which under their authority under the Clean Air Act has issued the Clean Power Plan 
(CPP), finalized in 2015 (EPA 2015). The CPP requires major decreases in GHG emission from 
power plants: requiring states to reduce their CO2 emissions 30% below 2005 levels, with 
discretion given to the states about how to achieve this goal.  
The EPA through the CPP has established state-level targets of emission rates (rate-
based) in terms of carbon-dioxide per megawatt hour of generation (lbs. per MWh) for all US 
states to be achieved by 2030. While the target was initially specified as a rate-based target, 
subsequent rules have given discretion to the states to choose either rate-based targets or 
emissions caps (mass-based) that are equivalent (Fowlie et al. 2014). These two different forms 
of regulation are intended to achieve the same goal of substantially reducing CO2 emissions, but 
as known from economic theory these different goals can have considerably different effects on 
markets in terms of efficiency, and policy incidence and can thus differ substantially in their 
effect on electricity generators and consumers, as well as their policy cost (Helfand 1991). The 
emissions cap with an allowance for trading of credits within its state or region is known to be 
the most efficient (lowest welfare cost) way to achieve the goal of reducing emissions within that 
region. It will result in the greatest reduction of the most carbon-intensive generation type, which 
is coal-based, thereby reducing consumption and increasing the price of electricity. The mass-
based policy under certain assumptions, such as non-stochasticity, will be equivalent to a carbon 
tax on emissions from capped sources and hence is a first-best policy in the context of electricity 
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sector emissions. A rate-based policy will induce the least cost mix of emission and total 
electricity generation with the state the rate is set, but gives also gives the incentive to firms to 
increase output to dilute the pollution. The rate-based regulations thus will induce a shift in 
generation from more carbon-intensive sources such as coal to less carbon-intensive source such 
as natural gas and renewables, but also provides an incentive for increasing electricity 
generation, as higher generation levels for a given emission rate reduces the rate. While setting 
regulations at the state-level is a feasible form of regulation for the EPA to implement through 
the Clean Air Act, by restricting emission targets based on region it can increase the costs of 
meeting policies goals. If the CPP were posed as a national cap on emissions with trading of 
credits (i.e. cap and trade) it would induce the lowest cost mix of generation and total 
consumption to achieve the policy goals.  
 The EPA envisions four “building blocks” through which states will attain the targets set 
forth by the CPP. These building blocks are: (1) improvements in the heat-rates of coal-fired 
power plants, (2) shifting more generation towards natural gas power plants, (3) increasing the 
use of renewables and nuclear, and (4) end-use energy efficiency improvements. Using these 
four building blocks the EPA determines an emission rate reduction that can be achieved by 
making progress in these four areas (EPA 2015). Due to states’ differing abilities to make 
improvement through these building blocks corresponds with the varying degrees of reductions 
required at the state-level under the CPP. 
 As the CPP is a significant energy and climate policy in the US the economic effects of it 
within the electricity sector and across other energy intensive economic sectors is of interest. The 
choice of states to choice the specification of the CPP as either a rate-based or mass-based target 
can lead to significantly different outcomes in terms of economic efficiency and policy 
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incidence. The CPP will be implemented contemporaneously with the existing state-level RPSs 
and may induce greater levels of renewable development and/or change electricity generation 
levels differently than would be found under the CPP alone, thus the stacking of these policies 
can result in different effects on generation, prices, welfare cost, and emissions reductions, 
thereby also have distributional effects. The purpose of this paper is to quantify the effect of the 
CPP as rate-based as specified by the EPA on the electricity, agricultural, and transportation 
sectors in the US, and compare to a mass-based policy which would achieve the same level of 
emissions reductions. Furthermore, I compare the rate-based CPP to a hypothetical national 
mass-based (emission cap) policy with credit trading, which would be equivalent to a cap and 
trade policy, and could be considered a first best policy within the context of the electricity 
sector. This national mass-based policy is compared to the other policies to find the welfare cost 
of currently specified CPP. Then the effect of stacking the state-level RPSs with a rate-based or 
mass-based CPP is quantified in terms of electricity generation mix, prices, welfare cost, and 
emissions. 
This paper follows with a discussion of some of the literature on policy effects in the 
electricity sector primarily of analysis of RPSs, and some of the currently small body of literature 
on the CPP. Following that the model used for analysis is described along with the revisions 
made to analyze the CPP. Then the results are presented on the effects of policies on energy 
mixture, prices, welfare cost, and GHG emissions. Finally, the paper is concluded with a 
summary of the research and suggestions for further work. 
4.3 Literature 
The CPP being a relatively new policy, there is little published academic literature on it. 
There has however been much economic research on other types of policies that affect the 
electricity sector. RPSs being some of the more significant renewable energy policies in the 
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electricity sector prior to the CPP, many studies have been done examining different aspects of 
them. Chen et al. (2009) reviews the literature on the costs of state-level RPS and finds that there 
is predicted to be a small effect on electricity cost. Studies that quantify the effect of RPSs on 
GHG emissions and social have used economic or energy system simulation models such as the 
Haiku model (Palmer and Burtraw 2005), the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) 
(Kydes 2007; Palmer et al. 2010), the Regional Energy Deployment System (ReEDS) model 
(Bird et al. 2011), and BEPAM-E (Oliver and Khanna 2015a). These studies have found a wide 
range for the effect of RPS on GHG emission and social welfare, but in general have found them 
to be less cost-effective than a carbon tax/cap-and-trade policy. 
In a recent paper, Bushnell et al. (Bushnell et al. 2014) consider the relative efficiency of 
rate-based versus mass-based standards that could be chosen by states under the CPP; this is 
done using a model of the Western US electricity market, where they find that rate-based 
standards are less efficient, but would be preferred by generators. The potential for coal power 
plant efficiency improvements from regulations under the Clean Air Act are evaluated by Linn et 
al. (2014), where they find increased coal prices can increase power plant efficiency, but that this 
more efficiently accomplished through a carbon tax rather than a performance-based standard. 
These studies have focused on CO2 reductions from Clean Air Act policies, but Driscoll et al. 
(2015) describe how power plant carbon standards also reduce other air pollutants resulting in 
significant regional and local health co-benefits. 
Another important aspect of energy and climate policy analysis is the consideration of the 
realistic case that there exist multiple energy policies being implemented concurrently within or 
across economic sectors. It has been found that a portfolio of energy policies can be more 
efficient than a single carbon tax/cap-and-trade policy (Fischer and Newell 2008). Though cross-
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sectoral spillovers can also decrease efficiency at which policy goals are attained, as shown with 
the case of the RFS and RPSs (Oliver and Khanna 2015b). The stacking of policies aimed 
achieving similar goals is considered in the case of both implementing the RFS and a potential 
LCFS concurrently in the US, where it is found that it increases effectiveness at which GHG 
emissions are reduced (Huang et al. 2012). I expand on this area by considering the case where 
in the electricity sector both the state-level RPSs and the CPP are stacked, being implemented 
concurrently, while in the agricultural and transportation sectors the RFS is also being 
implemented.  
 
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Model 
For this analysis I use a version of BEPAM-E that has been updated to include detailed power 
plant-level GHG emissions data and equations to represent the CPP. BEPAM-E is a nonlinear, 
dynamic, multi-sector, price-endogenous, partial equilibrium, mathematical programming model 
that simulates U.S. agricultural, transportation fuel, and electric power sectors including 
international trade with the rest of the world. Economy-wide market equilibrium is found by 
maximizing the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surpluses in the agricultural, transportation 
fuel, and electric power sectors subject to various material balance constraints, technological, 
and transportation constraints in a dynamic framework. Following is a brief summary of the 
model description presented in Chapter 2 and Appendices A & B, along with the model 
extensions done for this research. 
 I consider electricity generated from three types of fossil-fuel based power plants using 
coal, natural gas or oil, and from six types of plants using other energy sources that is generated 
to meet regional demands for electricity from residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. 
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These include wind, biomass, geothermal, solar, municipal waste, and nuclear. Electricity can be 
generated from biomass by co-firing biomass with coal at an existing coal-based electricity plant, 
combusting biomass in a dedicated bio-electricity plant and as a co-product of the cellulosic 
ethanol refining process. The solution to this model endogenously determines the amount of 
electricity generation, fossil fuel use in the electricity sector (coal, natural gas, and oil), 
renewable generation capacity expansion in the electricity sector (wind and biomass), and coal 
power plants’ decisions to co-fire biomass, in addition to regional crop production, land-use, 
biofuel production, liquid fuel consumption for transportation and VKT. Capacity expansion for 
nuclear, geothermal, and solar energy is fixed exogenously based on Annual Energy Outlook 
2010 projections but utilization is determined endogenously based on cost, availability and 
policy targets (EIA 2010a). 
The agricultural sector includes fifteen conventional crops, eight livestock products, two 
perennial bioenergy crops, crop residues from the production of corn and wheat, forest residues, 
and co-products from the production of corn ethanol and soybean oil (for further detail see Chen 
et al. 2014). In the crop and livestock markets, primary crop and livestock commodities are 
consumed either domestically or traded with the ROW (exported or imported). Primary crop 
commodities can also be processed or directly fed to various animal categories. Domestic and 
export demands and import supplies are incorporated by assuming linear price-responsive 
demand or supply functions. The commodity demand functions and export demand functions for 
tradable row crops and processed commodities are shifted upward over time at exogenously 
specified rates.  
BEPAM–E includes linear demand curves for Vehicle Kilometers Travelled (VKT) with 
four types of vehicles, including conventional gasoline, flex fuel, gasoline-hybrid, and diesel 
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vehicles (Chen et al. 2014). The VKT production function considers the energy content of 
alternative fuels, fuel economy of each type of vehicle and the forthcoming Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy standards, and technological limits on blending gasoline and ethanol for each of 
these four types of vehicles, as specified by Energy Information Administration (2010). Demand 
curves are exogenously shifted for VKT with each type of vehicles over time as projected by the 
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) (EIA 2010a) to capture the growth in demand due to changes in 
vehicle fleet, income and population. Transportation fuel demand can be met through a mix of 
liquid fossil fuels and biofuels. The supply of transportation fossil fuels are represented with 
upward sloping linear supply functions for both gasoline and diesel produced the US and ROW 
(Chen et al. 2014). The supply of biofuels is derived from first-generation fuels, which include 
corn ethanol, biodiesel, and imported sugarcane ethanol, and from second-generation, cellulosic 
biofuels produced from the same types of feedstock used for bio-electricity generation (energy 
crops, crop residues, forest residues). 
4.4.2 Policy  
I model the state RPSs as a constraint that requires eligible renewable generation 
consumed in each EMR, to be no less than the RPS proportion times the total consumed 
generation in each EMR. The RPS proportions parameters are calculated from the Database of 
State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE 2011). In general these parameters 
represent the RPS for an EMR and are proportions that increase over time until the target 
percentage is achieved in a target year. 
The CPP is designed by the EPA to reduce national electricity sector CO2 emissions 26% 
below 2005 levels, by 2020 and 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. However these reductions vary 
at the state-level by a significant amount: States such as Iowa or North Dakota require reductions 
by as little as 16% and 11%, respectively below levels observed in 2012, while other states such 
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as Oregon or Arkansas require reduction of 48% and 45%, respectively below 2012 levels 
(NRDC). These percentage reductions from 2012 levels are implemented in the model by taking 
a net generation-weighted average of percentage reductions for all states within in a given 
region. These weighted average reductions are used to find the reductions in emissions rates by 
region based on simulated 2012 emissions levels from the model. This total emission rate 
reduction is then converted to an annual emission rate that increase in stringency at a constant 
rate over 2016-2030 time period until it reaches its final target level in 2030. This emission rate 
targets are included in the model as constraints on the emission rates by region by year according 
to the follow statement: 
𝐺𝐻𝐺𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡𝑄𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡,𝑎𝑡  ∀𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 
where 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑟,𝑡 is the rate-based CPP target at regional level annually calculated in the manner 
just described, 𝑄𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡,𝑎𝑡 is total generation by region (EMR) by year as described in Appendix 1, 
and 𝐺𝐻𝐺𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡 is the total amount of smokestack power plant emissions from fossil fuel sources 
in region er at time period t. 𝐺𝐻𝐺𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡 is found from the following equation in the model: 
𝐺𝐻𝐺𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡 = ∑ 𝜂𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑄𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑟,𝑡
𝑓𝑓,𝑟(𝑒𝑟)
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑒𝑟,𝑡
𝑓𝑓
  ∀𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 
where  𝑄𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑟,𝑡 and 𝑄𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑒𝑟,𝑡 are variables representing generation from existing and new fossil 
fuel-based power plants, respectively as described in Appendix 1 and 𝜂𝑓𝑓,𝑟 is the average power 
plant-specific smokestack CO2 emissions rate by CRD and 𝜃𝑓𝑓is the average smokestack 
emission rates from new power plants. The average power plant emissions rates are calculated 
from EPA eGRID database (EPA 2010a).  
 In order to compare versions of a mass-based CPP to the rate-based CPP as just 
described, the emission caps for both the state-level mass-based CPP and national CPP are found 
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from the simulated results from under the rate-based CPP scenario, such that they produce an 
equivalent amount of CO2 reductions, and thus emissions reductions are normalized across the 
rate-based CPP and the state-level and national mass-based CPP. The mass-based CPP are 
specified in the model as constraints on smokestack emissions from the electricity sector: 
𝐺𝐻𝐺𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑟,𝑡  ∀𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 
for the regional based policy and  
∑ 𝐺𝐻𝐺𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡
𝑒𝑟
≤ ∑ 𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑟,𝑡
𝑒𝑟
  ∀𝑡 
for the national mass-based policy, where  𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑟,𝑡 is found from the simulated annual regional 
emissions levels from the rate-based CPP scenario. 
4.4.3 Welfare Effects 
I calculate the welfare cost of a policy from the discounted sum of the changes in consumer 
surplus, producer surplus in the electricity, transportation and agricultural sectors and in 
government revenue in the US at the equilibrium prices and quantities relative to the no-policy 
baseline over the 2007-2030 period. I refer to this as the change in the domestic economic 
surplus in these sectors since it does not account for changes in the monetized value of the GHG 
emissions between the policy scenario and the no-policy baseline. A 3% discount rate is used to 
obtain the net present value of welfare costs for each of the policy scenarios.  
Equilibrium prices at the national level are simulated for the agricultural and transportation 
fuels markets while regional prices are simulated for natural gas and electricity markets and 
CRD-specific prices are simulated for biomass. Consumer surplus is estimated for the three 
sectors as the area under national demand curves for each of the agricultural products and VKT 
and under the regional demand curves for electricity.  
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Producer surplus is estimated from national supply curves for gasoline, diesel, and natural 
gas. Producer surplus from electricity generation is calculated for all types of electricity 
generators as the difference between their marginal cost and the electricity price times the 
quantity sold, given the implicit merit cost ordering this implies that the marginal unit receives 
zero profit, while lower cost generators receive positive profit. Producer surplus earned by the 
natural gas producers supplying to the electricity sector is included in the electricity sector 
producer surplus. Effects of these policies on producer surplus from natural gas supplied for 
other uses like residential heating is not included in this analysis.  
4.5 Results 
 
The simulation model, BEPAM-E is first validated by comparing the simulated outcomes 
for 2007 under the current policy landscape including the corn ethanol mandate, the corn ethanol 
tax credit and tariff, and state-level RPSs for that year and comparing them with the observed 
prices and quantities in the relevant markets (Table 3.2) . This comparison shows the simulated 
total electricity generation deviates by less than 4% from observed levels, while the regional 
generation amounts deviated by less than 6%. Average wellhead natural gas price deviates by 
less than 7% and average electricity price deviates by less than 14%.  
In this analysis I consider a baseline policy scenario and 4 different alternative policy 
scenarios that are examined over the 2007-2030 time period. The baseline scenario includes the 
corn ethanol mandate of 15 billion gallons. The alternative policy scenarios include the state-
level RPSs, state-level RPSs stacked with the CPP rate based policy, the CPP specified as a mass 
based standard which produces equivalent cumulative GHG reductions as the rate based 
standard, and finally a national mass based standard which produces equivalent GHG emissions 
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reduction to the rate based standard. The national mass-based standard is equivalent to a carbon 
tax on smokestack emissions in the electricity sector. 
4.5.1 Effects on Energy Mixture 
 
Examining the results in the policy target year of 2030, it is clear that the effect of imposing the 
CPP as rate-based or mass based standard has a significant effect on the electricity generation 
mixture, additionally as discussed the national mass-based CPP that can be equivalent to cap-
and-trade policy also differs in its effects on the energy mixture (Table 4.1). The rate-based 
policy leads to a decrease in coal-based generation of 33% compared to 30% resulting from a 
mass-based policy, while a national mass-based standard would decrease coal-based generation 
by the least amount (29%). The effect of the CPP rate-based policy on natural gas generation 
differs, where it leads to an increase in of 4% as generation shifts away from coal-fired 
generation to natural gas-based generation. The CPP mass-based standard reduces natural gas 
generation by 10%, while a national version of it would reduce natural gas-based generation by 
the greatest amount (11%). Renewable-based generation increases under both the rate- and mass-
based standards, though the increase from the former is larger by 215 M MWh, the national 
policy increases renewable generation by the smallest amount of 194 M MWh. The increases in 
renewables from the CPP rate-based standard are derived primarily from wind based generation, 
while the increases from both the state and national mass-based standards are primarily from co-
firing. Combining the changes in the generation mix together gives the change in total 
generation: in the case of the rate-based standard generation decreases by 3%, while the mass-
base standard leads to a more significant decrease of 8%. The national mass based standard 
reduces total generation by 11%, the largest amount of the different policy types.  
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 Stacking of the RPSs with a rate-based or mass-based CPP affects the level of total 
generation and its mix. When the RPSs are stacked with the rate-based CPP coal-based 
generation is reduced by about 1% more, and natural gas based generation is reduced by 0.5%, 
whereas it increased under only the CPP. The share of renewables is also increased by about 2 
percentage points above what it would have been under the CPP alone, being derived primarily 
from increased wind energy. Overall total generation is about 1 percentage point less than it 
would have been the under CPP alone. The effects of stacking the RPSs with the mass-based 
CPP are qualitatively the same as the rate-based: coal-fired, natural gas-based, and total 
generation levels are less than under the CPP, while renewable-based generation is significantly 
higher. These results show the RPSs are not entirely achieved by the CPP, which achieves most 
of its target by inducing change in the generation and mix and decreasing generation.  
 
4.5.2 Effects on Prices 
Corresponding with the changes in the quantity of electricity generation discussed in the 
previous section, the prices of goods examined here also change differently based on the policy 
considered (Table 4.2). The rate-based CPP, which has the smallest decrease in electricity 
generation also has the smallest price increase at 9% above the no-policy baseline scenario. Both 
the state-level and national mass-based CPP which resulted in large decreases in generation also 
lead to large price increases of 30% and 34%, respectively. The average wellhead price of 
natural gas is also found across the policy scenarios. I find that, corresponding with the changes 
in fuel use for natural gas-based generation, the wellhead price of natural gas increases by 1% 
under the rate-based CPP due to the increase in generation, while the state-level and national 
mass-based CPP cause decreases in the natural gas price of 8% and 10%, respectively. The price 
of biomass is affected by the CPP as it increases the demand for bio-electricity for both co-firing 
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and dedicated bio-power plants. The rate-based CPP results in the greatest demand for bio-
electricity and thus leads to the greatest increase in biomass prices of 103%, while the state-level 
and national mass-based CPP, which result in less demand for bio-electricity, lead to price 
increases of 74% and 45%, respectively. Market prices in other sectors do not change in a 
significant way, as the CPP by itself has no effect on the transportation sector, and little effect on 
the corn or soybean prices, which change by less than 0.5% from changes in land use related to 
increases in demand for biomass for electricity.  
 The mass-based CPP or emission cap implies a price on CO2 or a tax that would be 
required to achieve the emissions reductions. This implied carbon price is found as the shadow 
(dual) price of CPP constraint within the model. These shadow prices for both the state-level and 
national mass-based CPP are illustrated in Figure 4.1. This shows the loss in efficiency or 
increased cost associated with imposing standards at the state-level compared to at the national 
level. The state-level mass-based CPP has a carbon price up to $15/MT of CO2 higher than the 
national CPP in 2021, though as the economy adjusts over time to the policy the carbon prices 
approximately equalize across the two different policies. 
 Stacking the RPSs with the CPP as a rate-based or mass-based policy also effects the 
magnitudes of the price effect. While the rate-based CPP resulted in a more moderate price 
increase of 9%, when the RPSs are also included that price increase is only 6%. The mass-based 
CPP which results in a more substantial price increase caused by a significant reduction in 
generation required to achieve the emission cap, also has its electricity price effect dampened by 
the RPSs, where price increase is 24% instead of 30%. Wellhead natural gas prices are also 
affected by implementing the RPSs along with CPP. The natural gas price, which slightly 
increased under the rate-based CPP is decreased when the RPS is considered as the natural gas-
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based generation is supplanted by some of the renewable induced by the RPSs. The mass-based 
CPP, which resulted in a decrease in natural gas prices caused by a decrease in natural gas-based 
generation, had the natural gas price further reduced by inclusion of the RPSs, again due to 
renewables induced offsetting some natural gas-based generation. 
4.5.3 Effects on Social Welfare 
The US welfare cost of the six policy scenarios and their distribution across producers, 
consumers, and sectors is shown in Table 4.3. The different CPP policies examined here have 
small impacts on economic surplus in the agricultural sector. As discussed in the section on 
prices, there the CPP has little effect on agricultural commodity prices, thus there is little change 
in welfare. There is, however an increase in producer surplus for biomass producers as bio-
electricity demand is increased due to the CPP. The greatest increase in biomass producer 
surplus is $14 billion and is found under the rate-based CPP. The state-level and national mass-
based CPP increase biomass producer surplus by $6 billion and $5 billion, respectively. 
 The largest changes in economic surplus and its distribution are found in the electricity 
sector. The rate-based CPP causes a decrease in electricity consumer surplus by $180 billion, 
which is significantly less the decreases found under the state-level and national mass-based 
CPP, which decreases electricity consumer surplus by $588 billion and $561 billion over the 
2007-2030 time period. The reason for the large difference between the policies is a function of 
the changes in generation and prices previously discussed; the rate-based policy which causes a 
relatively small decrease in consumption and increase in price, results in a smaller change in 
consumer surplus. The changes for producer surplus are the opposite of consumer surplus; the 
rate-based CPP creates a smaller increase in producer surplus of $34 billion, while state-level 
and national mass-based standards increase producers’ surplus by $475 billion and $476 billion, 
respectively. Through changes in natural gas use for electricity generation producer and 
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consumer surplus for natural gas changes. The rate-based CPP increases natural gas producer 
surplus by $16 billion, due to increases in the use of natural gas-based generation under the 
policy. The state-level and national mass-based CPP both decrease natural gas producer surplus 
by $23 billion and $16 billion, respectively, due to the decreases in natural gas used for 
electricity generation and corresponding price decrease. Consumer surplus for natural gas used 
outside of the electricity sector, for uses such as residential heating, are found from the price 
changes caused by the policies.7 The rate-based CPP decrease the natural gas consumer surplus 
by $22 billion, while the state-level and national mass-based CPP cause increases of $31 billion 
and $16 billion, respectively. 
 Inclusion of the RPSs in evaluating different versions of the CPP affects the overall 
welfare costs of the policy and its incidence on producers and consumers by sector. The 
implementation of the RPSs along with either a rate-based or mass-based CPP, has small impacts 
on the electricity, with the major difference being that it increases surplus for biomass producers 
by about $5 billion and $6 billion, respectively due to the greater level bio-electricity induced by 
the RPSs. Effects on transportation fuel sector surplus from inclusion of the RPSs with different 
versions of CPP is approximately zero. There are large changes in electricity sector surplus from 
stacking the RPSs with the rate-based or mass-based CPP. When stacked with the rate-based 
CPP the RPSs result in a much smaller decrease in electricity consumer surplus as the price 
increase is less than it would have been in once the CPP is implemented, and the before the CPP 
is implemented the RPSs results in lower electricity prices. Producer surplus which was 
increased under only the rate-based CPP decreases with the inclusion of the RPSs as the 
producer surplus gained by increases in electricity price in later years is offset by decreases in 
                                                 
7 Consumer surplus changes for electricity sector natural gas consumers (i.e. power plants) are captured as part of 
the calculation of electricity sector producer surplus as they are changes in the endogenous fuel cost for natural gas 
power plants. 
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producer surplus resulting from electricity price decreases in early years. There are no directional 
changes in electricity producer and consumer surplus under the mass-based CPP when the RPSs 
are included but the effects are dampened, as suggested by the price effects previously described. 
The RPS reduces the consumer surplus loss by approximately $201 billion and dampens the 
producer surplus gain by about $292 billion. For both the rate-based and mass-based CPP natural 
gas-based generation is reduced, resulting in lower prices, therefore the natural gas producer 
surplus decrease from inclusion of the RPSs and natural gas consumer surplus increases from 
inclusion of the RPSs. 
 
4.5.4 Effects on GHG Emissions 
The effect on GHG emissions resulting from the six policy scenarios is shown in Table 
4.3. As the state-level and national mass-based CPP policy were normalized to achieve the same 
level of emission reductions as the rate-based CPP specified by the EPA for purposes of analysis, 
the emissions reductions are the same. I find that the emissions are reduced 6% over the 2007-
2030 time period from the CPP, as the policy is not put into effect until 2016, the annual 
reductions are much greater at a level of 13% below the no-policy scenario by 2030.8 
 The GHG emissions reductions do differ however, when the RPS is stacked with the 
CPP. Stacking the RPS with the rate-based or mass-based CPP results in cumulative emissions 
reductions of 6% over the 2007-2030 time period and 14% annually by 2014. The state-level 
RPSs would reduce GHG emission 3% annually by 2030, showing that much of the emission 
reductions achieved from the RPSs are nested in the those from the CPP. 
                                                 
8 These results are derived from a model that assumes exogenous increases of energy efficiency and coal power 
plant efficiency, without which the annual emissions reduction would be greater. The sensitivity analysis suggest the 
emission reductions would be 17% below the baseline. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
 
One of the most significant climate policies in US the CPP will be implemented in the electricity 
and portends large effects on CO2 emissions, electricity generation mix, prices, and social 
welfare. I consider the different effects that come about from implementing the CPP using a rate-
based or mass-based standard at the state-level as is currently choice for states. I also compare 
this to a national mass-based CPP (emissions cap) which is equivalent to a cap and trade, to find 
welfare cost of the policies. Additionally, I also consider the effect of implementing the RPSs 
along with the CPP (in either form) as is expected to be the case in actuality. In order to evaluate 
these different policies scenarios I update the BEPAM-E model to include detailed power plant 
level smokestack CO2 emission rates and the state-level CPP targets. The results show that there 
will be largely different effects on the electricity mix, welfare cost, and policy incidence 
depending on whether the CPP is chosen to be attained via rate-based or mass-based targets. The 
use of a rate-based CPP by states would result in large decreases of coal-based generation with a 
small increase in natural gas-based generation and significant increases in renewable-based 
generation and total electricity consumption would decrease. This compares with mass-based 
CPP which induces greater reductions in all fossil fuel-based sources and in electricity 
consumption, but increases renewable-based generation at a lower amount than a rate-based 
policy would. These differ from a national emissions cap would reduce total generation by a 
greater amount than the state-level policies, but also result in less development of renewables. As 
suggested by theory the national emission cap has a lower welfare cost than either the state-level 
rate-based or mass-based CPP, at an amount of $57 billion or $36 billion less welfare cost, 
respectively. These lower cost are achieved by the national cap allowing for lower cost 
abatement options that are not available when targets are set at regional levels. 
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 I also find that consideration of RPSs that will be implemented along with the CPP is 
important in determining the electricity generation mix, welfare cost, and GHG abatement 
induced by these policies. Generally, implementing the RPSs along with the different versions of 
the CPP results in both greater reduction coal and natural gas-based generation and increases in 
renewable-based generation, where the total effect is to increase electricity consumption above 
what it would have been under only the CPP. This slightly increased level of electricity 
consumption corresponds with slightly dampened price increases compared to the CPP alone. 
Taking price and quantity effects together the results on economic surplus of the CPP are to 
dampen the loss of electricity consumer surplus and dampen the gain of electricity producer 
surplus. As in both cases natural gas-based generation is reduced under the CPP when the RPSs 
are added, they lead to decrease natural gas producer surplus and increase natural gas consumer 
surplus. 
 The CPP being a new policy, with the final rule only being released in the Federal 
Register in October, there will be more to learn about how the policy works going forward. This 
research, however suggest if states attempt to attain the policy goals under mass-based rules they 
can be achieved a lower economic cost than a rate-based rule, the incidence of the mass-based 
policy is much more dramatic than that of the rate-based rule. Furthermore, the currently existing 
RPSs are not entirely obviated by the CPP, as when they are implemented the result in renewable 
energy development above what would be attained under the CPP. The RPSs also act to dampen 
the price increases that would be seen under the CPP, thus lessening the incidence on electricity 
consumers. 
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4.7 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1: Energy Production 
Energy Source 
No-
policy RPS CPP rate  
CPP 
mass  
National 
CPP 
mass 
RPS & 
CPP rate  
RPS & 
CPP 
mass 
Fossil Fuels Quantity % Change from No Policy 
Electricity   
      Coal (M MWh) 1892 -5.1% -32.7% -30.1% -29.4% -33.5% -30.9% 
Natural Gas ( M MWh) 888 -13.4% 3.8% -9.8% -12.5% -0.5% -14.4% 
Fuel Oil (M MWh) 19.8 0.0% -4.0% -0.5% -0.5% -4.0% -0.4% 
Total Generation (M MWh) 4155 1.3% -3.1% -9.9% -11.4% -2.1% -8.3% 
Renewable Sources Quantity Absolute change from No Policy 
Electricity   
      Co-firing (M MWh) 36.3 78.2 86.1 88.5 94.3 85.0 89.4 
Co-product (M MWh) 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Dedicated biomass (M MWh) 0.81 26.6 151.2 72.9 22.4 159.5 85.8 
Wind (M MWh) 37.2 165.1 222.3 84.0 77.3 307.5 193.8 
All Renewables (M MWh) 417.8 269.9 459.5 245.4 194.0 552.0 369.0 
Share of renewables (% points) 10.06 6.3 11.7 7.7 6.6 13.8 10.6 
Agricultural Products Quantity Absolute change from No Policy 
Land Use (Ha)   
      Total Cropland 120.0 0.5 2.8 1.8 0.8 -120.0 -120.0 
Food Crops 117.0 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -117.0 -117.0 
Corn for Ethanol 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.0 -3.0 
Energy Crops 0.0 0.7 3.3 2.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 
Corn Stover 0.0 6.3 16.3 10.9 6.8 0.0 0.0 
Wheat Straw 0.0 2.6 5.3 3.6 2.4 0.0 0.0 
Biomass (M MT)   
      Agricultural Biomass 0.0 51.7 151.0 94.6 56.9 155.9 103.3 
Forest Biomass 32.2 12.1 9.8 9.8 9.8 12.1 12.1 
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Table 4.2: Market Prices 
  
No-
policy RPS 
CPP 
rate  
CPP 
mass  
National 
CPP 
mass 
RPS & 
CPP 
rate  
RPS 
& 
CPP 
mass 
    % Change from No-policy 
Electricity Price (avg. cents/kwh) 11.2 -4 7 28 34 4 23 
Coal generation (max) 4.9 -3 -20 -19 -18 -21 -21 
Natural gas generation 9.5 -6 -2 -9 -8 -2 -10 
Co-firing 5.7 26 26 18 10 27 19 
Wind 13.0 15 13 15 11 12 13 
Natural gas price ($/MMBtu) 5.16 -9 1 -8 -10 -1 -9 
Farmgate biomass price ($/MT) 35.3 58 105 75 46 104 77 
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Table 4.3: Welfare Cost and GHG Emissions 
  RPS 
CPP 
rate  
CPP 
mass  
National 
CPP 
mass 
RPS & 
CPP rate  
RPS & 
CPP 
mass 
  Change from No Policy 
Agricultural Sector 
      Agricultural Consumers ($B) -0.2 -1.5 -0.2 0.0 -1.4 -0.8 
Biomass Producers ($B) 8.9 14.1 6.3 4.5 19.0 12.3 
Agricultural Producers ($B) 0.2 1.7 0.2 -0.1 1.4 0.8 
Electricity Sector 
      Electricity Consumers ($B) 106.6 -179.6 -587.9 -561.9 -68.2 -386.3 
Electricity Producers ($B) -222.5 34.3 475.3 476.0 -162.2 182.7 
Natural Gas Producers ($B) -62.6 16.3 -22.7 -12.1 -26.3 -67.2 
Natural Gas Consumers ($B) 85.8 -22.3 30.9 16.0 34.3 93.5 
Transportation Fuel Sector 
      Cellulosic Ethanol Refineries ($B) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gas and Diesel Producers ($B) 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.5 
VKT Consumers ($B) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0 
Government 
      Government Revenue ($B) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 
      US Economic Surplus ($B) -183.1 -148.7 -127.4 -91.4 -284.9 -272.1 
Emissions in 2030 
      GHG Emission in 2030 (%) -3% -13% -13% -13% -14% -14% 
Cumulative Emissions 
      Agricultural and Forest GHG Emission 0.0 0.7 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 
Transportation Sector GHG Emissions 0.0 -3.1 -3.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
Electricity Sector GHG Emissions -2.5 -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 -6.3 -6.3 
US GHG Emissions (B MT) -2.4 -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 -6.3 -6.3 
US GHG Emissions (%) -2.3% -4.9% -4.9% -4.9% -5.9% -5.9% 
Global GHG Emissions -2.4 -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 -6.3 -6.2 
Cost of Abatement 
      US Cost of Abatement ($/B MT) 76 29 25 18 46 44 
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Figure 4.1: Shadow Price of Mass-based CPP 
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Chapter 5  
Summary 
 
The overriding theme of the three papers included in this dissertation is the evaluation and 
analysis from an economic perspective of significant energy and climate policies, which may 
have a positive effect on reducing GHG emissions and thereby diminishing the extent of 
anthropogenic climate change in this century and beyond. The first two papers of this 
dissertation begins this work by advancing the literature on both the effects of the state-level 
RPS and in understanding and quantifying the interaction and spillover effects that can occur 
when the RFS and state-level policies are implemented concurrently and have commonalities 
through bioenergy. I expand on the spillover effects of these two policies to consider the 
implications for GHG emissions on welfare cost for the US and the rest of the world when these 
sector-specific policies are compared to a GHG equivalent economy-wide carbon tax. I also 
extend this analysis to also consider the extent to which a RPS implemented at the national level 
could increase economic efficiency at which renewable energy development goals are achieved. 
In my final paper I examine the newest and what results suggest is the most significant policy in 
the US to reduce GHG emissions from the electricity sector: the Clean Power Plan. I consider the 
implications of implementing the CPP as either a rate-based or mass-based emissions standard 
and how it would compare to national carbon emissions cap. I then leverage the research done in 
the first two papers on RPS to evaluate how stacking the CPP with the state-level RPSs affects 
the economy.  
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 The underlying framework for these analyses is the development of an integrated model 
of the US agricultural, electricity, and transportation sectors called BEPAM-E. This model 
incorporates an integrated model of the US electricity sector, which interacts with agricultural 
and transportation sectors through bioenergy markets and transportation. The electricity sector 
model at fundamental level consists of electricity producers, power plants, and electricity 
consumers. Electricity consumers are represented by aggregate demand functions at 20 EMRs 
consisting of demand from industry, commercial, and residential consumers. The 20 EMRs have 
interaction through interregional transmission that can be undertaken. Electricity generators or 
power plants are represented at the CRD level, by energy source for existing power plants and 
EMR levels for endogenously electricity generation from new power plants. An important source 
of new generation is from the bioenergy sector. Electricity is generated from biomass through 
three sources: co-firing of coal and biomass, at dedicated bio-power plants, and through co-
product electricity generated at cellulosic ethanol refineries built to attain the goals of the RFS.  
 The results of this model include the endogenously determined prices and quantities for 
the energy, transportation, and agricultural goods consider allow for quantification of social 
welfare or economic surplus in these sectors and how it changes across policies. Additionally 
GHG emissions from these sectors can also be quantified across scenarios.  
 To highlight some of the results of this research, there are the results on how the extent to 
which the state-level RPS reduce GHG emissions and induce development of renewable energy, 
where I find that over the 2007-2030 period GHG emissions are reduced by about 3% similar to 
the amount by which the RFS would reduce GHG emissions. However, I find that unlike the 
RFS which leads a significant market-mediated (i.e. rebound effect) in ROW GHG emissions 
largely offset the domestic reductions, the RPSs market-mediated effects are not substantial. The 
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welfare cost of state-level RPSs however is much higher than that of the RFS. I find that in terms 
of the cost-effectiveness of these policies the RPS are less cost-effective in achieving GHG 
emission reductions domestically than both the RFS and RPSs combined. This story changes 
when consider the ROW effects which make the cost-effectiveness of the RFS and RPSs less 
than just the RPSs; a carbon tax is a more efficient way to achieve an equivalent reduction in 
GHG emissions both domestically and globally. I also quantify the inefficiency of imposing 
heterogeneous RPSs at the state-level compared to a national standard which achieves the same 
share of renewable energy in the electricity sector, where I find that share of renewable energy 
generation induced by the state-level RPSs could be achieved by a national policy at a cost of 
$61 Billion less over the 2007-2030 time period. This national RPS also achieves a much greater 
reduction in GHG emissions by leading to a greater reduction coal-fired power. These two 
results imply that a national RPS to be about twice as cost-effective as the state-level RPSs. The 
results from analysis of effects different version of the CPP show the substantial differences in 
electricity generation mix, total generation, energy prices, and welfare cost that occur when 
specify policy targets. The state-level, rate-based CPP while substantially decreasing coal based 
generation would slightly increase natural gas-based generation and would increase renewable 
substantially as well. By imposing the CPP as a mass-based standard that achieves equivalent 
emissions reductions, the coal and natural gas-based generation decrease more substantially, 
while renewable-based generation increases less than it would under the rate based. The results 
show the rate-based CPP has a welfare cost that is about $22 billion greater than the mass-based 
CPP, which in turn is greater than national emissions cap by about $36 billion. The effect of 
implementing the CPP concurrently with the RPSs is to increase renewable energy generation, 
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and to dampen the price increases seen under the CPP, thus the RPSs are not obviated by the 
CPP. 
 The research described here advances the understanding of quantifying policy interaction 
and spillovers that can occur when dealing with the most carbon-intensive sectors in the US 
economy. With the general policy implications being that policy goals set at regional levels are 
less effective than national goals and that policies that are aimed at achieving GHG reductions 
but are not confined to a single economic sector can be both more effective and less costly. 
Utilizing the broad and flexible modeling framework developed in this dissertation, there are 
many pathways of further research that could be undertaken. I think some important areas future 
research that would prove fruitful would be to consider the impact of allowing for endogenous 
location of both power plants and biofuel refineries to better understand the effects of space on 
policy effectiveness. The recent developments in the electric vehicle industry, suggest that 
further integration in the modeling of electricity and transportation sectors is necessary to better 
evaluate the effectiveness and cost energy and climate policies. Also it is of interest how states 
choose to impose the requirements of the CPP and what effect that has on social welfare and 
GHG emissions. 
 
 101 
 
 
References 
Abt, K.L., R.C. Abt, and C. Galik. 2012. “Effect of Bioenergy Demands and Supply Response 
on Markets, Carbon, and Land Use.” Forest Science 58(5):523–539. 
Acton, J.P., B.M. Mitchell, and R. Sohlberg. 1980. “Estimating residential electricity demand 
under declining-block tariffs: an econometric study using micro-data.” Applied 
Economics 12(2):145–161. 
Babcock, B., K. Barr, and M. Carriquiry. 2010. “Costs and Benefits to Taxpayers, Consumers, 
and Producers from U.S. Ethanol Policies.” Staff Report 10-SR 106 Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University.  
Beach, R.H., and B.A. McCarl. 2010. “U.S. Agricultural and forestry Impacts of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act: FASOM Results and Model Description.” RTI 
International, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709.  
Beach, R.H., Y.W. Zhang, and B.A. Mccarl. 2012. “Modeling bioenergy, land use, and ghg 
emissions with fasomghg: model overview and analysis of storage cost implications.” 
Climate Change Economics 03(03). 
Bird, L., C. Chapman, J. Logan, J. Sumner, and W. Short. 2011. “Evaluating renewable portfolio 
standards and carbon cap scenarios in the U.S. electric sector.” Energy Policy 
39(5):2573–2585. 
Brechbill, S.C., W.E. Tyner, and K.E. Ileleji. 2011. “The Economics of Biomass Collection and 
Transportation and Its Supply to Indiana Cellulosic and Electric Utility Facilities.” 
BioEnergy Research 4(2):141–152. 
Bushnell, J.B., S.P. Holland, J.E. Hughes, and C.R. Knittel. 2014. “Strategic Policy Choice in 
State-Level Regulation: The EPA’s Clean Power Plan.” Energy Institute at Haas 
Working Paper. Available at: 
https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/pdf/working_papers/WP255.pdf [Accessed May 6, 2015]. 
Chen, C., R. Wiser, A. Mills, and M. Bolinger. 2009. “Weighing the costs and benefits of state 
renewables portfolio standards in the United States: A comparative analysis of state-level 
policy impact projections.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 13(3):552–566. 
Chen, X., H. Huang, M. Khanna, and H. Önal. 2014. “Alternative transportation fuel standards: 
Welfare effects and climate benefits.” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 67(3):241–257. 
 102 
 
Chen, X., H. Huang, M. Khanna, and H. Onal. 2011. “Meeting the Mandate for Biofuels: 
Implications for Land Use and Food and Fuel Prices.” In Working Paper No. 16697 
(http://www.nber.org/papers/w16697). 
Chen, X., and M. Khanna. 2013. “Food vs. Fuel: The Effect of Biofuel Policies.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 95(2):289–295. 
Chen, X., and M. Khanna. 2012. “The Market-Mediated Effects of Low Carbon Fuel Policies.” 
AgBioForum 15(1). 
Chen, X., and H. Onal. 2012. “Modeling Agricultural Supply Response Using Mathematical 
Programming and Crop Mixes.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94(3):674–
686. 
Dahl, C., and T.E. Duggan. 1996. “U.S. energy product supply elasticities: A survey and 
application to the U.S. oil market.” Resource and Energy Economics 18(3):243–263. 
DOT. 2010. “Transportation’s Role in Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Volume 1: 
Synthesis Report.” US Department of Transportation, Center for Climate Change and 
Environmental Forecasting, Washington, D.C.  
Driscoll, C.T., J.J. Buonocore, J.I. Levy, K.F. Lambert, D. Burtraw, S.B. Reid, H. Fakhraei, and 
J. Schwartz. 2015. “US power plant carbon standards and clean air and health co-
benefits.” Nature Climate Change 5(6):535–540. 
DSIRE. 2011. “Quantitative RPS data.” Database of State Incentives for Renewables and 
Efficiency, NC Clean Energy Technology Center.  North Carolina State University.  
Dubin, J.A., and D.L. McFadden. 1984. “An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric 
Appliance Holdings and Consumption.” Econometrica 52(2):345–362. 
Dumortier, J. 2013. “Co-firing in coal power plants and its impact on biomass feedstock 
availability.” Energy Policy 60:396–405. 
Dwivedi, P., W. Wang, T. Hudiburg, D. Jaiswal, W. Parton, S. Long, E. DeLucia, and M. 
Khanna. 2015. “Cost of Abating Greenhouse Gas Emissions with Cellulosic Ethanol.” 
Environmental Science & Technology 49(4):2512–2522. 
EIA. 2007. “Annual Energy Outlook 2007.” U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration. Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. Washington, DC.  
EIA. 2010a. “Annual Energy Outlook 2010: With Projections to 2035.” U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, U.S. Department of 
Energy.  
EIA. 2012. “Annual Energy Outlook 2012.” U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration. Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. Washington, DC.  
 103 
 
EIA. 2011a. “Electricity tends to flow south in North America.” Today in Energy Energy 
Information Administration. Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4270. 
EIA. 2013. “Electric Power Annual 2012.” U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration.  
EIA. 2010b. “State Energy Data System.” U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration. Washington, DC.  
EIA. 2011b. “The Electricity Market Module of the National Energy Modeling System Model 
Documentation Report.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated 
Analysis and Forecasting.  
EPA. 2015. “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units; Final Rule.” Federal Register.  
EPA. 2010a. “Emissions & Generation Integrated Database 2010.” U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency. Washington, DC.  
EPA. 2010b. “Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard 
Program; Final Rule.” Federal Register  
Espey, J.A., and M. Espey. 2004. “Turning on the lights: A meta-analysis of residential 
electricity demand elasticities.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 
36(1):65–82. 
Fischer, C. 2010. “Renewable Portfolio Standards: When Do They Lower Energy Prices?” 
Energy Journal 31(1):101–119. 
Fischer, C., and R.G. Newell. 2008. “Environmental and technology policies for climate 
mitigation.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55(2):142–162. 
Fischer, C., and L. Preonas. 2010. “Combining Policies for Renewable Energy: Is the Whole 
Less than the Sum of its Parts?” No. ID 1569634, Social Science Research Network. 
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1569634 [Accessed June 7, 2013]. 
Fowlie, M., L. Goulder, M. Kotchen, S. Borenstein, J. Bushnell, L. Davis, M. Greenstone, C. 
Kolstad, C. Knittel, R. Stavins, and others. 2014. “An economic perspective on the EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan.” Science 346:815–816. 
Fraas, A.G., and R.C. Johansson. 2009. “Conflicting Goals: Energy Security vs. GHG 
Reductions Under the EISA Cellulosic Ethanol Mandate.” No. ID 1473990, Social 
Science Research Network. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1473990 
[Accessed July 31, 2013]. 
 104 
 
Gillis, J. 2013. “Carbon Dioxide Level Passes Long-Feared Milestone.” The New York Times. 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/11/science/earth/carbon-dioxide-level-
passes-long-feared-milestone.html [Accessed March 6, 2014]. 
GREET. 2013. “GREET Model The Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use 
in Transportation Model.” Argonne National Laboratory.  
Haq, Z. 2002. “Biomass for Electricity Generation.” U.S. Department of Energy, Energy 
Information Administration. Washington, DC.  
Helfand, G.E. 1991. “Standards versus Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution 
Restrictions.” The American Economic Review 81(3):622–634. 
Hertel, T.W., W.E. Tyner, and D.K. Birur. 2010. “The Global Impacts of Biofuel Mandates.” 
The Energy Journal 31(1):75–100. 
Huang, H., M. Khanna, H. Önal, and X. Chen. 2012. “Stacking low carbon policies on the 
renewable fuels standard: Economic and greenhouse gas implications.” Energy Policy. 
Available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512005046 
[Accessed November 16, 2012]. 
Humbird, D., R. Davis, L. Tao, C. Kinchin, D. Hsu, A. Aden, P. Schoen, J. Lukas, B. Olthof, and 
M. Worley. 2011. “Process Design and Economics for Biochemical Conversion of 
Lignocellulosic Biomass to Ethanol National Renewable Energy Laboratory Report 
NREL.” TP-5100-47764.  
Ince, P.J., A.D. Kramp, K.E. Skog, D. Yoo, and V.A. Sample. 2011. “Modeling future U.S. 
forest sector market and trade impacts of expansion in wood energy consumption.” 
Journal of Forest Economics 17(2):142–156. 
Jain, A. k, M. Khanna, M. Erickson, and H. Huang. 2010. “An integrated biogeochemical and 
economic analysis of bioenergy crops in the Midwestern United States.” GCB Bioenergy 
2(5):217–234. 
Johnson, E.P. 2014. “The cost of carbon dioxide abatement from state renewable portfolio 
standards.” Resource and Energy Economics 36(2):332–350. 
Khanna, M., and X. Chen. 2013. “Economic, Energy Security, and Greenhouse Gas Effects of 
Biofuels: Implications for Policy.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
95(5):1325–1331. 
Khanna, M., X. Chen, H. Huang, and H. Önal. 2011. “Supply of Cellulosic Biofuel Feedstocks 
and Regional Production Pattern.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
93(2):473–480. 
Khanna, M., and C.L. Crago. 2012. “Measuring Indirect Land Use Change with Biofuels: 
Implications for Policy.” Annual Review of Resource Economics 4(1):161–184. 
 105 
 
Khanna, M., B. Dhungana, and J. Clifton-Brown. 2008. “Costs of producing miscanthus and 
switchgrass for bioenergy in Illinois.” Biomass and Bioenergy 32(6):482–493. 
Koppejan, J., and S. van Loo. 2012. The Handbook of Biomass Combustion and Co-firing. 
Routledge. 
Kotchen, M.J., and E.T. Mansur. 2012. “How Stringent is the EPA’s Proposed Carbon Pollution 
Standard for New Power Plants?” SSRN eLibrary. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2046238 [Accessed August 16, 
2012]. 
Kydes, A.S. 2007. “Impacts of a renewable portfolio generation standard on US energy 
markets.” Energy Policy 35(2):809–814. 
Lapan, H., and G. Moschini. 2012. “Second-best biofuel policies and the welfare effects of 
quantity mandates and subsidies.” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 63(2):224–241. 
LaTourrette, T., D.S. Ortiz, E. Hlavka, N. Burger, and G. Cecchine. 2011. “Supplying Biomass 
to Power Plants.” Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR876.html 
[Accessed June 6, 2013]. 
Latta, G.S., J.S. Baker, R.H. Beach, S.K. Rose, and B.A. McCarl. 2013. “A multi-sector 
intertemporal optimization approach to assess the GHG implications of U.S. forest and 
agricultural biomass electricity expansion.” Journal of Forest Economics 19(4):361–383. 
Linn, J., Mastrangelo, and D. Burtraw. 2014. “Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal Power 
Plants under the Clean Air Act.” Journal of the Association of Environmental and 
Resource Economists 1(1/2):97–134. 
McCarl, B.A., D.M. Adams, R.J. Alig, and John T. Chmelik. 2000. “Competitiveness of 
biomass-fueled electrical power plants.” Annals of Operations Research 94(1-4):37–55. 
McDonald, A., and L. Schrattenholzer. 2001. “Learning rates for energy technologies.” Energy 
Policy 29(4):255–261. 
Miao, R., M. Khanna, and H. Huang. forthcoming. “Responsiveness of Crop Yield and Acreage 
to Prices and Climate.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
Nogee, A., J. Deyette, and S. Clemmer. 2007. “The Projected Impacts of a National Renewable 
Portfolio Standard.” The Electricity Journal 20(4):33–47. 
OECD. 2012. OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Available at: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264122246-en [Accessed March 6, 2014]. 
 
 106 
 
Oliver, A., and M. Khanna. 2015a. “Implementing the Renewable Fuel Standard with the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard in the US: Implications for Policy Costs and Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions.” No. ID 2591094, Social Science Research Network. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2591094 [Accessed April 6, 2015]. 
Oliver, A., and M. Khanna. 2015b. “Spillover Effects of Sector-Specific Renewable Energy 
Policies: Implications for GHG Emissions.” No. ID 2667289, Social Science Research 
Network. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2667289 [Accessed September 
29, 2015]. 
Palmer, K., and D. Burtraw. 2005. “Cost-effectiveness of renewable electricity policies.” Energy 
Economics 27(6):873–894. 
Palmer, K., R. Sweeney, and M. Allaire. 2010. “Modeling Policies to Promote Renewable and 
Low-Carbon Sources of Electricity.” Backgrounder. Washington, DC: Resources for the 
Future. 
Paltsev, S., J.M. Reilly, H.D. Jacoby, and J.F. Morris. 2009. “The cost of climate policy in the 
United States.” Energy Economics 31, Supplement 2:S235–S243. 
Paul, A., D. Burtraw, and K. Palmer. 2009. “Haiku Documentation: RFF’s Electricity Market 
Model Version 2.0.” Resources for the Future.  
Perlack, R.D., and B.J. Stokes. 2011. “U.S. Billion-Ton Update: Biomass Supply for a Bioenergy 
and Bioproducts Industry.” No. ORNL/TM-2011/224, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
Oak Ridge, TN.  
Qin, X., T. Mohan, M. El-Halwagi, G. Cornforth, and B.A. McCarl. 2006. “Switchgrass as an 
alternate feedstock for power generation: an integrated environmental, energy and 
economic life-cycle assessment.” Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy 8:233–
249. 
Reiss, P.C., and M.W. White. 2005. “Household Electricity Demand, Revisited.” The Review of 
Economic Studies 72(3):853–883. 
Searcy, E., P. Flynn, E. Ghafoori, and A. Kumar. 2007. “The Relative Cost of Biomass Energy 
Transport.” In J. R. Mielenz, K. T. Klasson, W. S. Adney, and J. D. McMillan, eds. 
Applied Biochemistry and Biotecnology. ABAB Symposium. Humana Press, pp. 639–
652. Available at: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-60327-181-3_52 
[Accessed October 22, 2014]. 
UCS. 2011. “A Bright Future for the Heartland: Technical Appendix.” Union of Concerned 
Scientists. Available at: http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-
solutions/increase-renewables/a-bright-future-for-the-heartland.html [Accessed July 31, 
2013]. 
 107 
 
White, E.M., G. Latta, R.J. Alig, K.E. Skog, and D.M. Adams. 2013. “Biomass production from 
the U.S. forest and agriculture sectors in support of a renewable electricity standard.” 
Energy Policy 58:64–74. 
Wiser, R., and M. Bolinger. 2007. “Can deployment of renewable energy put downward pressure 
on natural gas prices?” Energy Policy 35(1):295–306. 
de Wit, M., M. Junginger, S. Lensink, M. Londo, and A. Faaij. 2010. “Competition between 
biofuels: Modeling technological learning and cost reductions over time.” Biomass and 
Bioenergy 34(2):203–217. 
 108 
 
  
Algebraic Description of BEPAM-E 
 
A.1 Introduction 
BEPAM-E is a nonlinear, dynamic, multi-sector, price-endogenous, open-economy, 
partial equilibrium, mathematical programming model that simulates U.S. agricultural, 
transportation fuel, and electric power sectors including international trade with the rest of the 
world (ROW). Market equilibrium is found by maximizing the sum of consumers’ and 
producers’ surpluses in the agricultural, transportation fuel, and electric power sectors subject to 
various material balance constraints and technological constraints underlying commodity 
production and consumption in a dynamic framework. BEPAM considers regional supply of 
crop and biofuel feedstocks at Crop Reporting District (CRD) level where crop production costs, 
yields, and resource endowments are specified for each CRD and each crop. The CRD is also 
used as a spatial unit to model electricity generation from existing power plants by fuel type, 
while generation from new electricity capacity is considered at Electricity Market Regions 
(EMR).9 The model endogenously determines the agriculture and transportation sector variables 
of food consumption, gasoline, diesel, and biofuel consumption, imports of gasoline and 
sugarcane ethanol, mix of biofuels, and regional land allocation among different food, feed and 
fuel crops and livestock activities over a given time horizon. It also endogenously determine 
electricity sector variables such as generation by energy type (coal, natural gas, oil, wind, co-
fired biomass, dedicated biomass, and co-product), regional electricity consumption, inter-
                                                 
9 Existing electricity generation capacity is aggregated to the CRD by taking the sum of capacity and the generation-
weighted average heat-rate of all power plants located in a given CRD for each type of energy source. The definition 
of EMRs is described in the spatial units section. 
 109 
 
regional electricity transmission, and GHG emissions. 
A brief overview and major components of the model are described below, followed by a 
mathematical representation of the model objective function and individual constraints.  
A.2 Description of Spatial Units 
The sector model considers the 48 contiguous United Sates where production and 
consumption of the outputs and inputs at different levels of spatial aggregation as is described 
here. Crop Reporting District, State, and Electricity Market Region. There are 306 CRDs 
included in the model. These CRDs are designated by the USDA and are made up of a number of 
counties that are contiguous and within the same state. The 48 contiguous United States and the 
District of Columbia included. There are 20 electricity market regions that are aggregation of 
group of adjacent states approximating the National Energy Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
designations.10 
A.3 Transportation Fuel Sector 
The demand for transportation fuels is driven by the demand for vehicle kilometers 
traveled (VKT) that are produced by blending liquid fossil fuels and biofuels. BEPAM includes 
linear demand curves for VKT with four types of vehicles, including conventional gasoline 
(CV), flex fuel (FFV), gasoline-hybrid (HV), and diesel vehicles (DV). We also include the 
demand for kilometers traveled with plug-in and battery electric vehicles (EV), but in the current 
version of the model its consumption is determined exogenously. In producing VKT, we 
consider the difference in the energy content of alternative fuels, fuel economy of each type of 
vehicle, and technological limits that liquid fossil fuels and biofuels can be blended in particular 
types of vehicles. Therefore, in addition to a minimum ethanol blend for gasoline blend vehicles 
                                                 
10 The EMRs used here do not directly correspond to NERC regions, as they are all based on state boundaries. 
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to meet the oxygenate additive requirement, we impose the blend limits as specified by Energy 
Information Administration (EIA 2010b)for each of these four types of vehicles due to their 
technological constraints in blending biofuels with fossil fuels. We exogenously shift demand 
curves for VKT with each type of vehicle over time as projected by the Annual Energy Outlook 
(EIA 2010a) to capture the demand due to the growth in income and population. 
We include linear supply curves for domestic gasoline and for gasoline supply from the 
ROW. The excess supply of gasoline to the U.S. is determined by the difference between 
gasoline demand and supply in the ROW. We also include a linear supply curve for diesel that is 
assumed to be produced domestically.  
The biofuel sector includes several first and second generation biofuels. First generation 
biofuels include domestically produced corn ethanol and imported sugarcane ethanol, biodiesel 
produced from soybean oil, DDGS-derived corn oil and waste grease. As second generation 
biofuels, we include cellulosic ethanol and biodiesel derived from cellulosic biomass such as 
crop or forest residues and dedicated energy crops (miscanthus and switchgrass). Biomass can be 
converted to either cellulosic ethanol blended with gasoline or biomass-to-liquids (BTL) blended 
with diesel using the Fischer-Tropsch process. While the feedstock costs of producing biofuels 
are determined endogenously in the agricultural sector, processing costs of biofuels are assumed 
to decline with cumulative production using the experience curve approach (de Wit et al. 2010). 
A.4 Agricultural Sector 
The agricultural sector component includes fifteen conventional crops, eight livestock 
products, two perennial bioenergy crops, crop residues from the production of corn and wheat, 
forest residues, and co-products from the production of corn ethanol and soybean oil. In the crop 
and livestock markets, primary crop and livestock commodities are consumed either 
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domestically or traded with the ROW (exported or imported). Primary crop commodities can 
also be processed or directly fed to various animal categories. Domestic and export demands and 
import supplies are incorporated by assuming linear price-responsive demand/supply functions. 
The commodity demand functions and export demand functions for tradable row crops and 
processed commodities are shifted upward over time at exogenously specified rates.  
The model incorporates spatial heterogeneity in crop and livestock production, where the 
production costs and yields of individual crop/livestock activities and resource endowments are 
specified differently for each region based on crop/livestock budgets reported by various 
agricultural experiment stations and the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) 
database. Crops can be produced using alternative tillage, rotation, and irrigation practices. As 
spatial decision units we consider 295 CRDs in 41 U.S. states in five major regions.11 Crop 
yields increase over time at exogenously given rates based on econometrically estimated trends 
and price responsiveness of crop yields in the U.S. (Chen et al. 2011). Following (Hertel, Tyner 
and Birur 2010), we assume that marginal lands have a crop productivity that is two thirds of the 
average cropland productivity. Yields of the bioenergy crops are assumed to be the same on 
marginal lands and regular croplands, but they vary regionally. In the absence of observed yield 
data for energy crops in most regions, we use the simulated biomass yields obtained from 
MISCANMOD (Jain et al. 2010).  
The model includes five types of land in each CRD, namely cropland, idle land, cropland 
pasture, pasture land and forestland pasture. Cropland availability in each CRD is assumed to 
                                                 
11 Western region includes Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming; Plains includes Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Texas and Kansas; Midwest includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Ohio and Wisconsin; South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,  Mississippi and 
South Carolina; Atlantic includes Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey,  New York, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia 
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change in response to crop prices. Idle land and cropland pasture are assumed to move in and out 
of cropland and idle state. They can also be converted to the production of energy crops at a 
conversion cost assumed to be equal to the returns from producing the least profitable annual 
crop. We fix pasture land and forestland pasture at 2007 levels, while the land enrolled in the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is kept at levels authorized by the Farm Bill of 2008. Due 
to concerns about the impact of monocultures of perennial grasses on biodiversity or sub-surface 
water flows, we impose a 25% limit on the amount of land in a CRD that can be converted to 
perennial grasses.  
In the livestock sector, we consider chicken, turkey, lamb, beef, pork, wool, dairy and 
eggs. Livestock production requires nutrition in terms of protein and calories that are provided 
by feed crops and byproducts of crop processing, such as soymeal and Distiller's Dried Grains 
with Solubles (DDGS, a byproduct of corn ethanol). The demand for feed from the production of 
livestock products is then determined by the number of livestock animals and their nutrition 
requirements through the least cost feed mix approach. We impose upper bounds for the share of 
DDGS in total feed consumption for each livestock category as in (Babcock, Barr and Carriquiry 
2010). We model the supply of chicken, turkey, lamb, pork, wool, diary and eggs at the national 
level, and restrict their supply to be a weighted average of the historical supplies obtained from 
the NASS database. The beef and dairy cattle activities are modeled at CRD level because they 
require grazing land and compete for land with crop production in each region. Thus, the supply 
of beef is restricted by the number of cattle which in turn depends on the amount of grazing land 
available at regional level.  
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A.5 Electricity Sector 
The electricity sector component of the model considers electricity producers and 
consumers in the 48 contiguous states on an annual basis. The electricity sector is modeled 
regionally, where existing power plants by fuel type are modeled at the CRD-level, and new 
electricity generation and electricity demand are considered at the EMR-level. Electricity 
demand functions for each EMR are found by aggregating state level, sector specific (residential, 
commercial, and industrial) demand functions. Electricity is supplied from existing capacity and 
from new capacity that is endogenously determined.  
Existing power plants are aggregated to the CRD level by energy type which consists of 
coal, natural gas, oil, hydroelectric, nuclear, geothermal, waste, solar, biomass, wind, and other. 
This power plant capacity is regionally heterogeneous in the energy type, nameplate capacity, 
and conversion efficiency. The decision can also be made to expand generation capacity that 
uses natural gas, wind, or biomass energy. The expansion of biomass capacity can be 
accomplished by co-firing biomass at an existing coal power plant, generating it at a new 
dedicated bio-power plant, or generating net co-product electricity from cellulosic ethanol 
refining. Biomass must be transported from where it is produced to a coal power plant to be co-
fired and incurs a transportation cost for this based on the distance between production and use. 
Wind capacity can be expanded at the EMR-level and its cost depend upward sloping wind 
supply curves that are based on the quantity of wind resources available at a given level of cost. 
The price of Fossil fuels which are supplied to power plants are based on supply curves. 
Natural gas supply is specified at the national level, which gives a national wholesale price for 
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natural gas based on the quantity consumed.12 Power plants which consume natural gas must pay 
EMR-specific transmission and distribution cost in addition to the wholesale price. Coal and fuel 
oil prices are specified at the state level and are fixed on an annual basis.  
Electricity generated at a power plant must be transmitted to end-use consumers through 
transmission infrastructure. All electricity generation incurs a transmission cost and percentage 
loss before it can be consumed. The model also allows for electricity generated in a given 
electricity market region (EMR) to be transmitted to an adjacent market region to meet demand 
in that region subject to a transmission capacity constraint. 
A.6 Mathematical Representation 
We describe the algebraic model below. For convenience, we use lower case symbols to 
denote the exogenous parameters and upper case symbols to represent endogenously determined 
variables. We first describe the objective function then the constraints; the description of 
constraints follows Chen et al. (2014). 
A.6.1  Objective function 
The objective function is the sum of discounted consumers’ and producers’ surpluses 
obtained from production, consumption and international trade in the agricultural, fuel, and 
electric power sectors over a planning horizon of T and the terminal values of standing perennial 
grasses in year T. The algebraic expression is given in (1): 
                                                 
12 Natural gas demand from sectors other than electricity increases exogenously according to AEO projections (EIA 
2012); and is held constant across scenarios. 
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− ∑ 𝑙𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,𝑛𝑡,𝑡
𝑠,𝑛𝑡
− ∫ 𝑔𝑡(𝑁𝐺𝑡)𝑑(. )
𝑁𝐺𝑡
0
− ∑ 𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑡𝑁𝐺𝑀𝑒𝑟,𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑡
𝑒𝑟,𝑎𝑔𝑒
− ∑ 𝑓𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑒𝑟,𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟,𝑡
𝑓𝑓,𝑟(𝑒𝑟)
− ∑ ∫ ℎ𝑒𝑟(. )𝑑(. )
𝑄𝑊𝑒𝑟,𝑡
0𝑒𝑟
− 𝑝𝑐 ∗ 𝐵𝐸𝑡
− 𝑐𝑓 ∑ 𝐶𝐹𝑟,𝑡
𝑟
− ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑟1,𝑟2𝐵𝑇𝑟1,𝑟2,𝑡
𝑟1,𝑟2
− 𝑡𝑒𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑡 − ∑ 𝑟𝑐𝑟,𝑞𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑞
𝑟,𝑞
− ∑ 𝑝𝑐𝑟,𝑝𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑝
𝑟,𝑝
− ∑ 𝑟𝑠𝑟,𝑞𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑞
𝑟,𝑞
− ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑟Δ𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑝
𝑟,𝑝
− ∑ ∫ 𝑓𝑓𝑟,𝑟,𝑡(. )𝑑(. )
𝐹𝑅𝑓𝑟,𝑟,𝑡
0𝑓𝑟,𝑟
− ∑ 𝑙𝑐𝑘𝐿𝐼𝑉𝑡,𝑘
𝑘
− ∑ 𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡,𝑖
𝑖
− ∫ 𝑓𝑂(. )𝑑(. )
𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑡,𝑂
0
− ∫ 𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑙(. )𝑑(. )
𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡
0
− 𝑒𝑐𝑐𝐸𝑇𝐻𝑡,𝑐 − 𝑒𝑥𝑏𝐸𝑇𝐻𝑡,𝑏
− 𝑝𝑐𝑏𝐵𝑇𝐿𝑡 − ∑ 𝑝𝑐𝑗𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡,𝑗
𝑗
} + 𝑒−𝑟𝑇 ∑(𝑣𝑟,𝑝 − 𝑤𝑟)𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑇,𝑟,𝑝
𝑟,𝑝
 
(1)  
 
The first integral term in the first line of (1) represents the areas under the demand 
functions from which consumers’ surplus is derived. Each integral is associated with a crop, 
livestock, or processed commodity for which a domestic market demand is considered: 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑡,𝑧 
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denotes the endogenous domestic demand variable in year t; z =(i,j,k) denotes the index set for 
crop commodities (i), processed products from crops (j), and livestock commodities (k); 𝑓𝑧(. ) 
denotes the inverse demand function for the associated commodity; and d(.) denotes the 
integration variable. The next two integral terms account for the areas under the inverse demand 
functions for exports, 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡,𝑧 and the areas under the import supply functions, 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑡,𝑧 (such as 
sugar and sugarcane ethanol).  
The first integral term in the second line of (1) represents the area under the inverse 
demand function for kilometers traveled with alternative vehicle choices (v) (denoted by 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑡,𝑣). 
The second integral term denotes the area under the inverse demand function for VKT with 
diesel vehicles (denoted by 𝑀𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡). The third integral term in the same line represents the area 
under the inverse demand function for gasoline consumed by the ROW (denoted by 𝐺𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑤). The 
demand functions for crop and livestock products, kilometers traveled and ROW gasoline 
consumption are all characterized by linear demand functions in the current version, but other 
functional forms, such as constant elasticity demand functions, can be incorporated without 
difficulty.  
The first integral term in the third line of (1) pertains to the electricity sector and 
represents the area under the inverse demand curves for electricity generation. The choice 
variable 𝑄𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡 is the quantity of electricity consumed in EMR er during year t from all energy 
sources. The function 𝑓𝑒𝑟,𝑡(. ) is the inverse demand curve for electricity in EMR er during year 
t. The second term on line two is a summation that represents the variable operations and 
maintenance (O&M) cost for electricity generation from current power plants and co-firing. The 
parameter 𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑡 is the O&M cost for electricity generated from generation technology type et and 
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the variable 𝑄𝑅𝑒𝑡,𝑟,𝑡 represents the electricity generated from energy source type et in CRD r 
during year t. The third term on line three represents levelized cost of electricity generation from 
new power plants. The parameter 𝑙𝑐𝑛𝑡 is the levelized cost of generating electricity from a new 
power plant of type nt and the choice variable 𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,𝑛𝑡,𝑡 is the quantity of electricity generated in 
EMR er from a new power plant of type nt during year t. 
The first integral term on line four of (1) represents the area under the national supply 
curve for natural gas. The endogenous variable 𝑁𝐺𝑡 is the quantity of natural gas used to produce 
electricity for all EMRs during the year t and the function 𝑔𝑡(. ) represents the supply curve for 
natural gas at year t. The second term on line four of (1) represents the regional transmission and 
distribution costs of natural gas for electric power EMR. The parameter 𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑡 is the transmission 
and distribution cost per unit of natural gas by EMR 𝑒𝑟 at year 𝑡 and the endogenous variable 
𝑁𝐺𝑀𝑒𝑟,𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑡 is the quantity of natural gas used in EMR 𝑒𝑟, at power plant of type 𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∈
{𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑔, 𝑛𝑒𝑤}, during year t.  
The first summation term on line five of (1) is a summation that represents the fuel cost 
of power plants that consume coal or fuel oil to generate electricity. The parameter 𝑓𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑒𝑟,𝑡 cost 
of fuel for fuel type 𝑓𝑓 ∈ {𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙, 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑖𝑙}, in EMR in er, during year t and the variable 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟,𝑡 
is the quantity of fuel type ff used in a corresponding power plant type in CRD r, during t. The 
second summation term on the fifth line of (1) is an integral term that represents the area under 
the supply curve for electricity generated from new wind capacity. The choice variable 𝑄𝑊𝑒𝑟,𝑡 is 
the quantity of electricity generated from new wind capacity in EMR er, during year t. The 
functions ℎ𝑒𝑟(. ) are the supply curves for new wind generation in EMR er. The second term in 
the fifth line of (1) represents the processing costs for biomass from any type of feedstock that is 
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used to generate electricity at either a dedicated biomass power plant or co-fired at a coal power 
plant.13 The parameter pc is the processing cost and the variable 𝐵𝐸𝑡 is the quantity of biomass 
from all feedstock types that is used to generate electricity at dedicated biomass power plants or 
co-fired at a coal plant during year t.  
The first term on the sixth line of (1) represents the cost of retrofitting a coal power plant 
for co-firing. The parameter cf is the cost of retrofitting a MW of coal plant capacity for co-firing 
and the variable 𝐶𝐹𝑟,𝑡 is the amount of capacity converted for co-firing at that power plant. The 
second term in the sixth line of (1) represents the transportation cost of biomass for electricity 
generation for co-firing. The parameter 𝑡𝑟𝑟1,𝑟2 is the per-metric ton cost of transporting biomass 
from any type of feedstock from CRD 𝑟1 to CRD 𝑟2 and the variable 𝐵𝑇𝑟1,𝑟2,𝑡 is the quantity of 
biomass transported from CRD 𝑟1 to CRD 𝑟2, during year 𝑡. The second term in the sixth line 
represents the externality costs due to greenhouse gas emissions (𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑡) with an exogenously 
fixed carbon tax of te. The last term of sixth line and all of the terms of the eight line of (1) 
include the production costs of row crops, perennial crops, and collecting crop and forest 
residues for biofuel production. The land allocated to row crops and perennial crops (acreage) in 
region r and year t is denoted by 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑞 and 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑝, respectively. The production of row 
crops may use one of various production practices, denoted by q, which differ by crop rotation, 
tillage, and irrigation. Parameters denoting the production costs of row and perennial crops are 
𝑟𝑐_(𝑟, 𝑞) and 𝑝𝑐𝑟,𝑝. Leontief production functions are assumed for both row crops and perennial 
crops production. 
                                                 
13 This cost does not apply to electricity that is generated as a co-product at a cellulosic ethanol refinery. 
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The first term in the seventh line of (1) represents the cost of collecting crop residues 
(corn stover and wheat straw for cellulosic biofuel production), and we use 𝑟𝑠𝑟,𝑞 to denote the 
collection costs of crop residues. The amount of marginal lands converted for perennial grasses 
are denoted by Δ𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑝 and 𝑐𝑐𝑟 represents the conversion cost per unit of marginal land. The 
fourth term in the third line denotes the costs of converting marginal lands (such as idle land and 
crop pasture land) for producing perennial crops, which include costs of land clearing, wind 
rowing and any necessary activities for seedbed preparation.  
The first term on the eighth line of (1) represents the area underneath the supply functions 
of forest residues and pulpwood (𝐹𝑅𝑓𝑡,𝑟,𝑡), where ft is element of a set consisting of forest 
residues and pulpwood. The second term of the eighth line in (1) includes the costs associated 
with livestock activities, where 𝑙𝑐𝑘 denotes the cost per unit of livestock category k (again 
employing Leontief production functions), which is assumed to be the same across all regions. 
Variable 𝐿𝐼𝑉𝑡,𝑘 represents the quantity of livestock k processed in year t. The last term represents 
the total cost of converting primary crops (corn, soybeans, sugarcane and sugar beet) to 
secondary (processed) commodities (oils, soymeal, refined sugar, and HFCS). The amount of 
processed primary crop i in year t is denoted by 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡,𝑖, and 𝑠𝑐𝑖 denotes the processing cost per 
unit of i.  
All the terms in the ninth line and the first two terms of the tenth line of (1) consists of 
costs accruing to the fuel sector. The first integral represents the area under the supply functions 
for gasoline from domestic producers and the ROW 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑡,𝑂 (where index o denotes the source of 
gasoline supply), whose consumption and price are to be determined endogenously. The second 
integral represents the area under the supply functions for petroleum diesel from domestic 
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producers, 𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡. The next two terms represent the processing costs of corn and cellulosic 
ethanol in the refinery, namely 𝐸𝑇𝐻𝑡,𝑐 and 𝐸𝑇𝐻𝑡,𝑏, followed by two terms representing the 
processing costs of biodiesel produced from biomass (denoted by 𝐵𝑇𝐿𝑡) and vegetable oils 
(denoted by 𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡,𝑗). Finally, the last term in (1) reflects the value of the remaining economic 
life of standing perennial grasses beyond the planning period T, denoted by 𝑣𝑟,𝑝, net of the return 
from the most profitable cropping alternative in region r, denoted by 𝑤𝑟. The latter is used to 
account for the opportunity cost of land.  
A.6.2 Constraints 
Gasoline kilometers (𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑡,𝑣) are produced by blending gasoline and ethanol, which are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes in generating kilometers travelled with per liter of ethanol 
providing two-thirds energy of per liter of gasoline. The amount of kilometers generated for each 
type of gasoline-based vehicles by the use of gasoline and ethanol is formulated in equation (2) 
below, where 𝐸𝑡,𝑣 and 𝐺𝑡,𝑣 represent the consumption of ethanol and gasoline for each type of 
vehicle and 𝛾𝑡,𝑣 is the fuel efficiency (kilometers per liter): 
 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑡,𝑣 = 𝛾𝑡,𝑣 [
2
3
𝐸𝑡,𝑣 + 𝐺𝑡,𝑣]  ∀𝑡 (2)  
We impose a minimum ethanol blending rate for gasoline vehicles in order to meet the 
oxygenate additive requirement, and also impose an upper limit for blending ethanol with 
gasoline for each type of vehicle. The latter is based on the technological characteristics of each 
vehicle type. Equation (3) below shows the gasoline demand and supply balance for the U.S. and 
the ROW markets:
 
 ∑ 𝐺𝑡,𝑣 + 𝐺𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑤
𝑣
= ∑ 𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑡,𝑂  ∀𝑡.
𝑂
 
(3)  
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Equation (4) below established the balance for the ethanol demand and supply. 
 ∑ 𝐸𝑡,𝑣
𝑣
= 𝐸𝑇𝐻𝑡,𝑐 + 𝐸𝑇𝐻𝑡,𝑏 + 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑡,𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙  ∀𝑡 
(4)  
 Similarly, we derive the production function of diesel kilometers that are produced by 
blending petroleum diesel and biodiesel. We incorporate the difference in energy contents 
between biodiesel produced from alternative sources and petroleum diesel, and use 𝜅𝑗 < 1 to 
represent this relationship. The amount of diesel kilometers generated is formulated in equation 
(5) below: 
 
𝑀𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 [𝜅𝑏𝐵𝑇𝐿𝑡 + ∑ 𝜅𝑗𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡,𝑗 + 𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑗
]  ∀𝑡 
(5)  
 The regional material balance equations link the production and usage of primary crops, 
as shown in constraint (6) for primary crop product i produced and marketed by region r: 
 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡,𝑟,𝑖 + {𝐶𝐸𝑡,𝑟}𝑖=𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛 ≤ ∑ 𝑦𝑟,𝑞,𝑖𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑞  ∀𝑡, 𝑟, 𝑖
𝑞
 
(6)  
where 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡,𝑟,𝑖 denotes the marketed amount of primary crop product i and 𝑦𝑟,𝑞,𝑖 is the yield of 
product i per unit of the land allocated to crop production activity q in region r. For corn, 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡,𝑟,𝑖 includes non-ethanol uses and 𝐶𝐸𝑡,𝑟 is the amount of corn converted to ethanol 
producers (which appears only in the balance constraint for corn). 
The amount of primary crop commodity i available in the market (excluding the corn 
used for ethanol) comes from the domestic supply of that commodity from all regions (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡,𝑟,𝑖). 
This total amount is either consumed domestically (𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑡,𝑖), exported (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡,𝑖), processed to 
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secondary commodities (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡,𝑖), or used for livestock feed (𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡,𝑖). This is expressed in 
constraint (7) below: 
 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑡,𝑖 + 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡,𝑖 + 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡,𝑖 + 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡,𝑖 ≤ ∑ 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡,𝑟,𝑖  ∀𝑡, 𝑖
𝑟
 
(7)  
 Similar to (7), a balance equation is specified for each processed commodity. Like 
primary commodities, processed commodities can also be consumed domestically, exported, or 
fed to animals, as shown in constraint (8) below: 
 
𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑡,𝑗 + 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡,𝑗 + 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡,𝑗 +
𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡,𝑗
𝑎𝑗
≤ ∑ 𝑣𝑖,𝑗𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡,𝑖
𝑖
+ {∑ 𝑣𝑖,𝑗𝐶𝐸𝑡,𝑟
𝑟
}
𝑗=𝑑𝑑𝑔,𝑖=𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛
  ∀𝑡, 𝑗 
(8)  
 
where 𝑎𝑗 is the conversion rate of vegetable oil j to biodiesel and 𝑣𝑖,𝑗 denotes the conversion rate 
of primary product i to processed product  j. A particularly important component of the model 
that links the crop and fuel sectors sector is the conversion of corn and cellulosic biomass to 
ethanol. During the conversion of corn to ethanol, a secondary commodity DDGS, is produced as 
a byproduct. The amount of DDGS produced is proportional to the amount of corn used for 
ethanol, 𝐶𝐸𝑡,𝑟 through a fixed conversion rate 𝑣corn,ddg, and it can either be fed to livestock as a 
substitute for corn or exported.  
The relations between biofuels production and crop production activities are expressed 
below: 
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 𝐸𝑡,𝑐 = 𝛼 ∑ 𝐶𝐸𝑡,𝑟
𝑟
  ∀𝑡 (9)  
 𝐸𝑡,𝑏 = 𝛽𝑒𝐵𝑀𝑡,𝑒𝑡ℎ  ∀𝑡 (10)  
 𝐵𝑇𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽𝑑𝑠𝑙𝐵𝑀𝑡,𝑑𝑠𝑙  ∀𝑡 (11)  
where 𝛼, 𝛽𝑒 and 𝛽𝑑𝑠𝑙 denote the amounts of biofuels produced from per unit of corn or cellulosic 
feedstocks.  
 Biomass can be utilized both for the production of liquid fuels for transportation and to 
generate electricity. The amount of biomass used for ethanol production, biodiesel production, 
and electricity generation at every CRD can not exceed the total production at that CRD, which 
is expressed in the accounting inequality below: 
 𝐵𝑀𝑟,𝑡,𝑒𝑡ℎ + 𝐵𝑀𝑟,𝑡,𝑑𝑠𝑙 + 𝐵𝑀𝑟,𝑡,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐
≤ ∑ 𝑏𝑦𝑟,𝑝𝐴𝐶𝑡,𝑟,𝑝
𝑝
+ ∑ 𝑟𝑦𝑟,𝑞𝐴𝐶𝑡,𝑟,𝑞
𝑞
+ ∑ 𝐹𝑅𝑓𝑟,𝑟,𝑡
𝑓𝑟
  ∀𝑡, 𝑟 
(12)  
where 𝑏𝑦𝑟,𝑝 and 𝑟𝑦𝑟,𝑞 are the biomass and crop residue yields in region r for respective perennial 
and crop production activities. The endogenous variable 𝐵𝑀𝑟,𝑡,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐 is the quantity of biomass 
from all feedstock types produced in CRD r and is utilized for electricity generation during year 
t. 
Land is the only primary production factor considered in the model. In each region, the 
total amount of land used for all agricultural production activities cannot exceed the available 
land (𝑎𝑙𝑡,𝑟), which is specified separately for irrigated and non-irrigated land categories. Due to 
the steady increase in biofuels consumption assumed in the model, the demand for agricultural 
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land is expected to increase through the conversion of marginal lands (not currently utilized) to 
cropland. The extent of conversion is assumed to depend on variations in crop prices over time. 
Therefore, in the model we determine the agricultural land supply ‘endogenously’. Specifically, 
for a given year t in the planning horizon T, we solve the model assuming a fixed regional land 
availability for each year of the 10-year production planning period ahead considered in that run. 
From the resulting multi-year equilibrium solution, we take the first-year values of the 
endogenous commodity prices and use them to construct a composite commodity price index 
(CPI). Based on the CPI generated thereby we adjust the land availability for the subsequent run 
(which considers another 10-year planning period starting with year t+1 in a rolling horizon 
framework). The land constraint is shown in (13). 
 ∑ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑞
𝑞
+ ∑ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑝
𝑝
≤ 𝑎𝑙𝑡,𝑟  ∀𝑡, 𝑟 
(13)  
 To prevent unrealistic changes and extreme specialization in land use, which may be 
particularly serious at regional level, we restrict farmer’s planting decisions to a convex 
combination (weighted average) of historically observed acreage patterns (ℎ𝑟,ℎ𝑡,𝑖) where 
subscript ht stands for the observed time periods prior to the base year. Historical land uses may 
be valid when simulating farmer’s planting decisions under ‘normal’ conditions. However, they 
may be too restrictive for future land uses given the increasing demand for biofuels which may 
lead to dramatically different land use patterns that are likely to occur in the future to produce the 
required bioenergy crops. To address this issue we introduce ‘hypothetical’ acreage patterns  
(ℎ𝑟,𝑛,𝑖
′ ) for each row crop and each region (Chen and Onal 2012). To generate hypothetical 
acreage patterns (crop mixes), we first use the historical data on prices and acreages of row crops 
in each region to estimate the acreage elasticities for each row crop with respect to its own price 
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and cross-price changes while controlling other factors, such as social- economic changes and 
time trend. Then we estimate a number of hypothetical acreages (crop mixes) using these price 
elasticities and considering a systematically varied set of crop prices. The resulting set of actual 
and hypothetical crop mixes are used in constraint (14) to limit the flexibility in planting 
decisions, where 𝜃𝑖,𝑞 represents the share of row crop i in production activity q and 𝑊𝑡,𝑟,∗ 
represents the weight assigned to historical or hypothetical crop mixes. The latter are defined as 
variables to be endogenously determined by the model.  
 ∑ 𝜃𝑖,𝑞𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑞
𝑞
= ∑ ℎ𝑟,ℎ𝑡,𝑖𝑊𝑡,𝑟,ℎ𝑡
ℎ𝑡
+ ∑ ℎ𝑟,𝑛,𝑖
′ 𝑊𝑡,𝑟,𝑛
𝑛
  ∀𝑡, 𝑟, 𝑖 (14)  
 The sum of the endogenous weights assigned to individual mixes must be less than or 
equal to 1 (convexity requirement), as shown in equation (15).  
 ∑ 𝑊𝑡,𝑟,ℎ𝑡
ℎ𝑡
+ ∑ 𝑊𝑡,𝑟,𝑛
𝑛
≤ 1  ∀𝑡, 𝑟 (15)  
 A similar set of crop mix constraints is also introduced for irrigated crops, which we do 
not show here, using only the historically observed irrigated land use patterns (no hypothetical 
mixes for irrigated crops). 
 
Since miscanthus is a non-native grass species, a large scale miscanthus production may 
have unforeseen impacts on biodiversity and water quality. To prevent extreme specialization in 
the production of perennial grasses in some regions, we restrict the land allocated to perennial 
grasses (miscanthus and switchgrass) not to exceed 25% of total land availability in each region  
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(𝑎𝑙𝑡,𝑟). The constraint is shown in (16).  
 ∑ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑝 ≤ 0.25𝑎𝑙𝑡,𝑟 ∀𝑡, 𝑟
𝑝
 
(16)  
In the livestock sector, we define production activity variables (number of animals) at 
national level for each category of livestock except the beef and dairy cattle. Cattle production is 
given special emphasis in the model for two reasons. First, cattle requires grazing land, therefore 
competes with crop production activities on total land in each region. Second, besides 
requirements of feed crops directly fed to different types of livestock, DDGS is also used as a 
feed item that may substitute other livestock feed crops. The regional cattle production activities 
are aggregated in equation (17) to obtain the total cattle activity at national level: 
 𝐿𝐼𝑉𝑡,𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 = ∑ 𝐶𝑇𝐿𝑡,𝑟
𝑟
  ∀𝑡 (17)  
where 𝐶𝑇𝐿𝑡,𝑟 is the number of cattle stock in region r and year t. Cattle supply is constrained by 
the grazing land availability. Therefore, for each region we specify the grazing rates and the 
supply of grazing land, 𝐺𝐿𝑡,𝑟,𝑔, where g denotes the type of grazing land (namely pasture land, 
forest land and cropland that can be used for grazing -such as wheat and oats). The latter is 
updated over time (for each region and land type) based on the expected livestock product prices 
and feed price index (similar to the way agricultural land is updated). Constraint (18) below 
relates the usage of grazing land and cattle activity in each region: 
 
𝐶𝑇𝐿𝑡,𝑟 ≤ ∑
𝐺𝐿𝑡,𝑟,𝑔
𝑔𝑎𝑟,𝑔
𝑔
  ∀𝑡, 𝑟 
(18)  
where 𝑔𝑎𝑟,𝑔 denotes the amount of grazing land required per unit of cattle. 
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Equations (19) and (20) establish the balances between nutrition needs of livestock 
activities, in terms of protein and calories, and the amounts of nutrients  provided by primary 
feed crops (grains) and byproducts of crops processing (i.e., soymeal and DDGS):  
 𝑛𝑟𝑘,𝑛𝑢𝐿𝐼𝑉𝑡,𝑘 = ∑ 𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑛𝑢𝐹𝑡,𝑖,𝑘
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝑛𝑐𝑗,𝑛𝑢𝐹𝑡,𝑗,𝑘
𝑗
  ∀𝑡, 𝑘 (19)  
 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡,𝑧 = ∑ 𝐹𝑡,𝑧,𝑘
𝑘
  ∀𝑡, 𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀𝑧 = 𝑖, 𝑗 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 (20)  
where 𝑛𝑐𝑧,𝑛𝑢 denotes the nutrition content per unit of feed item z, and 𝑛𝑟𝑘,𝑛𝑢 and 𝐹𝑡,𝑖(𝑗),𝑘 are the 
required amount of nutrient nu per unit livestock and the amount of feed item i or j used by 
livestock category k, respectively.  
 To avoid unrealistic changes in feed mixes, we impose historical feed mixes used by all 
livestock categories. Constraints (21) and (22) constrain the consumption of feed to be within a 
convex combination of historical feed uses. 
 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡,𝑧 = ∑ 𝑊𝐹𝑡,ℎ𝑡
ℎ𝑡
≤ 1 
(21)  
 ∑ 𝑊𝐹𝑡,ℎ𝑡 ≤ 1
ℎ𝑡
 
(22)  
where parameter ℎ𝑓𝑧,ℎ𝑡 denotes historical observed usage of feed crops, and 𝑊𝐹𝑡,ℎ𝑡 represents 
the weight assigned to historical feed crop mixes. We also impose appropriate upper bounds for 
DDGS to restrict the consumption of DDGS in total feed consumption for each type of livestock. 
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Livestock commodities can be consumed domestically or exported. The total supply of 
each livestock commodity is then related to the respective livestock production activity through a 
fixed yield coefficient, denoted by 𝑙𝑦𝑘. Constraint (23) establishes this relationship: 
 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑡,𝑘 + 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡,𝑘 ≤ 𝑙𝑦𝑘𝐿𝐼𝑉𝑡,𝑘  ∀𝑡, 𝑘 (23)  
Constrain (24) pertains directly to the electricity sector where it describes how electricity 
production by source is related to consumption. The quantity of electricity consumed is equal to 
the sum of all electricity produced from all sources considered: wind, coal, natural gas, fuel oil, 
geothermal, biomass, and other sources, including generation at new power plants, plus 
electricity transmitted from other regions (∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡,𝑡𝑒𝑟1,𝑎𝑡 ), minus electricity transmitted to 
other regions (∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡,𝑡𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡 ): 
 
𝑄𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡,𝑒𝑡 = 𝑄𝑊𝑒𝑟,𝑡 + ∑ (𝑄𝑅𝑒𝑡,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝑄𝑅bio,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑃𝑟,𝑡)
𝑟(𝑒𝑟)
+ ∑ 𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,𝑛𝑡,𝑡
𝑒𝑟
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡,𝑡
𝑒𝑟1,𝑎𝑡
− ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡,𝑡
𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡
  ∀𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 . 
(24)  
 
Electricity is generated or produced according to production functions with a fixed input-
output relationship (Leontief production functions). The generation of electricity from existing 
power plants is described by constraint (25) 
 𝑄𝑅𝑟,𝑡,𝑒𝑡 ≤ ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑟𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑡),𝑟,𝑡,old   ∀𝑟, 𝑡  (25)  
The amount of electricity generated from existing power plants (old) in CRD r, at time period t, 
from technology et is a function of the thermal efficiency of the power plant (heat-rate) and the 
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input of fossil fuel of type ff. This production does not apply to existing power plants do not use 
fossil fuels as an input (e.g. geothermal, wind, solar, and nuclear). 
The co-firing of biomass at existing coal power plants is described by constraint (26), 
where the coal-energy equivalent quantity of biomass that has been transported to CRD r, 𝐵𝐶𝑟,𝑡 
is converted to electricity using the coal power plant’s conversion efficiency. 
 𝑄𝑅𝑟,𝑡,bio ≤ ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙,𝑟𝐵𝐶𝑟,𝑡   ∀𝑟, 𝑡 (26)  
The percentage co-fired biomass is constrained to be ten percent or less of the amount of coal 
used at the power plant (27), on energy equivalent terms.14 
 0.1𝐹𝐹coal,𝑟,𝑡,old ≥ 𝐵𝐶𝑟,𝑡  ∀𝑟, 𝑡 (27)  
 Generation at existing power plants is subject to a capacity constraint. Constraint (28) 
describes how generation of electricity from technology et, in CRD r, at time period t must not 
be greater than the nameplate capacity 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡,𝑟 times the capacity factor 𝑐𝑓𝑒𝑡,𝑟, converted from 
megawatts to megawatt-hours by the parameter mw. 
 𝑄𝑅𝑟,𝑡,𝑒𝑡 ≤ 𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑐𝑓𝑒𝑡,𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑡,𝑟    ∀𝑟, 𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑡 ∉ {𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙} (28)  
Similarly for coal power plants (29), generation from coal and biomass sources can not be 
greater than the nameplate capacity times the capacity factor, converted to megawatt-hours. 
 𝑄𝑅𝑟,𝑡,coal + 𝑄𝑅𝑟,𝑡,bio ≤ 𝑚𝑤 ∗ 𝑐𝑓coal,𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑝coal,𝑟   ∀𝑟, 𝑡 (29)  
                                                 
14 Co-firing constraints at other percentages are examined in the sensitivity analyses. 
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Electricity generated from co-firing biomass can not be greater than the capacity already 
retrofitted, 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑟 plus the capacity that is converted 𝐶𝐹𝑟,𝑡 at time t for co-firing times the capacity 
factor, converted to megawatt-hours.15 
 𝑄𝑅𝑟,𝑡,bio ≤ 𝑚𝑤 ∗ ∑ 𝑐𝑓coal,𝑟(𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑟 + 𝐶𝐹𝑟,𝑡)
𝑡
𝑡=1
  ∀𝑟, 𝑡 (30)  
Generation occurring at new natural gas power plants is described by equation (31). Generation 
occurs at the EMR level with a thermal efficiency that is the same for all new power plants 
regardless of the state they locate in: 
 𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,ng,𝑡 ≤ 𝑛𝑟𝑛𝑔𝑁𝐺𝑀𝑒𝑟,𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑡  ∀𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 (31)  
where 𝑛𝑟𝑛𝑔 is the heat-rate of any new natural gas power plant. The natural gas balance 
equations relates natural gas used by the electricity and other sectors to the national quantity 
supplied: 
 𝑁𝐺𝑡 = 𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑡 + ∑ 𝑁𝐺𝑀𝑒𝑟,𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑡
𝑒𝑟,𝑎𝑔𝑒
  ∀𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 
(32)  
, where 𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑡 is the exogenous demand for natural gas from other sectors. 
 Electricity is generated at new dedicated bio-power plants according to constraint (33). 
The quantity of generation in EMR er at time period t,𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,bio,𝑡 is a function of the amount of 
biomass utilized at all bio-power plants within that EMR and a thermal efficiency that is the 
same for all new plants of that type: 
                                                 
15 Co-firing capacity conversion is updated across iterations according to the equation 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑟 = 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑟 + 𝐶𝐹𝑟,t=1. 
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 𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,bio,𝑡 ≤ ∑ 𝑛𝑟bio𝐵𝐷𝑟,𝑡
𝑟(𝑒𝑟)
  ∀𝑟(𝑒𝑟), 𝑡 
(33)  
where 𝑛𝑟bio is the heat-rate for any new dedicated biomass power plant and 𝐵𝐷𝑟,𝑡 is the quantity 
of biomass from any feedstock transported to CRD r that is used in a dedicated biomass power 
plant during year t.  
 Electricity is also generated as a co-product of the cellulosic ethanol refining process: 
 𝐶𝑃𝑟,𝑡 ≤ 𝑒𝑐𝑝 ∗ 𝐵𝑀𝑟,𝑡,𝑒𝑡ℎ  ∀𝑟, 𝑡, (34)  
where the quantity of coproduct electricity 𝐶𝑃𝑟,𝑡 is less than or equal to the amount of biomass 
from all feedstock types used to produce cellulosic ethanol times a constant that represents 
amount of electricity generate per ton of biomass ecp. 
 The amount of electricity generated from new power plants of other energy types: solar, 
geothermal, hydroelectric, and nuclear energy is constrained to be no greater than projections for 
these technologies from the AEO 2011. Constraint (35) describes how electricity generated from 
new sources of these types is considered in the model: 
 𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑡,𝑡 ≤ 𝑎𝑒𝑜𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑡,𝑡 (35)  
where 𝑎𝑒𝑜𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑡,𝑡 is a parameter that is an adjusted projection of electricity generated from 
technology type 𝑜𝑡 ∈ {ℎ𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜, 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟, 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙, 𝑛𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟} in EMR 𝑒𝑟 during year t.16  
It is necessary to transport biomass feedstocks from where it is produced to where it will 
be consumed for electricity generation. Constraint (36) describes how the biomass that can be 
                                                 
16 The AEO projection for these sources is adjusted by differencing the baseline quantity as of 2007 with the 
projected for each succeeding year and creating 𝑎𝑒𝑜𝑒𝑟,𝑜𝑡,𝑡 from it (EIA 2010a).  
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utilized to generate electricity is transported from the CRD that it is produced in to the CRD 
where it is used for electricity generation: 
 ∑ 𝐵𝑇𝑟1,𝑟2,𝑡
𝑟1
≥ 𝐵𝐷𝑟2,𝑡 + 𝐵𝐶𝑟2,𝑡  ∀𝑟, 𝑡. (36)  
 Biomass used for dedicated bio-power plants (𝐵𝐷𝑟,𝑡) and co-firing at existing coal power plants 
(𝐵𝐶𝑟,𝑡) at CRD r must be less than or equal to the quantity of biomass transported to that CRD 
from all other CRDs. Biomass that is transported to a power plant from where it is produced 
must not be greater than the amount of biomass produced in that CRD for the electricity sector: 
 ∑ 𝐵𝑇𝑟1,𝑟2,𝑡
𝑟2
≤ 𝐵𝑀𝑟,𝑡,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐  ∀𝑟, 𝑡. 
(37)  
The amount of biomass produced for the electricity sector, 𝐵𝑀𝑟,𝑡,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐 must be less than the 
amount of biomass produced minus that used for the production of liquid fuels for the 
transportation sector (constraint 12). 
Inter-regional transmission of electricity is constrained to only be allowed between 
adjacent regions and to not exceed historical levels by (38). 
 ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡,𝑡
𝑎𝑡
≤ 𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2   ∀𝑒𝑟1, 𝑒𝑟2, 𝑡 (38)  
where the variable 𝐼𝑇𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡,𝑡 is the quantity of electricity transmitted from 𝑒𝑟1 to 𝑒𝑟2 generated 
from technology type 𝑎𝑡, during year t. The parameter 𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2 constrains the quantity of 
electricity that can be transmitted from adjacent EMRs to a non-negative value and constrains the 
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amount of electricity that can be transmitted two non-adjacent EMRs to zero.17 Thus, the amount 
of electricity a given EMR imports from all other EMRs (𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑒𝑟,𝑡) is: 
 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑒𝑟,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡,𝑡
𝑒𝑟1,𝑎𝑡
  ∀𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 
(39)  
and the amount of electricity a given EMR exports to all other EMRs (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑒𝑟,𝑡) is: 
 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑒𝑟,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼𝑇𝑒𝑟1,𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡,𝑡
𝑒𝑟2,𝑎𝑡
 ∀𝑒𝑟, 𝑡 
(40)  
  It is assumed that once wind and dedicated biomass capacity is built it will be fully 
utilized over its lifetime on an annual basis. Constraints 41 and 42 ensure that generation from 
these sources can not decrease relative to the previous year.  
 𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,bio,𝑡 − 𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,bio,𝑡−1 ≥ 0 (41)  
and 𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,wind,𝑡 − 𝑄𝑀𝑒𝑟,wind,𝑡−1 ≥ 0 (42)  
Equation (43) accounts for total domestic GHG emissions generated from U.S. 
agricultural and transportation sectors. The first line of (39) includes GHG emissions from the 
production of conventional crops, perennial energy crops, and crop residues collection, while the 
second line consists of emissions from gasoline and petroleum diesel consumption and biofuel 
conversions. We use 𝛿𝑖 to denote unit lifecycle GHG intensity of transportation fuels/crop 
production. We use 𝛾𝑓𝑓 to denote fuel cycle GHG emissions from all power plant that burn fossil 
fuels. 
                                                 
17 Inter-regional transmission constraints are based on historical data as is described in the Data section. 
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𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑡 = ∑(𝛿𝑟,𝑞 + 𝛿𝑟,𝑞,𝑠)𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑞
𝑟,𝑞
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑟,𝑝𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑟,𝑝
𝑟,𝑝
+ 𝛿𝑔 ∑ 𝐺𝑡,𝑣
𝑣
+ 𝛿𝑑𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑏𝑡𝑙𝐵𝑇𝐿𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡,𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝛿𝑐𝐸𝑇𝐻𝑡,𝑐
+ 𝛿𝑏𝐸𝑇𝐻𝑡,𝑏 + ∑ 𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑟,𝑡
𝑓𝑓,𝑟
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑒𝑟,𝑡
𝑓𝑓,𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛿𝑠𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑡,𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙   ∀𝑡 
(43)  
The constraint for the regional RPS policy scenarios (44) is modeled as constraint on the 
proportion of electricity generated from renewable sources that is consumed in the region, thus 
allowing for inter-regional trading of electricity generated from renewables:18 
 𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑟,𝑡𝑄𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡,𝑎𝑡 ≤ 𝑄𝐸𝑒𝑟,𝑡,𝑟𝑡 − 𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑟𝑡   ∀𝑒𝑟, 𝑡. (44)  
The parameter 𝑟𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑟,𝑡 is the percentage of renewables required in region 𝑒𝑟 during year 𝑡 and 
𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑟𝑡 is the amount of generation from renewable sources that is ineligible to apply to RPS in 
region 𝑒𝑟 or energy type 𝑟𝑡. 
Constraint (45) establishes the consumption mandate specified by the Renewable Fuel Standard 
(RFS). The RFS is implemented as a blend mandate where biofuel (including ethanol and 
biodiesel) is blending with conventional fuel at exogenously given rates 𝜃𝑡: 
 
∑ 𝐸𝑡,𝑣
𝑣
+ 1.5𝐵𝑇𝐿𝑡 + 1.5 ∑ 𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡,𝑗 ≥ 𝜃𝑡 (∑ 𝐺𝑡,𝑣 + 𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑣
)
𝑗
 ∀𝑡. 
(45)  
 
                                                 
18 An adjustment is made to the qualifying renewable electricity generation for EMRs that have states where some 
existing renewable energy does qualify in achieve the RPS. 
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Parameters and Assumptions 
B.1 Introduction 
Here we detail the parameters and assumptions used in the electricity sector extension with 
BEPAM-E. A description of the parameters and assumptions applied to the agricultural and 
transportation sectors is available in Chen et al. (2014). 
B.2 Regional Electricity Demand 
Linear demand curves are used to model the demand for electricity generated across the US. The 
model includes a demand curve for each the 20 EMRs. In order to construct these regional 
demand curves linear demand curves are calibrated for each state and each electricity demand 
sector. The electricity demand sectors include residential, industrial, commercial, and 
transportation. These demand curves are calibrated with the quantity of electricity consumed in a 
given sector in a given state for the year 2007, and the average price paid by that sector in that 
state for the generation in 2007 (Table B.1) (EIA 2010b). These demand curves are all calibrated 
with the a price elasticity of demand with a value of -0.25 following Dubin and McFadden 
(1984) and EIA (2010a), which are at the low end of a range of estimates (Table B.2).19 These 
state and sector demand curves are then aggregated across all sectors and all states contained 
within a given an EMR to obtain aggregate demand curves for all retail sales of electricity in an 
EMR for 2007. Demand for electricity is assumed to grow at an annual rate of 0.7% following 
                                                 
19 Based on EIA’s NEMS parameter for commercial sector demand elasticity. 
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Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) (2012), for all EMRs across the time period of 2007-2030 (Table 
B.33). Demand curves consider electricity generation from any source or within any region as 
functional equivalents. 
 
B.3 Electricity Generation: Existing Power Plants 
Existing power plants are represented in the model at the CRD level. These CRD level power 
plants are obtained by taking a sum of the nameplate capacity of all power plants located within 
a given CRD and taking a capacity weighted average of the plants’ capacity factor and overall 
heat rate, where applicable by primary energy source. The data on power plant location, capacity, 
capacity factor, nominal heat rate, and primary fuel source are obtained from EPA’s eGRID 
database for the year 2007 (Table B.4). The energy sources considered are: coal, natural gas, oil, 
nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal, solar, wind, biomass, municipal waste, and other. These 
power plants are classified into different generation sources based on their primary fuel usage. 
This classification determines whether or not they require an input fuel source in the model, and 
if so what type. These CRD-level parameters are used to calibrate two constraints that describe 
generation: a capacity constraint and a production function/constraint. The capacity constraint is 
specified for all energy technology types and doesn’t allow more annual electricity generation 
than total nameplate capacity times the capacity factor times. The production function/constraint 
is only specified for generation technology types that require a fossil fuel input. This production 
function is specified as a linear production function where the fuel input times the inverse 
nominal heat rate must be less than or equal to the generation quantity. Power plants become 
more costly to operate as the age and eventually are retired, we represent this by imposing annual 
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capacity retirement rates by plant type (Table B.4). Retirement rates are calculated as the average 
of annual capacity retirement rates of plant by type from Electric Power Annual 2008-2010. 
 The co-firing of coal and biomass from any source (energy crops, crop residues, or forest 
residues) is an option for any existing coal plant in the model. In order for a coal power plant to 
co-fire biomass it must convert some of it existing capacity for co-firing. The conversion cost is 
assumed to be $120/KW of capacity (EIA 2010a). Co-firing of biomass is constrained to be no 
more than 10% of energy equivalent coal use at a given power plant. Co-firing capacity 
expansion reduces coal capacity by displacing it with the biomass used, this necessitates that an 
increase in co-firing of biomass requires a decrease in coal use if the plant is being run at full 
capacity. Therefore, in this model co-firing provides a double benefit for GHG emissions 
generating electricity from a biomass and reducing coal emissions by an equivalent amount. This 
assumption differs from that of Latta et al. (2013), where coal capacity can increase for co-firing 
not yielding the dual GHG benefit shown in this model.  
B.4 Electricity Generation: New Capacity 
Generation of electricity from new power plant capacity is modeled at the EMR level, excluding 
co-firing. The quantity of generation from new power plants is determined endogenously for 
natural gas, wind, co-firing, dedicated biomass, and co-product sources, while the expansion of 
other sources (nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, geothermal, and waste) are specified exogenously 
according to projections from the EIA AEO (2010a).   
 
The expansion of natural gas generation incurs both a levelized cost and an endogenous 
fuel cost. The levelized cost of natural gas based generation net of fuel cost includes the 
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annualized capital cost, and annualized transmission cost as well as the fixed and variable O&M 
costs. The levelized cost is $83.10 for a conventional combined-cycle power plant and is 
obtained from EIA AEO (2010a) and an estimated fuel costs of $45.30/MWh are subtracted to 
result in a levelized cost net of fuel of $37.80/MWh (Table B.5).  
The cost of generation from new wind turbine capacity is represented by upward sloping 
supply curves for wind energy resources. The data used to estimate these supply curves are from 
intermediate results of the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) on regional wind 
resources in terms of capacity, which was provided to the authors by EIA. These data are 
projections of the amount wind capacity that is available by region at multiples of a base capacity 
cost. We convert these capacity values to generation by multiplying by the ratio MWhs/MW per 
year and a capacity factor of 0.34 (Table B.5). The base cost used $148/MWh from the EIA 
levelized cost (Table B.5). The converted data are then in form of regional supply functions for 
MWhs of electricity from wind resources with a step-function functional form. In order to allow 
for more variation of the marginal cost of wind-based generation in between these discrete steps, 
these supply functions are linearized using ordinary least squares.  
The cost of generation for dedicated biomass power plant capacity is a function of an 
energy content of biomass, a heat rate that represents the efficiency of converting biomass into 
electricity, the endogenous power plant-gate price of biomass, a levelized cost, and a processing 
cost. The energy content of all biomass feedstock is assumed to be 8600 Btu/lbs. (Haq 2002).The 
heat rate assumed for dedicated biomass capacity is based on a thermal efficiency of 20% from 
Qin et al. (2006) for a biomass power plant where switchgrass is used as a feedstock. The 
levelized cost for a biomass power plant of $111/MWh is obtained from EIA AEO (2010a), 
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which is estimated to be without fuel cost $71.90/MWh. The cost of processing biomass of 
$18/MT is found from the average cost of different processing techniques (Koppejan and Loo 
2012).20 The price of biomass feedstock is determined endogenously. 
 
B.5 Biomass Transportation 
The data used to represent cost of transporting biomass for bioelectricity are based on the 
distance of transportation and a cost per mile per ton of biomass. The data representing the 
distance from the centroid every CRD to any other CRD are estimated using ArcGIS software. 
The cost of transporting a ton of biomass is assumed to be $0.212/mile (Searcy et al. 2007). Thus 
the costs of transporting biomass from any CRD to any other CRD is represented in the model. 
B.6 Natural Gas Supply 
A national natural gas supply function is specified annually. Given that the model’s 
starting year is 2007 and that there have been large changes in the natural gas market in north 
America in part due to the large expansion in shale gas extraction since then, we calibrate the 
annual natural gas supply curve based on observed data for 2007-2011 instead of having it 
increase or decrease at a fixed rate. The annual supply curves are calibrated based on annual 
production and average wholesale price (EIA 2010b), and a price elasticity of supply of 0.48 
(Fischer 2010) selected as the median from a range of studies (Table B.2). The specification of 
the supply curves for all years after 2011 are based on an AEO projected annual growth rate of 
1.4% for price and quantity of natural gas (Table B.3). Sources of natural gas demand apart from 
that of the electricity sector are specified exogenously for the years 2007-2011 based on 
                                                 
20 The processing techniques are: breaking and shredding, grinding, pulverization, mechanical separation, and 
pelletizing; converted to USD. 
 140 
 
observed consumption, a growth rate of 0.4% is specified for all years following 2011 based on 
AEO projections (EIA 2012). 
The natural gas transmission, distribution, and markup parameter is used in the model to 
describe the difference between the wellhead price of natural gas and power plant-gate price of 
natural gas and the difference in this power plant-gate price of natural gas across regions. This 
parameter is calculated from the difference between the national average wellhead price of 
natural gas in 2007 and the weighted-average regional delivered price of natural gas in 2007 
calculated from the State Energy Data System (EIA 2010b).  
B.7 Electricity Transmission 
All electricity that is generated must be transmitted and distributed to end-use consumers. 
Electricity generation incurs a transmission cost of $0.007 per kWh and a distribution cost of 
$0.021 per kWh (EIA 2007). There is also a loss of energy as it is transmitted to consumers that 
is assumed to be 8% following GREET (2013). Inter-regional electricity transmission between 
adjacent EMRs is allowed for. This inter-regional transmission is subject to transmission 
capacity constraints based on historically observed levels (EIA 2011a). 
B.8 Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 Renewable Portfolio Standards is generally a mandate that requires a minimum 
percentage of retail sales of electricity be generated from renewable energy sources. In this 
analysis RPSs described by existing law at the state level evaluated. State level RPSs data that 
describes existing legislation is obtained from DSIRE (2010). DSIRE maintains an extensive 
database of attributes of state level RPSs. This study utilizes the annual implementation schedule 
of RPSs, the load proportion of state generation that the RPS applies to, the qualifying renewable 
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sources, the date at which the RPS becomes effective, and the dates at which the renewable 
energy capacity must have been built by in order to qualify from this database.  
The RPSs are implemented by a schedule at which the RPS increases annually or bi-
annually until it reaches its target rate. As annual data is necessary for the model, it is assumed 
that for states that have a bi-annual or irregular RPS implementation schedule that RPS increases 
linearly between any two years which the RPS is specified for. RPS reach their target maximum 
percentage at different years ranging from as early as 2016 to as late as 2025; it is assumed that 
this target RPS must be maintained for all succeeding years.  
For a number of states renewable energy capacity built before a legally specified year 
does not qualify for the RPS. In order to adjust the RPS constraint in the model for this, we 
calculate a parameter that represents the amount of renewable generation not eligible for the 
RPS. This parameter is assumed to be the quantity of electricity generation from renewable 
energy sources in the year prior to eligibility from the State Energy Data System (2010b). 
 
B.9 Life Cycle Analysis 
Life cycle analysis, which determines all of the emissions incurred from using a particular 
fuel for electricity generation is used to estimate the GHG emission resulting from the from coal, 
natural gas, and oil based generation (Table B.7). These values are: These electricity sector Life 
Cycle emission are added to a GHG accounting equation that captures the life-cycle emissions 
across the agricultural, transportation, and electricity sectors. 
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B.10 Learning by Doing 
 The model allows for learning- by-doing based on cumulative production with a 
technology to reduce the costs of production in the case of wind based electricity and dedicated 
bio-power plants. The quantity of wind based generation or dedicated biomass generation is used 
to update the cost of generation from these sources based on a technology specific learning rate. 
The annual learning rate for wind generation is 8% and 15% for dedicated bio-power (McDonald 
and Schrattenholzer 2001). 
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B.11 Tables 
Table B.1: Electricity Price and Consumption 
 
State 
Average 
Price 
2007 
($/Mwh) 
Average 
Price 
2011 
($/Mwh) 
Total 
Consumption 
2007 (Thou. 
Mwh) 
Total 
Consumption 
2011 (Thou. 
Mwh) 
AL 76.6 92.4 91828 88995 
AR 70.2 75.1 47055 47928 
AZ 85.4 97.1 77193 74944 
CA 128.4 130.8 264235 261942 
CO 77.8 94.2 51299 53458 
CT 164.4 163.5 34129 29859 
DC 117.9 128 12110 11562 
DE 113.8 115.1 11869 11483 
FL 103.3 106.1 231085 225090 
GA 78.6 96.1 137454 136371 
IA 68.3 75.6 45270 45655 
ID 50.7 64.4 23755 23272 
IL 84.8 90 146055 142886 
IN 65.2 80.3 109420 105818 
KS 68.5 89.1 40166 40760 
KY 58.6 72 92404 89538 
LA 84.5 77.7 79567 86369 
MA 151.6 141.1 57139 55570 
MD 115 119.3 65391 63600 
ME 145.9 125.8 11860 11415 
MI 85.4 104.3 109297 105054 
MN 74.5 86.8 68231 68533 
MO 65.6 83.2 85533 84255 
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Table B.1: Electricity Prices and Consumption (Continued) 
State 
Average 
Price 
2007 
($/Mwh) 
Average 
Price 
2011 
($/Mwh) 
Total 
Consumption 
2007 (Thou. 
Mwh) 
Total 
Consumption 
2011 (Thou. 
Mwh) 
MS 81 88.7 48153 49338 
MT 71.7 82.8 15532 13788 
NC 78.3 86.5 131881 131085 
ND 64.3 75.1 11906 13737 
NE 62.8 78.8 28248 29676 
NH 139.8 147.4 11236 10869 
NJ 130.3 143.1 81934 76860 
NM 74.9 88.4 22267 23042 
NV 100.2 90.2 35643 33916 
NY 152.2 158.9 148178 144047 
OH 79.4 90.6 161771 154746 
OK 73 78.2 55193 59847 
OR 70.1 80.4 48697 47171 
PA 91.1 104.8 151573 148757 
RI 131.1 130.4 8013 7732 
SC 71.8 88 81948 80489 
SD 68.9 80.5 10603 11680 
TN 70.9 93 106717 100733 
TX 101.8 90.9 343829 376065 
UT 64.4 71.6 27785 28859 
VA 71.3 88.4 111570 110228 
VT 120.4 138 5864 5550 
WA 63.9 68.3 85742 93725 
WI 85 102.4 71301 68612 
WV 53.6 79 34184 31239 
WY 53.3 66.2 15536 17418 
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Table B.2: Demand and Supply Elasticities 
Function Estimates Sources 
Electricity Demand -0.25 (Acton, Mitchell and Sohlberg 
1980; Dubin and McFadden 
1984; EIA 2010a; Espey and 
Espey 2004; Reiss and White 
2005) 
 -0.25 to -0.7 
Natural Gas Supply 0.48 (Dahl and Duggan 1996; Fischer 
2010)  0.09 - 3.10 
 
Table B.3: Demand and Supply Growth Rates 
 Growth 
rate (%) 
Source 
Regional Electricity demand 0.7 (EIA 2010a) 
State Coal Price 1.4 (EIA 2012) 
Natural Gas Production 1.4 (EIA 2012) 
Non-electricity Natural Gas Demand 0.4 (EIA 2012) 
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Table B.4: Attributes of Existing Power Plant Capacity 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 In the model capacity is summed by technology type and CRD, a CRD weighted average heat rate is found by technology type, weighted by 2007 net 
generation. 
22 Fixed O&M cost that are given in $/MW are converted to $/MWh based on an average capacity factor by technology. 
23 These are delivered fuel prices for the electric power sector by state.  
24 Found by calculating the average of the annual retirement rate by power plant type from EIA Electric Power Annual 2008-2010. 
Generation 
Technology 
Total 
capacity 
(MW) 
Average 
Capacity 
Factor 
Average 
Heat 
rate 
(MMBtu 
/MWh) 
O&M 
Costs 
($/MWh) 
Average 
Fuel 
Cost 
($/MWh) 
Average 
Cost 
($/MWh) 
Capacity 
Retirement 
Rate 
(Annual) 
References 
Existing capacity                
Coal 374067 0.59 10.42 5.50 21.83 27.33 0.27% Capacity, capacity 
factor, and heat rate: 
EPA (EPA 2010a)21. 
 O&M costs: (UCS 
2011)22. 
 Fuel price: (EIA 
2010b).23  
Retirement Rate: (EIA, 
2008-2010).24  
Geothermal 3181 0.57 
 
32.50 
 
32.50     0.22% 
Hydroelectric 97031 0.30 
 
5.90 
 
5.90 0.01% 
Natural Gas 429740 0.16 9.90 5.20 70.85 76.05 0.75% 
Nuclear 107270 0.88 
 
19.40 
 
19.40  
Fuel Oil 33554 0.04 12.66 3.80 115.38 119.18 2.12% 
Other 2655 0.41 
 
3.80 
 
3.80 1.53% 
Solar 448 0.16 
 
6.40 
 
6.40  
Waste 1023 0.55 
 
11.20 
 
11.20  
Wind 15823 0.26 
 
17.60 
 
17.60 0.01% 
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Table B.5: Attributes of New Power Plant Capacity 
                                                 
25 Using 2011 electricity sector natural gas price of $4.78/MMBtu, and a delivered and processed price of biomass of $90/MT. 
26 For conventional combustion turbine. 
27 The levelized cost used here is net of estimated fuel costs, and therefore represents capital, O&M, and transmission costs. 
28 It is assumed that co-firing may use up to 10% of existing coal capacity, corresponding with an equivalent decrease in coal capacity. 
29 Co-fired biomass is assumed to burn at the same efficiency as coal at that plant. Qin et al. (2006) finds that co-firing has about a 32% thermal efficiency for 
switchgrass at the 10% level. 
30 Converted from gallons based on 83 gallons per MT. 
31 Where 100% switchgrass feedstock is fired at 20% thermal efficiency. 
32The levelized cost used here is net of estimated fuel costs, and therefore represents capital, O&M, and transmission costs.  
33 The levelized cost is used as a base cost parameter to calibrate the wind supply functions. 
34 Regional wind availability data were provided to the authors by the EIA, which are from intermediate results of the National Energy Modeling System 
(NEMS). These data are in the form of wind capacity by region available at multiples of a base cost.  
Generation 
Technology 
Total 
capacity 
(MW) 
Average 
Capacity 
Factor 
Average 
Heat rate 
(MMBtu 
/MWh) 
O&M, 
Levelized, 
or capital 
cost 
Estimated 
Fuel 
Cost25 
($/MWh) 
Average 
Cost 
Learning 
Rates (%) References 
New capacity                 
Natural Gas   9.26 $37.8 
/MWh 
44.3 $82.1 
/MWh 
 Heat rate: (UCS 2011)26 
Levelized cost: (AEO, 2010).27 
Co-firing 0 - 3740628 0.59 10.42 $5.5/MWh 
+$120/kW 
49.5 $55.0/MWh 
+ $120/kW 
 Capacity, capacity factor, and heat 
rate for coal: EPA (2010a).29 
 
Co-product   125 n/a n/a   Heat rate: (Humbird et al. 2011)30 
Dedicated 
Biomass 
  17 $71.9 
/MWh 
80.5 $152.4 
/MWh 
10% Heat rate: Qin et al. (2006),31 
levelized cost EIA (AEO, 2010)32 
Wind    $148 
/MWh 
 $148.0 
/MWh 
8% Levelized cost EIA AEO (2010). 33 
Data from EIA NEMS.34 
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Table B.6: Learning Rates 
Learning Curve parameter Wind Dedicated biomass Data Sources 
Initial Cost ($/MWh) 148 71.9 (EIA 2010a) 
Learning rate (%) 8 15 (McDonald and 
Schrattenholzer 
2001) 
Initial stock of generation (M MWh) 383.0 776.2 Author’s 
estimate35 
 
 
                                                 
35 Cumulative generation of all wind energy or bioenergy for all sectors, from 1990-2010, EIA detailed State Data 
System. 
